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... PREFACE 
This evaluation of European Union Aid managed by the Commission (hereafter called European 
Community or EC aid) to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries is  part of the global evaluation 
of EC aid  requested in  June  1995  by the  EU  Council of Ministers responsible for Development 
Cooperation. The global evaluation was  to draw lessons from experience in  order to  prepare the 
future  aid  policy  of the  EC  and  to  improve  the  effectiveness,  efficiency  and  transparency  of 
European aid instruments and procedures. It  was to include aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries, to Asia and Latin America, and to the Mediterranean region. 
This evaluation of EC aid to ACP countries has involved three phases: 
1.  The  desk  study  phase  involved  collecting  and  analysing  existing  information  on  aid 
programmes and  instruments,  including previous  evaluations, and selecting a  representative 
sample of countries and regions. (August 1996-July 1997) 
2.  The field phase involved visiting the  selected sample of countries to  examine the quality of 
policy dialogue between the Commission and the ACP governments, donor coordination and 
the  operation  of arrangements  for  aid  implementation.  Vis  its  were  made  to  six  countries 
(Zimbabwe, Tanzania,  Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroun, Liberia,  and Jamaica) and one  region (the 
Eastern  Caribbean).  In  these  visits,  we  paid  as  much  attention  as  was  possible  to  the 
operation of other donors, particularly Member States.  This is  important given our emphasis 
on the  work of aid as  a  whole, and its  importance is  reflected in  this report (see for example 
section  2.5 ).  This  phase  also  included an  examination of the  process  by  which  ACP-EC 
development policies are formulated. (lanuar.v-September 1998) 
3.  The synthesis phase has  involved summarising and drawing the most important conclusions 
from the evidence of the desk and field study phases, with a particular to view providing clear 
recommendations on the future direction of EC aid. (Mid-September to mid-November 1998) 
This is the report of the synthesis phase of the ACP evaluation.  It is  based on the reports from the 
previous  two  phases  and  selected  recent  documents.  It  focuses  on  a  few  key  arguments  and 
recommendations.  The  reports  from  the  previous  phases  constitute  an  integral  part  of  this 
synthesis report.  While their main conclusions and evidence have been included in  this synthesis 
report,  the  synthesis report  uses  evaluation criteria  that allow  a  clear focus  on the  key  priority 
objectives (particularly poverty reduction), institutional strengthening and donor coordination.  Of 
necessity.  much of the- richness of the evaluation,  particularly the  country studies,  has  not been 
fully captured in this report. 
This evaluation  report covers  aid  to  ACP countries  managed by the Commission in  the  period 
since  1985.  Trade issues and humanitarian aid (ECHO) fall  outside the scope of this evaluation. 
Within  the  Commission.  the  evaluation  focuses  on  the  operations  of DG  VITI  ~nd associated 
delegations. 
The authors of this evaluation report are Carlos Montes (overall coordinator), Stefano Migliorisi 
and  Toby  Wolfe.  They  acknowledge  the  valuable  advice  provided  by  Andrew  Bird.  The 
evaluation  has  benefited  from  consultations  with  Commission  officials  in  headquarters  and 
delegations. 
The  evaluation  was  supervised  by  the  Working  Group  of  Heads  of  Evaluation  Services 
(Development)  of  the  European  Union  and  the  European  Commission.  The  European 
Commission funded the evaluation. 
Those  H:ishing  to  obtain further copies of this  report,  or copies of the  reports from the  earlier 
phases of the evaluation, should contact the Head of the Evaluation Unit,  Common Service Relex 
of  the European Commission.  Eight reports are available from the field phase of  the evaluation-
seven Case Stud}' reports and the Case Stud}' Synthesis. Executive summary 
This  is  an  executive summarv of the  Evaluation  of European  Union  Aid (Managed by  the  Commission)  to  African 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)  Counrries.  This  evaluation  1s part of the  Rlobal evaluation of EU aid requested by the 
Council of  Ministers responsible for Development Cooperation in June 1995. 
This  report is  based on  the findinRS  of an  evaluation process which  included a desk  study and field case studies in  6 
countries and I reRion.  The evaluation benefited from consultations  ~vith Commission officials. and supervision by the 
WorkinR  Group of Heads of Evaluation Sen•ices (Development) of the EU Member States and the Commission.  The 
executive summary provides a strategic overview of  the main conclusions and recommendations. 
In  this report,  European Union aid managed by the Commission is referred to as European Community aid (EC aid) to 
distinguish ir from  Member State bilateral aid. 
If the  European Community is  to  help meet 
the  OECD development targets - especially 
that  of reducing  by  half  the  proportion  of 
people living in  extreme poverty by the year 
2015- and if it is  to build a new partnership 
with ACP countries, EC aid programmes 
must be  results-oriented.  This evaluation of EC 
aid  since  1985  (policy,  results  and  Commission 
activities)  has  been  guided by principles derived 
from  donor  experience  for  making  aid 
programmes more results-oriented and effective: 
Key principles for results-oriented and effective aiel 
I.  Clear objectives. Aid should focus on a small number of clear objectives which should be the bottom line for 
aid organisations.  The central  objectives  of aid  have been defined at the highest political  levels as  poverty 
reduction and a higher quality of life for all people. 
2.  Focus on strenRthening institutions and policies.  'Aid can only be as effective as the policy, economic, and 
administrative environment in  which it operates' (DAC 1985). Donors should focus less on the disbursement of 
funds and more on  helping to  strengthen the policies and institutions of those governments committed to reform 
('ownership' and 'selectivity'). 
3.  Donor coordination.  Aid is  typically  fungible.  Donors should  be  concerned with the quality of the entire 
framework  of public  expenditure  management.  and  not  just  with  their  own  interventions.  Donors  should 
therefore  act  together.  Each  should  act  on  its  strengths,  taking  into  account the  activities  of other  donors 
( 'complementarit_v '). 
4.  Transparency and accountability are necessary for critical monitoring of results, for improving the operation 
of aid organisations, and for winning greater public support. 
t  Principles  based  on:  the  operational  lessons  of the  OECD/DAC  1985  'Review of Twenty-Five Years  of Development 
Cooperation' I  also quoted in the  'DAC Principles for Effective Aid', 1992): the OECD/DAC 1996 'Shaping the 2l"t Century': 
and the World Bank Policy Research Report· Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn't and Why'. 1998. 
Policy 
Has EC-ACP aid policy matched these principles? 
The policies and approach of EC aid have in 
a number of respects become more in  line with 
the  key  principles  for  effective  aid: 
•  Poverty  reduction  and  other  priority 
objectives  have  become  more  explicit 
objectives  of EC  development cooperation 
with  ACP  countries.  For  example, 
democratisation  and  human  rights  have 
been given a central place in Lome IV bis. 
However,  the  focus of aid policy  has  been 
affected by the escalation of objectives and 
instruments  introduced  by  Lome 
Conventions,  Council  Resolutions  and 
special budget lines. Executive Summary 
•  There has  been a gradual policy shift from 
aid  being  an  ·entitlement'  for  all  ACP 
countries.  to  ·good·  policies  and 
institutions  being  emphasised,  particularly 
through  'conditionality'  (Lome  IV).  While 
the  EC's  conditionality  has  been  more 
flexible  than  that  of  many  donors.  policy 
conditionality in  some cases has contributed 
to weaker local ownership of reforms. 
•  Donor  coordination  policies  have  been 
weak for most of the  period covered by  this 
evaluation.  However,  since  Maastricht 
there  has  been  consistent  pressure  by  the 
Council  of  Ministers  and  often  by  the 
Commission on  the  need for  European aid 
programmes to  work  in  the  same direction. 
Coordination at  international  level  has  also 
begun to be tested in  the field. 
•  Progress  in  increasing  transparency  and 
accountability  has  been  limited. 
Information  available  on  EC  aid  is  still 
difficult  to  obtain.  The  recent 
reorganisation  should  enhance 
accountability.  However, the placing of the 
merged  evaluation  unit  within  the  new 
implementation  service  (Common  Service) 
ratses  concerns  over  its  independence  and 
impartiality. 
It  remains  the  case,  however,  that  EC  aid 
policies  make  it  difficult  for  the  Commission 
to be results-oriented.  Progress has been slow 
in  identifying  a  role  for  EC  aid  which  would 
allow  it  to  concentrate  its  activities  where  its 
Results 
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strengths lie,  taking into account the activities 
of  other  donors  (cmnplementarit_v).  EC  aid 
results have  not been adequately monitored by 
the  EU  Member  States  or  the  Commission. 
Policy-makers,  who  do  not  have  sufficient 
feedback  from  the  field,  have  added  to  the 
constraints  imposed  by  Lome  on  the 
Commission,  further  reducing  its  operational 
flexibility.  As a consequence, there has been a 
mismatch between an expanding policy agenda 
and  the  Commission's  capacity  to  implement 
this agenda. 
These  policy  outcomes  are  explained  by  the 
complexity  and  fragmentation  of  the 
development policy formulation process within 
the  EC.  There  is  weak  coordination between 
the main actors in  this process.  There are weak 
links between the EDF Committee, the Council 
of Ministers,  the  ACP-Fin  and  other Council 
working  groups,  and  the  development  and 
budgetary  committees  of  the  European 
Parliament.  The role of the EDF Committee in 
enhancing coordination  has  not  been  realised. 
In  addition,  each  Member  State  has  its  own 
particular policy  emphasis,  and even within  a 
Member State there may be weak coordination, 
for instance  between finance and development 
ministries.  Member States are  involved at all 
stages  of the  policy  formulation  process,  but 
their level of representation and their degree of 
involvement are variable. 
Results achieved by EC aid in ACP countries 
EC  aid  has  often  had  limited  impact  on  the 
priority  objectives of poverty  reduction,  good 
governance  (including  democracy  and  human 
rights),  gender equality  and  the  protection  of 
the environment. 
Some  targeted  programmes  and  budget  lines 
(e.g.  micro-projects,  and  the  budget  line  for 
democratisation  and  human  rights)  have 
addressed these objectives  with  some success, 
although  at  a  localised  level  and  often  with 
high administrative costs. 
EC  aid  has  had  more  success  in  delivering 
immediate  project  outputs,  including  physical 
outputs,  than  in  following  a  policy-based 
approach (i.e.  than in  working with committed 
governments  to  strengthen  institutions  and  in 
coordinating with other donors).  However, our 
country  visits  found  evidence  of  moves 
towards  a  policy-based  approach,  with 
enhanced sectoral policy dialogue. Executive Summary  iii 
Some EC aid results 
Programme aid.  The Commission's participation in  structural adjustment operations is facilitating its transition 
to being a policy-based donor.  However, the Commission's interventions have often had similar weaknesses to 
those of the Bretton Woods instltutions.  The Commission has often faced difficulties in  achieving institutional 
objectives.  The  effectiveness  of Stabex  and  Food  Aid  has  been  limited  in  the  past  because  they  did  not 
adequately address the policy environment. 
Project aid.  Too strong a focus  on  physical outputs has often meant that key  sectoral policy constraints have 
not been addressed. This has contributed to low sustainability of most projects.  Nevertheless, when measured 
in  terms of physical  outputs  the  results of EC  aid  were often  good, especially in  the  transport  sector and in 
infrastructure-building, because of the Commission's expertise in these areas.  While it is too early to assess the 
impact of the  adoption of a more policy-based approach, we  found some evidence that the approach has been 
most successfully adopted m the health and transport sectors. 
The relatively  good  performance  of EC  Micro-projects  (and  to  a  lesser degree of cooperation  with  NGOs) 
suggests that close contact with  direct beneficiaries helps to  improve the design, delivery and sustainability of 
interventions.  In  contrast  to  these  participatory  interventions.  the  weak  commitment  of ACP countries  to 
regional organisations has  Jed  in  the past to weak results in  regional cooperation programmes.  However, the 
Commission has  adopted  innovative  approaches  in  its  more  recent interventions  (e.g.  support  to  the  Cross 
Border Initiative). 
What explains these results? 
Our country visits confirmed that the principles 
of local commitment and capacity and of donor 
coordination,  which  affect  all  donors,  are  as 
central as  the  petformance of the  Commission 
(which  is  evaluated  in  the  next  section)  in 
explaining EC aid results. 
•  The  capacity  and  commitment  of ACP 
governments.  The EC' s early approach, in 
which  aid  was  an  'entitlement',  involved 
little  'selectivity'.  and  meant  that  support 
was  given  to  states  with  limited 
commitment  to  ·good'  institutions  and 
policies.  However,  the  move  to 
·conditionality',  following  the  move  of the 
Bretton Woods institutions in  this direction, 
often has not encouraged local  commitment 
to  reforms.  Moreover.  in  many  countries, 
weak  civil  services  have  had  limited 
capacity  to  prepare,  supervise  and 
coordinate  donor  interventions.  This  has 
affected EC  aid  in  particular,  given  its  co-
management  with  ACP  governments. 
Competition  among  donors  for  rapid 
implementation of their  own  interventions, 
under their own procedures, has  resulted in 
donors  setting  up  parallel  government 
structures which weaken further, rather than 
strengthen, government institutions. 
•  Weak donor coordination has contributed 
to  insufficient  complementarity.  Donors, 
including the Commission, have often tried 
to  be  present  in  most  sectors  and 
particularly in  the most popular sectors (e.g. 
recently  education  and  health).  Donors 
have  done  this  without  adequately  taking 
into  account  the  overall  needs  of  the 
country,  the  activities  of other  donors,  or 
where  their  own strengths  lie.  The  quality 
of donor interventions has  been affected by 
limited information-sharing, the insufficient 
number of joint actions (such as monitoring, 
evaluation,  appraisal  and  programming), 
and  limited  co-financing.  Donors' 
incentives  to  focus  on  aid  disbursements 
rather than  results, and differences between 
donors  in  organisational  set-ups  and  in-
country capacity, have contributed to  weak 
coordination. 
•  The  Commission's  performance  in 
managing aid, presented in the next section 
(activity  by  activity),  1s  central  to 
explaining  EC  aid  results.  This 
petformance  reflects  both  constraints 
imposed on the Commission and limitations 
within it (see final section). Executive Summary  IV 
Activities 
The Commission's performance in managing EC aid 
The country visits found a recent improvement in  the Commission· s policy dialogue with a number of ACP 
governments, particularly in  indicative programming and sectoral dialogue.  However. results vary widely. 
Aid management continues to be  strongly affected hy burdensome administrative procedures and problems 
with technical assistance. while quality support and monitoring are still weak.  However. the introduction of 
Project Cycle \1anagement hJs led to some improvements in project preparation.  Finally. we found that in-
country donor coordination is  still mostly limited to information-sharing. 
Polic_v preparation at headquarters 
In  some  ret:ent  case..,,  the  Commission  has  increased  its  consultation  with  experts  in  Member  States  and  other 
stakeholders.  However, the  Commission has  been unable to persuade policy-makers of the need to adopt a  strategic 
role  for  EC  aid  and  to  recogmse  the  CommissiOn's  constraints.  In  its policy  function,  it  faces  difficulties  in  the 
incorporation of the prionty objectives into EC aid, and in  monitoring them. 
Policy dialogue with ACP governments 
Indicative programming has been strengthened for  EDF8.  Consultations with ACP governments and Member States 
have become more extensive in  many cases.  The EDF8 Strategy Papers are often more analytical than  the previous 
Pre-Programming documents.  However, we often found insufficient concentration of EC interventions and insufficient 
select1v1ty in  the choice of focal sectors. 
Dialogue.  (  i) Overall economic dialogue.  At  headquarters,  the Commission has supported the programmes of the 
Bretton Woods im.titutwns while using international  forums effectively (such as  the Special Programme for Africa) to 
support  the  social  dimensions  of  adjustment.  local  ownership  of reforms  and  improvements  in  ACP  budgetary 
institutions.  However,  in-country  mvolvement in  economic policy dialogue  and  participation in  public expenditure 
reviews have often  been  limited  by  staffing constraints.  (  ii) Sectoral policy dialogue.  The Commission was  often 
found to be effective, although results varied widely, in  part due to the high administrative demands of EC aid (see next 
page). 
In-countrv donor coordination  is  mostly  limited  to information  shanng but we  found  progress in  some countries we 
visited. particularly Cote d'Ivoire and Lihena.  Success in  donor coordination and policy dialogue was found to depend 
strongly on the expertise and staffing of delegatJons. 
Afanagement o.fprogrammes and projects 
Preparation.  Some improvements in quality have resulted from the introduction of Project Cycle Management in  1993. 
However. there 1s  still insufficient rigour and consultation in project identification, and insufficient clarity and realism 
in design.  Priority objectives remain difficult to incorporate. 
Preparation is also affected by an excessive reliance on consultants and by insufficient quality support and peer review. 
In  the  past,  because  of  the  EDF  Committee's  limited  technical  capadty.  it  was  possible  for  interventions  to  be 
processed without adequate scrutmy.  The quality review process has recently been reinforced through the creation of 
an internal Quality Support Group. 
Implementation has often been characterised by (i) delays. (ii) inefficient administrative controls. (iii) weak monitoring 
of on-going projects, and (tv) problems with technical assistance. 
Extensive  ex  11nte  admmi~trativc  and  financial  controls,  which  result  from  EC  financial  arrangements  and  the 
Commission·~ 'visa'  culture. are  extremely time-consuming and  incffic1cnt.  They arc carried out without selectivity 
and 1n1pose  high costs. particularly on delegations.  Ex post financial  audits,  on the other hand.  have not been  used 
systematically.  At the same time, weak monitoring of the performance of on-going projects has resulted in insufficient 
flexibility in EC interventions. 
The high  administrative demands of EC  aid  have  often resulted  in  excessive reliance on  technical  assistance (TA), 
which  nominally  supports ACP governments  but in  practice also supports central Commission functions.  This dual 
responsibility of TA has weakened both accountability and its  contribution  to  strengthening the insritutions of ACP 
governments. 
Evaluations, transparency and accountability 
Evaluation.  In recent years the Commission has carried out many ex post evaluations.  While the quality of evaluations 
is mixed,  the  design of some new  projects is  beginning to  benefit  from  the  lessons  learned.  The dissemination of 
evaluations has improved but is still limited.  Joint evaluations with other donors are still infrequent 
Transparency in  Commission activities is limited by the complexity of EC aid.  Activities are scrutinised by a number 
of EU institutions, including the Court of Auditors, and also by  DAC Peer Reviews (one of which has recently been 
completed).  However, this is done in a fragmented way.  Public information on EC aid, particularly using electronic 
media, is still limited. Executive Summary  v 
What explains the Commission's performance? 
The  Commission  has  been  focused  not  on 
achieving  results  - on  reducing  poverty - but 
on  administrative  procedures  and  levels  of 
disbursement.  While  this  in  part  reflects 
constraints imposed on the Comrnission, it also 
reflects  limitations  within  the  Commission. 
The  positive  results  of  many  EC  aid 
interventions are explained by the hard work of 
its  staff.  particularly  in  delegations.  and  often 
by  the  quality  of  the  partnership  with  ACP 
policy-makers and technical staff. 
Constraints  imposed  on  the  Commission. 
The  Commission  has  not  been  given  clear 
objectives  or  sufficient  operational  flexibility, 
while EC  aid results have not been adequately 
monitored  by  policy-makers.  The  Lome 
Convention  provides  too  many  objectives and 
instruments, and specifies complex procedures, 
including  co-management  with  many 
governments  with  weak  capacity.  The  EC 
policy  formulation  system  has  expanded  the 
policy agenda and the number of  instruments, 
while  introducing  extensive  and  time-
consuming  administrative  and  financial 
controls.  and  providing  for  limited  budgetary 
and  staffing  flexibility.  All  of  this  has 
constrained  the  operational  flexibility  of  the 
Commission.  The  policy  formulation  process 
does  not  include  an  effective  system  for 
monitoring EC aid results. 
The  limitations  within  the  Commission 
reflect  these  constraints  and  its  history  as  an 
organisation which initially focused on projects 
and  administration  and  which  has  grown 
rapidly, spreading its resources too thinly.  The 
Commission's  trans1t1on  to  being  a  policy-
based  donor  is  difficult.  It  requires  an 
organisation  that  is  results-oriented, 
knowledge-based, and self-critical.  The recent 
reorganisation  is  intended  to  address  some of 
the limitations identified in this evaluation. 
The limitations within the Commission are: 
1.  a  fragmented  structure  and  weak 
accountability.  A  fragmented  structure,  in 
which  policy  and  operational  units  within 
DGVIII are unduly separated, has resulted in  a 
'culture'  of  weak  team-work  and  limited 
accountability  for  results.  The  current 
reorganisation  is  intended  to address  this,  but 
there  is  a  risk  that  the  new Common Service 
will  reinforce fragmentation if it is  not merged 
with  the  RELEX  directorates  as  soon  as 
possible. 
2.  inadequate  systems  and  procedures. 
The  Commission  still  relies  on  limited  and 
unsystematic  information flows.  Neither staff 
and  departmental  responsibilities,  nor 
operational  procedures,  are  clearly  defined. 
This  is  a  particular  problem  for  delegations, 
which  in  addition  have only  limited  decision-
making  authority.  The  organisation  is 
characterised  by  a  'visa'  culture,  with  overly 
complex  and  inefficient  administrative  and 
financial controls, and little demand for quality 
support or peer review. 
3.  over-stretched  capacity.  The  excessive 
demands of administration, policy dialogue and 
donor  coordination  have  over-stretched  the 
Commission's capacity,  given its  involvement 
in  many  sectors  and  activities.  Budget 
resources  appear  insufficient  for  key  areas, 
including  monitoring,  delegations  and 
investment  in  professional  development  and 
training.  In  terms of staffing,  there is  a  clear 
shortage  of  in-house  specialist  skills  in 
institutional  development,  poverty  reduction, 
and other priority areas. 
4.  weak  learning  capacity.  Learning  is 
carried  out  individually  or  by  consultants. 
Delegation  staff,  who  have  the  most  direct 
information on developments in  the field,  have 
limited  resources  and  weak  networks 
connecting  them  with  headquarters  and  other 
delegations.  There  has  been  little  demand 
within  the  Commission  for  monitoring  of 
results or for learning lessons from evaluations, 
either internal or carried out by  other donors. 
The capacity to ensure that knowledge and best 
practice  are  disseminated  and  incorporated 
systematically within the organisation is weak. Executive Summary  vi 
Key recommendations 
To make EC aid programmes more results-oriented requires actions by  both the Member States 
and the Commission.  The Member States should help to  identify a strategic role for EC aid and 
provide  greater  operational  flexibility  (financial  controls,  budgets  and  recruitment).  The 
Commission  should  reform  organisational  structures  and  incentives.  equip  its  staff better,  and 
improve its learning from performance. 
A clear role for EC aid 
1.  A  more  realistic  polic,v  agenda.  We  recommend  a  review  of ways  to  integrate  the  policy 
fonnulation  process,  enhancing  coordination  between  the  EDF  Committee,  the  Council  of 
Ministers,  the  ACP  Fin  Group  and  other Council  Groups,  and  relevant  European  Parliament 
committees.  Vv'e  suggest that the EDF Committee focus more on policy orientation, coordination 
with Member States and the monitoring of implementation. 
2.  Pragmatic  specialisation.  for  complementarity.  We  recommend  a  gradual  and  pragmatic 
specialisation of EC aid, which does not imply a scaling down but a refocusing based on relative 
strengths.  Possible  areas  for  specialisation  include  the  transport  sector,  because  of  the 
Commission· s expertise,  structural  adjustment,  because  of its  high coordination  requirements, 
and areas which require in-depth political dialogue (e.g. democratisation).  Regional cooperation, 
though central to the EC, requires caution, considering the difficulties in achieving results in this 
area in the past. 
3.  Independence ol evaluations and transparency.  We  recommend  a review  of ways  to achieve 
greater  separation  of  the  Commission's  evaluation  function  from  the  new  implementation 
Common  Service.  One  possibility  is  for  it  to  report  to  the  Comitc  de  Directiont  with  the 
collaboration  of  the  Member  States  (possibly  through  a  restructured  EDF  Committee). 
lnfonnation  on  EC  aid  should  be  disseminated  more  widely  (particularly  through  electronic 
media). 
Jointly strengthening ACP institutions 
4.  EU coordination.  Member  States  and  the  Commission  should  appoint  lead  coordinators  in 
sectors  of intervention  in  each  recipient  country  to  lead  dialogue  with  ACP countries  and  to 
facilitate  a  common  approach.  The  Commission  should  increase  its  joint activities  with other 
donors  (including appraisals and evaluations) and co-financing.  We note that the shift from a 
project to a sector approach requires caution.  Weak civil services. and the difficulties of donor 
coordination. constrain both project and sector approaches. 
5.  Strenf?thening institutions. Support to parallel government structures and salary supplements for 
civil  servants  should  be  discontinued.  Institutional  support  to  ACP  governments  should  be 
provided  and  monitored  jointly  by  donors  and  should  focus  first  on  public  expenditure 
management (particularly in social sectors), management of technical assistance, and civil service 
refonn. 
Making the Commission more results-oriented 
6.  Preventing  further  organisational fragmentation  in  the  Commission.  It  is  essential  that,  as 
planned, the Common Service is integrated with the RELEX Directorates as soon as possible.  In 
the  meantime, we  recommend that team work  between DGVIII, the new  Common Service and 
delegations be closely monitored. 
7.  Simplifying  administrative and financial controls.  We  recommend a more selective  use of ex 
ante administrative and financial controls, an extension of ex post financial audits to all projects 
and  programmes, and  wider monitoring of perfonnance.  We also recommend a  simplification 
and reduction in the number of special EC budget lines 
8.  More  resources to delegations.  Delegations should be  reinforced through the use of more local 
staff at technical level, and that the Commission be given resources to use Technical Assistance 
to  support its  own  capadty to  monitor and implement programmes.  However, we recommend 
that core functions should be the responsibility of Commission staff. 
t Suggested m the  1998 DAC Review of EC Aid. EC-ACP aid policy 
1. EC-ACP aid policy
1 
In  1985, a DAC review of twenty five  years of development cooperation identified essential 
operational lessons to  make aid  more successful.
2  In  1996, a similar reflection by the DAC 
on 50 years  of development cooperation  reaffirmed and  developed many of the  principles 
identified eleven years before.·
1 
These principles guide the approach followed in this evaluation of EC aid to ACP countries. 
In this chapter. we compare these principles with the policies and general approach of EC aid 
to ACP countries in  the last ten years.  In  the next chapter, we evaluate how well the results 
of EC aid measure up against the same principles. 
Section (I .I) sets out the  key  principles which should guide aid if it is  to be results-oriented 
and effective, including the need to focus on clear objectives, to improve the institutional and 
policy environment in  developing countries, and to coordinate with other donors.  In section 
( 1.2),  we  assess the policies and general approach of EC aid by comparing them with these 
principles.  For  EC  aid  policy  to  be  'relevant',  not  only  should  its  stated  objectives  be 
consistent with the needs of ACP countries, but also its policies and general approach should 
be ones that are likely to achieve those objectives. 
Section (1.3) discusses the EC' s gradual move from  'aid entitlement' to conditionality.  The 
discussion suggests that in  the future the sense of ownership that was present in the early EC-
ACP partnership must be combined with greater selectivity, and greater donor coordination. 
1.1  Principles for results-oriented and effective aid 
Both the  1985  and  1996  DAC  reflections  on  several  decades of development cooperation 
indicate principles for results-oriented and effective aid.
4  The OECD 21st  Century strategy 
sets development targets and  reaffirms the  importance of locally-owned strategies, enhanced 
co-ordination and monitoring and evaluation.
5  These principles apply to  all donors, not just 
the  EC.  They  provide  the  framework  for  this  evaluation  of  EC  aid  policy  and  results 
achieved. 
In  this  report the  term  'European Community aid'  ('EC aid') refers to that  portion of European Union aid 
managed  by  the  European  Commission,  rather  than  Member  State  bilateral  aid.  The  Annex  contains 
background information on EC aid to ACP countries. 
Review  of Twenty-Five  Years  of Development  Cooperation.  OECDIDAC,  1985.  Also  quoted  in  DAC 
Principles for Effective Aid, Development Assistance Manual, OECDIDAC, 1992, p. 5 
Shaping the 21'
1  Century:  The  Contribution of  Development Cooperation, OECDIDAC,  1996.  See also the 
recent Assessing Aid: What Works.  What Doesn't and YVhy,  Policy Research Report, World Bank, 1998. 
See also Burnside and  Dollar. Aid,  Policies and Growth,  Policy Research Working Paper No.  1777, World 
Bank,  1997;  Bottchwey  K.,  Collier P.,  Gunning  J.  and  Hamada K.,  Report of the  Group  of Independent 
Persons Appoimed to Conduct an Evaluation of Certain Aspects of the Structural Adjustment Facility, IMF, 
1998:  and  the  survey  by  Tsikata, Aid Effectiveness: A  Survey of the Recent Empirical Literature, Paper on 
Policy Analysis Assessment. IMF, 1998. 
See also Development Partnerships in the New Global Context. OECDIDAC. 1995. 2  Chapter 1 
Clear objectives.  Aid aims to foster a higher quality of life for all people,
6  particularly for 
the poorest. 
7  If aid is to be successful, the reduction of poverty should be an explicit target, as 
should other priority  objectives which are essential components of sustainable development 
such  as  democracy  and  human rights,  protection of the  environment, and gender equality.
8 
(See Box). 
Donors should have a  small number of clear objectives, which should be the bottom line for 
all their activities.  If a donor has too many objectives, it may spread its resources too thinly. 
OECD 21st century goals for economic and social development 
At  the  GB  Summit  in  Birmingham  in  May 1998,  international  leaders  endorsed  the  goals for economic 
and  social  development  in  the  OECD's  '21st  Century'  strategy.  The  OECD  proposes  a  global 
development partnership effort through which the following goals are to be achieved by the year 2015: 
1 
Economic well-being 
•  A reduction by one-half in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty. 
Social development 
•  Universal primary education in all countries. 
•  Demonstrated  progress  towards  gender equality  and  the  empowerment  of  women  by  eliminating 
gender disparity in primary and secondary education. 
•  Reduction by two-thirds in the mortality rates for infants and children under age 5 and a reduction by 
three-fourths in maternal mortality. 
•  Access through the  primary health-care system to reproductive health services for all individuals of 
appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than the year 2015. 
Environmental sustainability and regeneration 
•  The  current  implementation  of  national  strategies  for sustainable  development in  all  countries  by 
2005,  so  as  to  ensure  that  current  trends  in  the  loss  of  environmental  resources  are  effectively 
reversed at both global and  national levels by 2015. 
The OECD also identifies a number of  qualitative factors which  it regards as  essential to the attainment 
of the measurable goals above.  These include: 
•  Democratic accountability, the protection of human rights, and respect for the rule of law. 
1.  See  Shaping  the  21sr  Century:  The  Contribution  of Development  Co-operation,  OECD,  May  1996.  The 
partnership approach was also endorsed in  the  Second Tokyo International Conference on  African Development 
(TICAD II) by  representatives of about 80 countries and 40 international and civil  society organisations (October 
1998). 
Th1s  is the goal of sustainable development according to the  1995 G7 Summit at Halifax. 
·support for  development is  a compassiOnate response to  the extreme poverty and human suffering that still 
afflict  one-fifth  of the  world's population', OECD/DAC,  1996.  op.  cit.,  p.  6.  The April  1998  High Level 
meeting  of  DAC  reaffinned  economic  well-being  and  poverty  reduction  as  the  primary  targets  of the 
Development Partnership Strategy.  Article 130u of the Maastricht Treaty also includes support to democracy, 
the  rule of law,  respect for  human  rights.  and  the  smooth and  gradual integration into the world economy. 
The other key legal framework of EC cooperation policy, the Declaration of the Council of the 18  November 
1992,  'Run-up  to  2000',  section  20,  reiterates  the  Maastricht  objectives  and  further  explains  that  'The 
Community and its Member States will seek to respond in particular to the needs of the poorest sections of the 
population and of the poorest countries'. 
Elements  mcluded  in  Development Partnerships  in  the  New  Global Context,  produced for the  DAC at  the 
May  1995  meeting of Development Cooperation Ministers and  Heads of Aid Agencies.  See also Annex to 
OECD/DAC,  1996, op.  cit.  These are also the policy objectives specified for evaluation in  the  'Procedures 
and  Organization  for  the  Evaluation of the  European  Union's Development Instruments and Programmes', 
Council of Ministers, June 1995, p. 6 EC-ACP aid policy  3 
Institutions and policies.  The experience of several decades, shared by many donors, is 
that sustainable development and the  reduction of poverty depend above all  on the  political 
and economic environment in  developing countries themselves.
9  Firstly, poverty is  reduced 
more effectively where the  institutions of government and civil society are participatory, and 
where the government is  committed to  improve the capacity of the public sector to  manage 
public expenditure and deliver services.  Secondly, sustainable development and the reduction 
of  poverty  depend  on  governments  developing  policies  that  encourage  investment  and 
growth. 
Where institutions in  developing countries are not yet sufficiently strong, aid is effective only 
if it can help to strengthen the policies and institutions of governments that are committed to 
reform.  Aid  cannot  buy  or replace  this  commitment.  For effective  aid,  donors  must  be 
selective, supporting governments committed to  reform and opening their support to partners 
in  civil  society.  All  this  should  be  done  in  the  context  of an  open  dialogue  with  local 
partners. 
Donor  coordination.  Aid  financing  is  typically  fungible.  It  often  finances  public 
investment,  but  it  does  not increase investment any more than  any  other source of revenue 
would.  Similarly,  aid  financing  to  a  particular  sector often  does  not  result  in  additional 
spending  in  that  sector.
10  Instead,  each  donor  effectively  finances  a  share  of the  entire 
government budget. 
A donor should therefore be principally concerned with the quality of the whole framework of 
public expenditure management, and not just with  the  quality of its  individual intervention. 
Aid results,  particularly the  reduction of poverty, need to  be judged by  looking at  what all 
donors achieve together- the impact of an individual donor cannot be considered in isolation. 
In this  context,  donors'  interventions need to  be  closely coordinated. 
11  Donors should act 
together, even if different donors focus on particular sectors or activities.  While each donor 
should  act  on  its  strengths  (see  Box),  all  should  try  to  ensure  that  their  roles  are 
complementar.v.  Complementarity, which is a difficult process, requires some specialisation, 
but does not imply that any individual donor should scale down its overall resources. 
10 
ll 
Acting on strengths- applying the principle 
The EC too should act where its relative strengths lie.  The EC has experience of 
diverse  institutional  and  political  models,  and  often  has  less  direct foreign  and 
commercial policy interests than  other donors.  It  is  therefore  in  a good position 
to foster a genuine partnership with developing countries: economic, commercial 
and  political.  The  EC  is  the  second  largest  multilateral  donor,  and  maintains 
close consultations with  the  Member States of the  EU.  It  is therefore in  a good 
position to support activities which  have  high coordination  requirements.  These 
considerations, together with the particular strengths which EC aid reveals in the 
field, 
1 
should guide a gradual and pragmatic specialisation of EC aid. 
1  .  Some of the strengths and weaknesses of EC aid in the field are presented in the next 
chapter. 
'Aid can only be  as  effective as  the policy economic, and administrative environment in  which it  operates', 
OCED/DAC 1985, op.  cit. 
See for example 'Assessing Aid' World Bank, 1998, op.  cit., chapter 3. 
These are also key principles in OECDIDAC 1985 and 1996, op.  cit. 4  Chapter 1 
Transparency and accountability.  Aid performance should be monitored and evaluated 
independently, and information on  all  donors'  interventions should be disseminated widely. 
Transparency in  the  workings of EC aid  and in  its  results is  essential if it  is  to retain public 
support.  It  is  only  if  EC  citizens  know  and  value  what  is  being  done  in  the  EC  aid 
programme that the programme will  be  supported.  Transparency and accountability are also 
essential  if  donors  arc  to  learn  from  each  other's  experience,  improve  through  external 
appraisals,  coordinate  their  actions,  and  play  complementary  roles.  They  are  essential 
components of a results-oriented approach. 
1.2  Has EC aid policy matched these principles? 
12 
In  the  period covered by  this evaluation ( 1985  to date),  and  particularly in  the most recent 
years.  the  general approach and policies of EC aid  have,  in  a  number of respects, become 
more in  line with the principles for results-oriented and effective aid mentioned above. 
Poverty  reduction  and  other  priority  objectives 
13  have  gradually  become  more  explicit 
objectives of EC development cooperation with ACP countries, although there has continued 
to  be  an  escalation  in  the  number of objectives  and  instruments  of EC  aid.  Similarly,  a 
greater emphasis has gradually been given to  "good' institutions and policies, through greater 
conditionality.  However, in  many cases conditionality has weakened the local commitment 
or  ·ownership·  of aid  programmes  by  ACP  States.  Conditionalities  have  often  not  been 
internalised, and often result from the increasing inequality in the EC-ACP partnership. 
For much  of the  period covered by  this  evaluation, donor coordination has  been extremely 
weak.  Since  Maastricht  there  has  been  consistent  pressure  by  some Member States,  and 
often by  the Commission, to focus on the need for European aid programmes to work in the 
same direction.  However, there has not been so  much progress in  identifying a strategic role 
for EC aid vis-a-vis other donors.  Progress in enhancing the transparency and accountability 
of EC aid has also been relatively slow. 
•  A more explicit and clear emphasis on  poverty and other priority objectives 
Until  1985,  poverty  reduction  and  other  priority  objectives  were  not  explicit  and  central 
objectives of EC aid.  During this period, the partnership's policy priorities changed over time 
(e.g. from rapid industrialisation to rural development). 
The evolving priorities of EC aid may have reflected concern about poverty, but the reduction 
of poverty only became an  explicit policy objective of EC-ACP cooperation in  1985 (Lome 
Ill).  Lome  III  stated  that  the  objectives  of EC-ACP  cooperation  were  'to  promote  and 
expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP states' and 'improving the 
living conditions of the poorest sections of the population'. 
12 
13 
Because the purpose of this evaluation is  to suggest lessons for the future, the principles used for assessment 
are those regarded as  valid in recent years (for example, the principles in OECD/DAC. 1985, op.  cit.).  The 
assessment of aid results is discussed in the following chapter. 
Trade cooperation instruments (e.g.  general trade agreements) are not part of the evaluation.  The Maastricht 
objective of smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy has not been 
covered by  this repon. EC-ACP aid policy  5 
Related priority objectives have also been incorporated in EC-ACP cooperation, with the joint 
declaration  on  human  rights  and  protection  of  the  environment  (Lome  III),  and  the 
introduction  of gender  objectives  (Lome  IV).  Lome  IV  bis  ( 1995)  introduced  a  greater 
emphasis on respect for human rights, democratic principles and the  rule of law.  Within the 
'internal' EC policy forn1ulation process, the Council of Ministers and the Commission have 
produced a number of resolutions 
supporting (and expanding) these 
priority objectives. 
14 
However,  while  a  more  explicit 
and  clear  emphasis  has  been 
given to  priority objectives, there 
has continued to  be  an escalation 
in  the  number of objectives  and 
instruments  of  EC  aid.  The 
accumulation  of instruments (and 
related  objectives)  is  partly 
explained  by  the  nature  of  the 
Conventions,  since  it  is  easier  to 
create  new  instruments  than  to 
remove  instruments  that  have 
created entitlements.  But it is also 
explained  by  the  weak 
coordination  among  policy-
makers in the EC (see Box). 
Faced  with  an  expanding  policy 
agenda,  EC  aid  has  spread  its 
activities too thinly, and does not 
concentrate  its  resources  where 
its strengths lie. 
•  Increasing  conditionality 
Weak  coordination 
makers 
among  EC  policy-
As a result of weak coordination among EC policy-makers, there has 
been  a  mismatch  between  an  expanding  policy  agenda  and  the 
Commission's capacity to implement this agenda: 
•  Member States bring to the policy formulation  process their own 
agendas (or multiple agendas), which are not integrated and which 
contribute  to  expand  the  number  of policy  priorities.  Policy 
outcomes appear principally to reflect political compromises. 
•  There  has  been  weak  coordination  between  different  actors 
within  each  Member  State,  between  headquarters  and 
delegations,  between  finance  ministries  and  development 
ministries. 
•  Insufficient  feedback  from  operations  to  policy-makers  has 
meant  that  realities  in  the  field  have  not  been  adequately 
recognised:  the  weak  capacity of ACP governments, the large 
number of (often competing) donors, and the constraints on the 
Commission.  In  part this is because of insufficient coordination 
between the Council of Ministers and the EDF Committee. 
•  The  European  Parliament  has  created  numerous  special  budget 
lines as a way to support additional priorities for EC aid.  Many of 
these budget lines have been difficult to administer efficiently. 
•  The Commission, which plays a key role in policy initiation, has 
been  unable  to  persuade  Member States of the  need  for  a  more 
strategic and realistic policy agenda. 
of aid on  'good' institutions and policies 
Previous  policies  of ACP governments  (many  supported  by  donors)  and  external  shocks 
contributed  to  the  severe  crisis  of the  1980s,  which  resulted  in  the  structural  adjustment 
conditionality of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI).  The conditionality of the BWI, and 
increasing realisation of the failure of the EC' s aid  'entitlement' approach, slowly resulted in 
a gradual but consistent move of the EC towards policy conditionality. 
The EC' s first steps towards conditionality began with the introduction of policy dialogue on 
National Indicative Programmes, the Special Import Programmes, and the explicit recognition 
of the  need  to  focus  on  all  institutions  and  policies  (Lome  III).  However,  at  this  stage 
conditionality  was  minimal.
1 :~  Conditionality  was  significantly  increased  with  the 
introduction of the Structural Adjustment Facility and the Framework of Mutual Obligations 
on  the  use  of  Stabex  (Lome  IV).  Finally,  the  EC  objective  of  increasing  policy  and 
governance conditionality has been given a firm legal basis in the latest Convention. 
The EC' s embrace of conditionality has been more recent and moderate than that of the BWI, 
and  in  many  cases  the  EC  continues  to  be  seen  by  ACP States  as  a  more  understanding 
14 
15 
See, for example. the Declaration of the Council of 18 November 1992. Run-Up to 2000. 
See discussion  in  the  Desk Study (Evaluation  of EU Aid to  ACP Countries _Managed by the  Commission, 
Phase !: Analysis of  Existing Documents. ADE, July 1997 ),  pp. 16-17 6  Chapter 1 
development partner (see discussion on programming in chapter 3).  However, as with other 
donors,  the  conditionalities of EC aid  have  in  some cases  resulted  in  attempts  to  buy and 
micro-manage reform efforts  by  ACP governments.  The conditionality approach has often 
underestimated  the  internal  politics  of reform  - the  need  for  local  ownership  - and  the 
resources which are needed for effective in-country policy dialogue and institutional support. 
•  Recent pressures to enhance donor coordination 
For much of the  last  10  years.  donors underestimated the  importance of coordination.  The 
EC, like other donors. assumed that their financial support for ACP projects would contribute 
to  growth,  and  left  to  ACP  governments  the  responsibility  for  coordinating  aid.  In  this 
context, the weakness of the ACP civil services often contributed to poor donor coordination 
and  donor  competition.  Structural  adjustment  conditionality  and  the  Policy  Framework 
Papers  brought  some  focus  to  donors'  support  for  the  reform  programme  of  ACP 
governments.  However.  these  initiatives  were  sometimes seen  as  dominated by  the  BWI, 
initially  with  limited genuine coordination 
16  Coherence of EC policies  among key donors. 
The  Maastricht  Treaty  included  the  obligation  to 
pursue  consistency  in  the  different  Community 
policies.  Community  policies  have  to  take  into 
account  the  goals  of  the  Community  development 
cooperation policy. 
The  political  focus  on  coherence  appears  to  have 
led  to  closer  coordination  among  senior 
management  within  a  given  Directorate  General, 
between  Directorate  Generals,  and  between 
Commissioners. 
Within  DGVIII,  responsibilities  have  been  assigned 
for  monitoring  consistency  in  the  areas  of  food  aid 
(including  exports  under the  CAP),  fisheries  policy, 
and  post-conflict  situations,  as  well  as  for 
coordination with  relevant DGs. 
The  Green  Paper  has  noted  the  importance  of 
ensuring greater consistency between trade and aid 
policies. 
Problems  of  inconsistency  arise  particularly  in  the 
agriculture sector.  For  example,  under the  CAP, 
beef  exports  to  West  Africa  used  to  be  heavily 
subsidised,  to  the  benefit  of  EU  producers. 
However,  these  subsidies  harmed  local  producers, 
and  therefore  conflicterl  with  aid  policy.  Through 
consultation  and  coordination  between  services, 
this  inconsistency  has  been  largely  removed  (see 
Case Studies Synthesis p. 27). 
This  case  may  provide  a  model  for  dealing  with 
other  cases  of  inconsistency.  To  facilitate  this, 
there  should  be  effective  mechanisms  for  alertin~ 
the Commission to the existence of problem areas. 
1  . See  the suggestion m the  1998 DAC Review of EC  Aid 
on  'instituting  a complaints  procedure  comparable to  that 
of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank' (draft, p.SO). 
Although.  institutionally,  the  European 
Union  would  seem  to  offer  a  promising 
setting for effective donor coordination, the 
EC has resembled other donors in focusing 
largely  on  committing  resources,  with 
limited  emphasis  on  coordination  with 
other donors.  Even so,  in  the Commission 
there  is  a  perception that there  has been a 
greater flow of information on EC aid from 
the  Commission  to  Member  States  than 
there  has  been  in  the  other  direction. 
Moreover. the potential for a two-way flow 
of information through the EDF Committee 
has not been realised.
17 
Recently,  the  Maastricht Treaty  has  given 
political  momentum to  donor coordination 
efforts.  It specifies clear priority objectives 
and  it  provides  a  common  Community 
policy  which  complements  the  bilateral 
policies  of  the  Member  States 
(complementarity).  It  commits  the 
Commission  and  the  Member  States  to 
coordinate  their  policies  on  development 
cooperation.  It  also  requires  greater 
coordination  to  ensure  that  Community 
policies  are  consistent  with  one  another 
(see Box on the coherence of EC policies). 
At  the  policy  level,  the  coordination 
objective  has  recently  been  decisively 
In  The difficulties of coordination between different organisations cannot be  underestimated.  According to  the 
recent external evaluation of the ESAF. even coordination between the IMF and the WB appears to be weak. 
Bottch..-;ey K  .. et al.  , IMF.  1998. op. cit. 
17  See Case Studies Synthesis. p.  29. EC-ACP aid policy  7 
supported and monitored by  the Council of Ministers.  The Council mandated and monitored 
a  pilot  coordination  exercise  in  6  countries,  and  in  February  1998  it  issued  Guidelines for 
strengthening operational coordination. This political pressure and efforts by the Commission 
have  contributed  to  increased  contact  between  experts,  officials  and  Director Generals  of 
Development of EU Member States and of the  Commission.  Within  the  EC, the  Director 
Generals for Development have been focusing in recent meetings (June and September 1998) 
on  looking  for  operational  ways  to  enhance aid  coordination  in  the  EU.  However, policy 
efforts have not yet been sufficiently translated to the field (see next chapter). 
At  the  international  leveL  increased  contacts  between  most  donors  have  contributed  to  a 
growing  recognition  of the  need  for  enhanced  coordination  to  achieve  better  results  and 
greater complementarity and coherence.
1 s  Donor coordination has begun to improve through 
mechanisms  such  as  the  Special  Programme  for  Africa  (SPA),  donor  discussions  in 
Consultative Groups and Round Table donor meetings and the High Level Meetings between 
the Commission and the  World Bank.
19  In particular, the Special Programme for Africa has 
slowly allowed major donors to  influence some of the policies of  the BWI.  However, the 
translation of coordination efforts to the field has been found to be slow. 
20  A recent example 
of the  potential  of enhanced  coordination  is  the  Commission's  initiative  to  pilot  a  new 
approach to conditionality in Burkina Faso. 
Transparency and accountability 
Problems  of transparency  and  accountability  in  the  Commission's management of EC aid 
result  in  part from fragmentation  and complexity in  the  Commission's aid programme (the 
multiplicity of programmes and budget lines), from fragmentation within DGVIll, and more 
generally  from  the  complexity of the  policy formulation  process (see  Box  above).  While 
DGVIII' s  activities  are  scrutinised by  a  number of EC institutions,  including the  Court of 
Auditors, this is a fragmented and ad hoc system.
21 
Some steps have been taken to make EC aid more transparent.  However, it is still difficult to 
find  information  on  the  nature  and  performance  of the  EC  aid  programme.  The  in-house 
capacity to  evaluate the EC aid programme, although still limited, has improved recently, and 
the dissemination of evaluations has also begun to improve.  However, the recent placing of 
the  merged evaluation  function  within  the  new  implementation  service  (Common Service) 
"'1'1 
raises some concerns. 
1.3  From entitlement to conditionality 
The early partnership: entitlement 
The vision that guided the  first Lome Convention (1975) was of a partnership (see Box), in 
which ACP States were expected to  take  the  lead in formulating development policies and 
18 
19 
20 
21 
See. for  example, commitments by DAC members in OECD/DAC. 1996. op.  cit. 
These  meetings  were  formalised  in  July  1996.  Pilot  coordination  with  the  World Bank in  Ethiopia  and 
Mozambique Is on-going. 
See  the  recent  evaluation  of the  SPA,  Independent  Evaluation  of the  SPA  as  a  Mechanism  to  Promote 
Adjustment and Development in  Sub-Saharan Africa, OED, November 1997. 
The EC aid programme is also subject to the DAC Peer Review. 
The performance of the Commission in  evaluations and in the dissemination of information is considered in 
more detail in chapter 3. 8  Chapter 1 
designing  projects.
2 -~  At  this  stage,  the  institutions  and  policies  of ACP States  were  not 
questioned.  In  part,  this reflected the assumption that the ACP governments would identify 
the development needs of their countries.  It also reflected the realisation that, by involving 
ACP governments as co-managers of the aid  programme, they would gain ownership of the 
programme. The partnership was reinforced by the establishment of high-level joint EC-ACP 
institutions to oversee the aid programme. 
For the first  10 years of the Lome Convention, then, EC aid was in effect an  ·entitlement' for 
ACP countries.  EC-ACP cooperation policy changed over time  in  line  with the  changing 
priorities of ACP states, political comprom.ises and, like other donors, in line with prevailing 
thought on development.  Aid instruments and sector priorities were added to successive EC-
ACP Conventions to accommodate changing policy objectives (with a time-lag introduced as 
a result of the duration of the Conventions).  Over tin1e,  this contributed to a  'tendency for 
development instruments to dictate policy'. 
24 
With hindsight, we can see that some of the priorities and instruments did not reflect clear and 
strategic objectives, and resulted in  a multiplicity of objectives and instruments.  Cooperation 
with  ACP countries  under EDF  1 focused on support to  rapid  industrialisation  led by the 
public  sector,  while  EDF 2  and  3  introduced  trade  preferences.  Lome  I,  in  a  context of 
pessimism  about  commodity  exports,  created an  instrument  for  the  stabilisation  of export 
earnings.  Lome  II  shifted  the  focus  from  industrialisation  to  rural  development,  with  its 
emphasis on food self-sufficiency.
25 
However, since Lome III  in  1985, a slow move away from 'entitlement' has begun, and this 
has facilitated the explicit incorporation in  the  Lome Convention of priority objectives such 
as  the reduction of poverty and democracy and the protection of human rights.  Lome III also 
took  initial  steps,  although  with  minimal  conditionality,  in  transforming  the  'entitlement' 
approach.  As  a consequence of the entitlement approach,  the  EC,  like some other donors, 
financed  governments  with  weak  commitment  to  democracy  and  human  rights,  and  with 
inappropriate economic policies. 
26 
2.1 
2-i 
'Initially.  it  was  intended  that  the  ACP governments  would  provide  the  leadership  for  the  development 
policies that EU  aid was supporting, and the ACP states would therefore have the responsibility for ensuring 
that EU aid would meet their needs and fit with their policies' (Desk Study. p.  39). 
Green Paper on  relations hetween the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of  the 21
51  century, 
European Commission, 1997. 
An mstrument to  cover fluctuations in revenues of mineral exports was also introduced (Sysmin). 
For example Ethiopia until  the early nineties.  See An Evaluation of Development Cooperation between the 
European Union and Ethiopia,  1976-1994, IDS.  1996. EC-ACP aid policy  9 
EC-ACP partnership 
The Yaounde  and,  subsequently,  the  Lome Conventions embodied a partnership between the  Member 
States  of  the  EEC  (EC)  and  ACP  countries.
1  The  contractual  nature  of  the  Conventions,  the  co-
management  of  the  EDF,  and  indicative  programming  have  allowed  ACP  countries  a  degree  of 
participation  (and  certainty)  in  policy formulation  and  in  the  management of the  aid  programme higher 
than they have had with  most other donors. 
Many  of  the  policies  and  implementation  procedures  that  apply  to  EC-ACP  cooperation  are  derived 
directly from the Lome Convention. The Convention goes beyond aid to include trade and (since Lome IV 
bis)  political  issues.  Negotiations on  the  Convention are the principal opportunity for ACP countries to 
influence the formulation of development cooperation policies. 
The Convention  provides for a framework  of Joint Institutions,  established  on  a basis of parity between 
ACP States and the  EC:  a Council of Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors, and Joint Assembly. 
Growing inequality. ... 
Over  time,  however,  the  partnership  has  changed.  As  the  Green  Paper  notes,  'The  principle  of 
partnership  enshrined  in  the  Lome  Convention  has  diminished  in  substance  and  has  not  been  fully 
realized'.  In  recent Conventions.  the  bargaining  power of  EU  countries  has  increased  relative  to ACP 
countries.  The  effectiveness  of the joint institutions  has  been  reduced  by  the  increasing weakness of 
ACP institutions and a shift within the  EU  towards other priorities.  There is  now limited participation by 
EU  ministers.  In  addition,  the  increasing  'conditionality'  of  EC  aid  has  made  the  partnership  less 
contractual . 
.  . .  .  but potential for the future 
Nevertheless, the partnership principle has proved resilient,  and  is  highly valued by ACP States.  Other 
donors are now trying to include a similar principle in their operations, including the World Bank initiative 
'World Bank Partnership for Development' (May 1998).  Unfortunately,  initiatives of this type have often 
overlooked the long experience of the  EC-ACP partnership. 
1. See Annex.  See also Case Stud1es Synthesis, pp.  12-14. 
Growing conditionality but less partnership 
The  initial  partnership  was  gradually  transformed  through  the  growing  emphasis  on 
conditionality, particularly in  Lome IV and IV bis.  Conditionality has focused EC aid more 
clearly on  priority  objectives, particularly the  reduction of poverty and also on the need for 
focusing  on  policies  and  institutions.  However,  in  many cases this  emphasis has  resulted 
from  pressure  from  the  EC  rather  than  from  the  intemalisation  of these  objectives  and 
approach by  ACP governments.  Therefore, while the objectives of EC aid and its approach 
have  become  gradually  more  relevant,  they  may  now  be  less  fully  shared  by  ACP 
governments. 
The economic  cri~is of the  1980s, the increased economic and institutional weakness of many 
ACP states, the failure  of many aid interventions, the reform conditionality of the  BWI, and 
the end of the Cold War have all contributed to  weaken the influence of the ACP States, and 
have motivated the EC to take a more active role.  The Joint Institutions have become weaker, 
and  while  negotiations  on  the  Convention remain the  most important opportunity for ACP 
states to have an input into decision-making, increasingly policy formulation within the EC -
rather than the Lome framework - leads the process of development policy formulation. 
27 
The  risk  is  that  the  Commission  has  been  moving  from  under-involvement  in  addressing 
institutions  and  policies  in  the  initial  period  of the  partnership to over-involvement in  aid 
:.7  'The more recent Conventions have given growing weight to common priorities, such as cross cutting issues 
and economic policy conditionalities, mainly introduced at the request of the EU' (Desk Study, p.  39).  The 
central role of the  'internal' EC policy cycle is examined more fully in the Case Studies Synthesis, pp.  14-22 10  Chapter 1 
conditionality (with micro-management of ACP reforms).  While there are benefits in aid no 
longer  being  an  entitlement,  the  introduction  of too  many  and  unrealistic  conditions  may 
undermine the commitment of ACP governments to reform. 
However.  the  Commission· s  move  towards  conditionality  has  been  more  moderate  and 
gradual than that of other donors (particularly the BWI), given the contractual nature of the 
Conventions and the continued importance of the partnership concept.  Compared with other 
donors, the Commission· s conditionality often involves a more flexible policy dialogue with 
recipient countries (as we observed in many of our country visits).  Nevertheless, in practice it 
has  been  difficult  for  the  Commission  to  avoid  the  weaknesses  of the  'conditionality' 
approach. 
The conditionality of EC  aid  has  been  further complicated by  the  escalation  in  the  number of 
objectives and instruments. While some of the EC' s aid objectives may be seen to be heading 
in  the  right  direction.  the  problem  with  the  escalation in  their number,  the  introduction of 
budget lines  and the  conditionality approach  is  that they  over-burden the  capacity of both 
ACP governments and the Commission.  Conditionality and the insufficient internalisation of 
policy objectives by ACP governments mean that their commitment to the EC aid programme 
has been weakened. 
While both the entitlement and conditionality approach have led to problems, they also both 
provide  us  with  lessons on how to  move towards a more genuine partnership that combines 
aid selectivity (support to governments committed to reform and to non-government partners) 
with a partnership based on a contractual agreement. 
Towards a genuine partnership 
In  a  genuine  partnership,  firm  commitments  from  ACP  governments  need  to  be  matched  by  similar 
responsibilities from  the  EC.  Transparent and  simple  performance criteria,  produced jointly, should be 
used to  monitor these  commitments.  Greater selectivity  in  aid  allocation to ACP countries would  make 
aid  more  effective  by  ensuring  that  aid  is  provided  to  governments  that  are  committed  to  (a)  'good' 
governance 
1  and  (b)  economic  policies  that  encourage  growth.  Firm  EC  commitments  could  include 
enhanced  aid  coordination  (focusing  on  support  for  ACP  institutions),  efficient  aid  management,  and 
greater transparency.  The new partnership could be supported by restructured and simplified Lome Joint 
Institutions,  which  could  be  used  to  monitor  the  reciprocity  of  commitments,  as  well  as  to  increase 
'ownership'  of  the  policy  agenda  (e.g.  through  discussions  of  EC  Council  Resolutions  in  the  Joint 
Council). 
This  new  partnership  would  also  involve  more  flexibility  in  the  Commission's  involvement  in  aid 
management in  ACP countries.  Where the capacity and commitment of an ACP government is high, the 
government should be  given considerable control over aid planning and  implementation, with systematic 
ex post financial  at ''lits by the  Commission.  Where this cgpacity or commitment are  absent,  the focus 
should be on the strengthening of ACP institutions and on extending partnership to non-State actors (civil 
society, private sector).
2 
A partnership of this kind would make EC  aid  more in  line with the  principles for successful aid.  Priority 
objectives would not only be the right ones, they would also be shared by ACP governments.  Monitoring 
the implementation of these priority objectives would then become essential.  If aid is to be supported by 
EU citizens it must be able to show its results, particularly in terms of the reduction of poverty. 
1.  Including democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
2.  Extending the partnership is one of the recommendations of the recent Council Guidelines for the negotiation of a 
new agreement with ACP countries. Results of EC aid  11 
2. Results of EC aid 
Having assessed  EC  aid  policies,  we  now  review the  results of EC  aid.  In  part  A  of the 
chapter, we  present some of the strengths and weaknesses of EC aid interventions.  We begin 
by explaining the criteria which have guided our assessment (2.1 ).  We suggest that the first 
measure  of EC  aid  results  should  be  what  impact  it  has  had  on  the  priority  objectives, 
especially  the  reduction  of poverty  (2.2).  We  then  look  at  the  results  of different EC aid 
instruments in terms of strengthening institutions and policies, and immediate project outputs, 
including physical outputs. (  2.3 ). 
In  Part  B  of the  chapter.  we  explore  the  key  factors  which  explain  EC  aid  results:  the 
commitment  and  capacity  of  ACP  institutions  (2.4  ),  donor  coordination  (2.5),  and  the 
performance  of  the  Commission  itself  (2.6).  The  performance  of  the  Commission  is 
examined in more detail in chapter 3. 
The first two factors in this list also affect the aid effectiveness of other donors.  Many aspects 
of the EC aid results presented in part A of this chapter are therefore shared by other donors. 
A:  Results - strengths and weaknesses 
2.1  Assessing results 
When assessing EC aid results, the first question should be to ask what the contribution of EC 
aid  has  been  to  the  reduction  of poverty,  and  what  its  beneficial  impact has  been  on  the 
related  priority  objectives:  good  governance
28
,  gender equality  and  the  protection  of the 
environment.  The  second question, based on the principles discussed in Chapter I, should be 
to ask what the contribution of EC aid has been in supporting institutions and policies (which 
are necessary to obtain a beneficial impact on poverty), and what project outputs (including 
physical outputs) have been obtained. 
This  framework  is  based  on  an  understanding  of how  aid  works  which  emphasises  the 
importance  of a  sustainable  impact  on  poverty  and other priority  objectives, and therefore 
focuses  on  the  effect  of aid  interventions  on  institutions,  policies  and  coordinated  donor 
action.  Since  aid  to  one  s~~ :t'Jr does  not  generally  increase  government  spending  in  that 
particular  sector,  each  donor  intervention  in  effect  finances  a  share  of  all  government 
spending. The reduction of poverty (and therefore the success of aid) does not depend on  the 
outcome  of a  particular  project,  but  on  how  all  donor  interventions  affect  policies  and 
institutions (in both government and civil society). Our evaluation of whether EC aid works 
therefore focuses less on the individual results of particular projects (e.g. the number of roads 
and hospitals built), and more on how the interventions have been carried out. 
While we  continue to  use the criteria of 'effectiveness' and  'sustainability', we principally 
assess these  in  terms of their contribution to  strengthening institutions and policies, and not 
simply in  terms of physical outputs or short-term results.  We also assess interventions in 
terms of the quality of coordination with other donors. 
28  Including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. 12  Chapter 2 
Therefore, to answer if EC aid has worked: 
(I) we  need to  assess  its  impact on  the  priority objectives (particularly the  reduction of 
poverty); 
(2)  at an intermediate level. we need to assess if particular interventions have: 
•  provided support to  governments committed to 'good' policies and institutions; 
•  involved effective policy dialogue with governments (or civil society) and careful 
programmes of institutional support: 
•  involved close coordination with other donors (including joint actions). 
(  3)  we need to take into account project outputs (including physical outputs). 
The Desk Study of this evaluation was based on a review of existing evaluations, and gave 
some  indication of the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of EC instruments.  It argued 
that the  design of EC  interventions  has  traditionally  been  more concerned  with  resources 
required (inputs) than with results. It argued that EC programmes have not provided baseline 
scenarios to allow quantitative assessments of effectiveness, and that information on impact 
has rarely been collected in  the field. 
In  presenting  this  chapter,  the  qualitative  evidence  gathered  in  the  Desk  Study  of this 
evaluation has been complemented with findings from the six country and one regional Case 
Studies.  The Case Studies focus on the key criteria for assessing whether aid contributes to 
the  poverty  reduction  and  other key  priorities:  the  quality  of policy dialogue,  institutional 
strengthening and donor coordination. 
2.2  Impact on poverty and other priority objectives 
The  impact  of  EC  interventions  on  the  pnonty  objectives  of  poverty  reduction,  good 
governance,  gender  equality  and  the  protection  of the  environment  is  difficult  to  assess. 
However,  available information  suggests that EC aid  has  often had limited impact on these 
objectives, in  part because of the weak initial focus on strengthening policies and institutions. 
This difficulty has been shared by other donors. 
29 
The impact of EC aid depends in part on  incorporating priority objectives into the design of 
EC programmes, but also, and more importantly, on the commitment of ACP governments to 
these  objectives.  However,  the  intemalisation  of  some  of  these  objectives  by  ACP 
governments is sometimes a slow process.  Many of the priority objectives have only recently 
become central to the EC-ACP partnership. 
While the  impact of programmes and projects has often been limited, a  number of specific 
interventions have had a strong impact.  Some targeted programmes (e.g. Micro-projects) and 
budget lines (e.g. for democratisation and human rights) have addressed these objectives with 
some success, although at a localised level and often with high administrative costs. 
The impact of EC interventions should improve as a result of the increased political pressure 
to monitor results in  these areas,  the gradual transition to  being a more policy-based donor, 
and the EC' s important role in democracy, human rights and governance conditionality. 
29  See for example review in the Independent Evaluation of  the Special Programme for Africa, OED, 1997. Results of EC aid  13 
Reducing poverty 
The impact of the EC aid  programme on  poverty appears so  far to  have been limited.  The 
impact of the  Structural adjustment Support Programme (SASP) has produced mixed results 
in  terms of poverty and growth,
30  and  much project aid has  similarly had  a  limited impact. 
The  strength  of EC  aid  seems  to  lie  in  its  targeted  interventions  involving  strong  local 
participation. 
While the EC' s approach to the SASP has been more flexible than the conditionality approach 
of the  BWL  in  general  conditionalities  have  not  facilitated  government  commitment  to 
reforms, and have often not been targeted to comrrUtted reformers.
31  It has been difficult for 
the  SASP  to  protect  social  sector  budgets,  although  in  some  cases  it  has  contributed  to 
keeping  this  issue  high  on  the  reform  agenda  and  to  making  improvements  in  budgetary 
processes (for example in  Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroun
32
).  However, the SASP has in some 
cases facilitated  sector reform,  particularly in  the  health sector.  While programme food aid 
and Stabex have sometimes targeted beneficiaries successfully, until recently their impact was 
affected by  their failure to  link  interventions to  policy reform.  This has now changed, with 
the reorientation of programme food aid since 1996. 
The  impact of project aid  on  poverty  was  limited by  an  insufficient focus  on  policies  and 
institutions, and by the specific activities pursued.  While public infrastructure has often led to 
(short-term) improvements in  the quality of life of the poor, transport projects have suffered 
from  insufficient  assessment  of  the  impact  on  the  poor  and  from  insufficient .local 
partiCipation.  Agriculture  and  rural  development  projects  have  shown  little  success  in 
improving life  in  rural  areas,  while education projects have  targeted  high  skills rather than 
basic  education,  and  have  involved  insufficient  monitoring  to  ensure  that  allocated  funds 
reach their targets.  However, EC interventions in  the health sector have recently supported 
reforms  in  the  sector,  and  rural  health  centres  have  made  successful  contributions  to 
improving the health conditions of the poor. 
The EC has achieved a greater impact on the poor through its targeted interventions (see Case 
Studies  box),  including  its  Micro-projects  interventions.  Evaluations conclude that  Micro-
projects  have  had  an  important,  though  localised,  impact  on  poverty.  Similarly,  local 
participation  in  some  projects  involving  Cooperation  with  NGOs  also  appears  to  have 
contributed  to  improve  the  lives  of  the  poor,  by  fostering  people's  own  capacity  for 
development. 
33 
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3! 
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The impact of the SASP is  the impact of the BWI structural adjustment operations.  See ToR for Evaluations 
of SASP Programmes. Evaluation Unit. 
On  lack  of selectivity  by  BWL  which  set  the  pace  for  SASPs,  see  Bottchwey  et al.,  IMF,  1998,  op.  cit. 
According to OED. World Bank, 1996, 'Poor and weak compliers with programmes received$ 11  billion out 
of the $15 billion lent for adjustment from  1980 to  1996'. 
Case Studies Synthesis p. 41 
Desk Study, Annex 5. p. 4 14  Chapter 2 
Case studies: How the Commission has worked to reduce poverty 
Micro-projects 
In  Zimbabwe,  the  Micro-proJects  Programme,  which  uses  explicit  poverty criteria  to  guide the  selection  of 
projects, has funded several successful projects.  We visited the Rutope Rural Health Centre, which provided 
a  very  good  example  of  community  participation  (Zimbabwe  Case  Study  p.  25).  Other  donors  have 
recognised  the  quality  of  the  Micro-projects  Programme  in  Zimbabwe  and  some  have  expressed  their 
willingness to co-finance such projects. 
Stabex 
Stabex funds in  Cameroun, Tanzania and Cote d'lvoire were distributed directly to farmers as compensation 
payments.  An  evaluation study of the programme in  Tanzan1a shows that farmers used these resources on 
food, school fees and inputs (Tanzania Case Study p.  31 ). 
Sector reform 
In  Cote d'lvoire, the Commission has supported the progressive liberalisation of the coffee-cocoa sector, thus 
increasing the  revenue of  farmers  (Cote d'lvoire Case Study p.  4).  In  the Eastern  Caribbean countries, the 
gradual approach to the phasing out of  preferential treatment of the banana regime is intended to allow time 
for farmers to move to different crops (Eastern Caribbean Case Study pp.  12-16) 
Governance and the rule of Ia w 
While  in  the  past  EC  interventions  have  generally  had  a  limited  impact  on  governance, 
specific interventions, recent sector policy dialogue and the use of budget lines are beginning 
to have an impact on governance in  ACP countries.  In our country visits, we observed that in 
some cases,  the  EC' s  impact  in  this  area  appears  to  have  been  greater than  that of other 
donors. 
In the earlier year~ of the EC  -ACP partnership, the EC. like most other donors, did not focus 
sufficiently on  democracy. the rule of law and governance.  However. more recently the EC 
has become one of the first donors to tie aid to conditionality on this priority area, particularly 
with Lome IV  bis.  While this conditionality is a sensitive issue for many ACP governments, 
it appears to be supported in  principle by civil society in ACP countries.
34 
The SASP was one of the first Lome instruments to allow conditionality, but it was based on 
BWI conditionality,  with  too  many  conditions  and  with  micro-management  of the  reform 
programme. and therefore the  effect on  governance was limited.  However, the introduction 
of the  IMF guidelines on Governance, the  focus  of the World Bank on  corruption, and the 
Commission's pilot conditionality approach in  Burkina Faso (in the framework of the SPA) 
might all contribute to improving the impact of EC aid on governance.
35 
Most  pn~jects  have  in  the  past  had  little  impact  on  governance,  with  the  EC  giving 
insufficient  attention  to  institution  building (see  failures  of IRDPs in  this  area).  However, 
some specific interventions have had a high impact, such as the innovative approach followed 
by the  EC  in  supporting  the  consolidation of peace  in  Liberia  (see  Box).  In  many  cases, 
delegations have also begun to  play an  important role  in  raising difficult governance issues 
with  ACP governments.  In  Tanzania,  we  found  that  the  delegation  had  recently  taken  a 
strong stance on governance in  the transport sector. 
36  Similarly, targeted interventions such 
as  Micro-projects and Co-financing with  NGOs  have  in  many cases  supported governance 
through the strengthening of civil society.  The impact of project aid on governance should 
3..\ 
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Performance Criteria in  Future ACP-EU Cooperation, ECDPM, October 1997. 
A recent description of the problems of ownership of reform programmes can  be  found  in the Bottchwey et 
a/., IMF,  1998, op.  cit. 
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improve in  the future.  as the  EC has  begun to  focus  projects more closely on improving the 
governance of public sector institutions. 
Finally,  budget  lines  have  often  been  used  very  effectively  in  providing direct  support for 
democracy  and  human  rights.  Budget  lines  have  been  used  successfully  in  supporting 
elections and in  supporting NGOs' activities on human rights.  In Zimbabwe, for example, the 
EC has supported the  Legal Resources Foundation and, through Transparency International, 
the Fight Against Corruption.~
7 
Effective conflict prevention in  Liberia 
Following  the  Second  Abuja  peace  agreement  for  Liberia,  signed  in  August  1996,  the  EC,  with  an 
established presence  on  the  ground,  played  an  influential  role  in  quickly developing a well-coordinated 
set of measures aimed at consolidating peace. 
A key initiative was a three day workshop organised by the EC  in  September 1996, which was attended 
by faction  representatives from  the National  Disarmament and Demobilisation Committee as  well  as by 
other donor agencies.  Bringing the faction leaders together was a key stage in the peace negotiations. 
At  the workshop,  the  EC  took the  lead  in  presenting proposals for the  reintegration  of the fighters  into 
c1vil  society.  These  included  a  'jobs  for  guns'  programme,  assistance  for  the  reintegration  of  child 
combatants into the  community,  and a programme to  support the  restoration of democratic government 
and  the  holding  of  elections  in  1997.  Another critical  area  of  EC  support  was  a  programme  for the 
rehabilitation of roads  and bridges, which facilitated the deployment of ECOMOG peace-keeping forces 
throughout the country. 
The preliminary evidence  is  that the  EC's  programme  in  Liberia has achieved considerable success  in 
delivering aid efficiently and effectively.  The main factors behind this success are: 
•  delegated and decentralised management within an accountable framework; 
•  strong operational capacity within the EC's Aid Coordination Office (ACO); 
•  recruitment of high quality staff to the ACO; 
•  strong coordination with other donors: and 
•  efficient management and administration. 
Source: Libena Case Study 
Gender equality 
The impact of past EC aid interventions on gender equality has been low.  Recent progress in 
this  area  is  slow,  given  the  often  limited  commitment of ACP governments  and  the  very 
limited financial  and human resources available for mainstreaming gender issues.  Lome IV 
was the first  Lome Convention to  focus  on  gender issues, and a supporting Resolution was 
adopted by the Council in  December 1995. 
Information in  this area is  particularly limited.  Evaluations show that most EC interventions 
in  the  past  have  been  ·gender blind'.  with  no  gender dimension  or  disaggregated data on 
gender.  Many  projects  under Lome  II  and  III  had  a  negative  impact  on  women,  while  in 
multisector projects the  impact on  beneficiaries was not considered.
38  Only in water supply 
projects and fisheries  projects were  women the prime beneficiaries.  Our Case Studies also 
show very limited activity in gender equality. 
However, the  Commission notes that progress has been made recently, with the updating of 
the Gender Manual, more frequent use of the gender questionnaire in financial proposals, and 
the designation of staff in different DGVIII units to promote gender sensitivity.  A budget line 
has supported the use  of consultants to  provide gender sensitisation work in delegations and 
37 
38 
Zimbabwe Case Study p. 25 
Desk Study. Annex  19, p. 2 16  Chapter 2 
ACP governments.  In  May  1998,  after a  review  of progress  on the  1995  Resolution,  the 
Council agreed on  wide-ranging steps to enhance the operationalisation of the Resolution. 
Protecting the environment 
The environmental  impact of EC aid  to  ACP countries is  difficult to  assess.  The EC is  a 
signatory of many environmental conventions,
39  and Lome IV  has  made the environment a 
policy priority in  the EC-ACP partnership.  However, there is not yet an integrated EC policy 
which presents clear targets  and responsibilities nor has there  been a  significant increase in 
financial  support for the environment.
40  The Commission has been slow, compared to other 
donors,  in  introducing  procedures  to  integrate  environmental  factors  into the  project cycle 
(including systematic Environmental Impact Assessments).""' 
A  thorough sector evaluation.
12  found  that there  has not been a  clear strategy for integrating 
environmental  objectives  into  country  programmes or project  identification.  Environmental 
issues  are  only  partially  integrated  in  sectoral  policy  guidelines  and  National  Indicative 
Programmes,
43  though they appear to be better integrated in Regional Indicative Programmes. 
The application of environment instruments to non-programmable aid has not been consistent, 
'leading to a real and significant risk that Food Aid projects, Sectoral Import Programmes and 
Stabex funds could lead to adverse environmental and social impacts' (p. 9). 
The sector evaluation also provided information on the impact of environmental projects. 
44  It 
found that about half of a sample of EDF-ALA environment projects had no visible positive 
impact,  while  only  a  small  proportion  of  projects  have  demonstrated  the  likelihood  of 
sustainability  (particularly  institutional ).
45  The  evaluation concluded  that  the  environment 
budget  line  (B7 -6200)  'has  not  very  successfully  managed  to  promote  sustainable 
development  and  the  integration  of  the  environmental  dimension  into  the  development 
process over the period 1990-1995 as demonstrated by the low levels of effectiveness, impact 
and sustainability' .
4
(
1  However,  the  1997  Council  Regulation  should contribute to  greater 
clarity of objectives and accountability in the use of this budget line. 
Because  of the  difficulties  of designing  and  implementing  environmental  projects  (which 
require  inter-disciplinary  and  specialised  skills),  and  because  of  limited  ownership  and 
participation of ACP governments and local communities, some of these outcomes are shared 
by other donors.  However. environmental instruments were introduced by the Commission 
later than they were by  other donors, and effectiveness is  still severely compromised by the 
very limited number of specialised staff in  DGVIII and in  delegations - funds managed by 
each DGVIII environment staff-member are eight times the size of those managed by DFID 
_\l) 
40 
41 
These include the  5th  Environmental  Action  Programme (adopted  by  the Council of Ministers and Member 
States in  Februaf)  1993) and agreements made at  UNCED (mcluding the Rio Declaration. and Agenda 21  for 
global acuon ). 
Evaluation of  the Environmental Performance of  EC Prof?rammes in Developing Countries, Synthesis Report. 
vol. I, ERM. December 1997. pp. 4-5.  See also vol. II (main text). 
An environment manual was introduced in  1993 but its use has been mandatory only since May 1996. 
ERM, 1997, op.  cit. 
liED,  1995.  Often  when  indicative  programmes include the  environment dimension  as  a  priority.  this  is 
insufficiently translated into strategic plans or targets. 
The evaluation involved an inventory and a desk study phase of evaluation policies and instruments, as  well 
as  a  field  phase.  The  field  phase  focused  on  a  sample  of  EDF-ALA-MED  projects  in  which  the 
environmental  component  was  either  primary  or  secondary,  as  well  as  projects  funded  through  the 
Environment  Budget  Line.  The  Inventory  of Environment and  Tropical  Forest  Programmes  (ERM,  May 
1996) recorded that 8.5%:  of total funds committed by DGVIJI and DGIB in  1990-1995 went to either primary 
or secondary environment projects. 
However, success was more likely in the extension phases of projects that were already being funded. 
Cost-effectiveness was also found to be low. Results of EC aid  17 
staff and more than seventy times those of a World Bank staff-member.  Among Commission 
staff, there  is  still  limited awareness of the  role that the Environmental Unit should play in 
country programming and EDF projects. 
However, following the sectoral evaluation, the Commission has taken measures that should 
strengthen  the  environmental  impact  of  its  programmes.  Recent  measures  include  the 
updating of the  environmental  manual, training  on  awareness of environmental issues,  and 
framework  contracts  to  facilitate  Environmental  Impact  Assessments.  In  the  field,  we 
observed  that  in  the  transport  sectors  in  Cameroun and  Tanzania  environmental  appraisal 
techniques are increasingly being applied in the planning and implement.ation of projects. 
2.3  Supporting 
outputs 
institutions  and  delivering  project 
EC  aid  has  had  more  success  in  delivering  immediate  project  outputs,  including  physical 
outputs,  than  in  following  a  policy-based  approach.  The  impact  of EC  aid  on  poverty 
depends not only on the delivery of project outputs (including physical outputs), but also, and 
more  importantly,  on  the  success  in  engaging  committed  ACP  governments  in  policy 
dialogue,  in  helping  to  strengthen  local  capacities,  and  in  coordination  with other donors. 
Until recently, these areas did not receive sufficient focus in EC aid.  This is  reflected in the 
evidence  from  the  Desk  Study  and  recent  evaluations  and  from  our  own  country  visits 
showing  the  limited  'effectiveness'  of many  EC  programmes and  projects  until  the  early 
1990s.  However.  the  recent  emphasis  on  policy  dialogue  should  contribute  to  better 
performance of EC aid in the future. 
The insufficient focus  on  institutions and  policies is  in  part explained by the  'entitlement' 
approach that characterised much of the history of the EC-ACP Lome partnership.  There was 
no policy or governance selectivity or conditionality attached to EC aid, and the Commission 
had no instruments to  reward committed governments.  Instead, programme objectives were 
initially  driven  by  ACP  governments'  support  to  state  initiatives,  controls  and  large 
investments.  In  this  context  donors  focused  on the  individual  contributions of their own 
projects and coordination was not seen as a priority. 
This section of the report offers a broad assessment of the contribution of EC aid instruments 
to  supporting institutions,  policies and delivery of project outputs, drawing on the evidence 
presented in  the Desk Study and the Country Case Studies of this evaluation.  More details on 
the performance of individual instruments are presented in the Boxes on pages 21  to 23. 
P  "d47  rogramme a1 
The Commission now  recognises the  importance of a policy-based aid programme,  'selectivity' 
and donor coordination.  The  Commission's involvement in  structural  adjustment operations  is 
facilitating  its  transition  to  this  new  approach.  Up  till  now,  the  Commission's involvement in 
overall policy dialogue and  its  support to  public expenditure reviews have often been limited by 
staffing constraints, by the limited ACP ownership of reform programmes, and by  over-detailed 
.17  ·Programme  aid'  (as  used  in  Understanding  European  Community  Aid:  Aid Policies,  Management  and 
Distribution  Explained.  001/European  Commission,  1997)  includes  support  for  structural  adjustment 
(including import support programmes initiated under Lome III), Stabex and Sysmin.  In this report, we  also 
include programme food aid. 18  Chapter 2 
earmarking  of counterpart  funds.  Nevertheless.  in  Zimbabwe  and  Cote  d'Ivoire  we  did  find 
effective overall economic monitoring in spite of limited resources:-tx 
The  Commission's  early  focus  on  the  importance  of public  expenditure  management  has 
encouraged other donors to focus  on these  areas (as  seen  with the  new Public Expenditure 
Review  guidelines).
49  However,  although  there  have  been  some  successes  (e.g.  in  Cote 
d' I  voire.'i
0
),  the  Commission's  work  in  the  field  has  encountered  difficulties.  Support to 
policies and institutions requires a more coordinated donor approach in capacity building and 
in  addressing  the  problems  of conditionality (see  the  Commission's pilot  work  with other 
donors in Burkina Faso  ). 
The effectiveness of earlier programme aid such as Stabex and Food Aid was limited because 
they  initially did not address the policy environment.  The introduction of conditionality into 
Stabex  has  in  some cases supported sector reform, as  we  saw for example in  the proposed 
innovative  use  of Stabex  to  support  restructuring  of the  banana  industry  in  the  Eastern 
Caribbean region  .  .'i 
1  However. in  many cases the delays introduced by Stabex conditionality 
have neutralised the potential stabilising effect of Stabex on export earnings.  A recent change 
in policy on programme food aid should enhance the effectiveness of programme food aid by 
linking it to food security strategies.  However, donor coordination in this area still appears to 
be weak.
52 
Sector projects 
Until the early 1990s, EC projects in different sectors (see Boxes on pp. 21-23) focused on the 
delivery  of  physical  outputs  rather  than  on  policies  or  institutional  strengthening  in  the 
sectors.  These  project  interventions  were  therefore  unable  to  address  key  sectoral  policy 
constraints, which limited the effectiveness of the interventions in producing physical results, 
and  resulted  in  low  sustainability of most  projects.  In  agriculture  and  rural  development, 
Integrated  Rural  Development Programmes and  large-scale  irrigation  projects were carried 
out in  a  distorted agricultural sector and created infrastructure that was often not integrated 
with national policies.  Sinlilarly, projects to support small and medium scale enterprises did 
not focus on the  environment for private  sector development.  The focus on education and 
health was on  scholarships,  vocational training and curative and specialised services, rather 
than on  sector reform that could contribute more directly to the reduction of poverty.  In our 
own country case studies,  we saw in  Jamaica, for example, that EC assistance in  the water 
sector had been a success in engineering terms, but had initially neglected the issues of water 
supply management, financial sustainability and social policy. 
53 
However. the results of EC aid were often good when measured in terms of physical outputs, 
especially  in  the  transport  sector  and  in  infrastructure-building.  This  has  been  possible 
because of the Commission· s strong engineering and technical expertise.  Projects have been 
less  effective  in  physical  terms  in  agriculture  and  rural  development,  in  education,  and  in 
support for industry.  In  most sectoral interventions, however, sustainability has been low, as 
Case Studies Synthesis p.  39 
The evaluation of the  PER for  the  SPA was  presented in  the  report  'Strengthening Budget Management in 
SPA Countries', NEI,  September 1995.  The work. sponsored by the Commission and SIDA, was carried out 
by  the  SPA  Working  Group  on  Public  Expenditures  and  benefited  from  two  seminars  with  African 
participation.  The new  guidelines were presented in  July  1997.  The approach is  being tried out in Uganda 
and Tanzania. 
Case Studies Synthesis p.  41 
Eastern Caribbean Case Study p.  15 
Joint Evaluation of European  Union  Programme Food Aid, ODI,  1996.  However,  note the Commission's 
promotion of the Donors' Code of Conduct on Food Aid. 
Jamaica Case Study pp. 22-23 Results of EC aid  19 
a  result  of  the  insufficient  attention  gtven  to  strengthening  the  policy  and  institutional 
framework. 
New  approaches.  As  a  result  of the  lessons  learned  in  recent  evaluations,  EC  aid  has 
increased its  focus  on  policies. institutions and  donor coordination.  It  is  too early to  assess 
the  performance of different sectors in  adopting this  new  approach.  However, our country 
visits found some evidence that the approach has been most successfully adopted in the health 
and transport sectors.  The health sector in Cote d'Ivoire is  an  important success (see Box). 
Success in  implementing this new approach depends in large part on the in-country capacity 
of delegations.  For example, we  found that the strong capacity of the Zimbabwe delegation 
was a key factor in  the initial success of agriculture sector reform. 
54 
Successful policy dialogue on health in Cote d'lvoire 
The EC  is considered, by both the Government and other donors, to have made a  valuable contribution 
to the restoration  of the  public health sector in  Cote d'lvoire.  The existence of a clear sectoral strategy, 
and  its  support by  donors through  intensive policy dialogue,  have formed  an  enabling  environment for 
donor activity in the sector.  However, the capacity of the Government to co-ordinate and manage donor 
activities has been equally important in ensuring the coherence, complementarity and success of donors' 
interventions.  The EC  has  also played a lead role  amongst donors in  the  health sector policy dialogue 
due in part to its important financial involvement, and to its very good relations with the Ministry of Health, 
facilitated by the  presence of competent EC-financed TA  adviser to  the  Ministry.  Health  is  a sector in 
which  the  Commission  has  developed  its  own sector strategy and  institutional and technical expertise, 
which have enabled it to contribute effectively to international discussions on  health and to offer support 
in  the field.  Since  mid-1997,  the  EC  has taken  the  lead  in  a pilot initiative for improving  coordination 
amonqst Member States and other donors in Cote d'lvoire, in particular in the health sector. 
Participatory projects 
The  relatively  good  performance  of  EC  Micro-projects  (and  in  many  cases  also  of 
cooperation with NGOs) suggests that close contact with direct beneficiaries helps to improve 
the  design,  delivery  and  sustainability  of interventions.  These  interventions  have  often 
successfully  contributed to  strengthening  the  capacities of local  communities.
55  While co-
financing  with  NGOs  has  faced  some  problems  of coordination  and  coherence,  Micro-
projects are (together with transport sector projects) the EC interventions that most evaluators 
regard as the most successful.  In our country visits, we found Micro-projects to be successful 
in  Zimbabwe
50  and also  in  Liberia,  where the  flexibility  of the  Micro-projects programme 
facilitated the delivery of aid in the absence of a stable government.  5
7 
Regional cooperation 
In  contrast  to  the  participatory  interventions,  the  weak  commitment of ACP countries  to 
regional organisations has led in  the past to weak results in  regional cooperation programmes. 
Regional cooperation has been a priority in EC aid.  The bulk of regional funds is allocated to 
programmes which are regional in conception and intent, but national in execution.  However, 
their regional specificity makes these programmes lengthier and more complex than national 
projects. 
54 
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Zimbabwe Case Study pp. 21-23 
However. their effect on policies and on broader institutional strengthening has been more limited. 
Zimbabwe Case Study p. 25.  See also Box in Chapter 3. 
Liberia Case Study pp.  10-12 20  Chapter 2 
Programmes setting up and running regional institutions (including those supporting regional 
integration)  have  been  weak.  This  is  explained  by  limited  government  ownership  and 
insufficient focus.  They have made some contribution towards a  gradual  intensification of 
cooperation. but there has  been no  noticeable impact on regional integration.  "Programmes 
for  trade cooperation are  rated  among  those  with  low  impact and  have  failed  to  affect the 
negative trend of exchanges among members of regional groups' .
58 
In our case study in the Eastern Caribbean, we found that the EC' s policy dialogue to support 
the  restructuring of the  banana industry  has  been  very  active (see the  Box in  section 2.5), 
whereas the support to regional integration may have insufficient focus. 
The  EC  has  decided  to  give  renewed  priority  to  regional  cooperation  and  part.icularly  to 
regional  integration.
5
'J  Many  of  the  weaknesses  of  previous  regional  interventions  are 
addressed in  the  new approach. seen in  interventions such as  the Cross Border Initiative and 
support to  UEMOA (West Africa).  These actions were co-sponsored by the Commission in 
collaboration with other donors, they include the private sector and rely on existing regional 
organisations.  Early indications of the new approach are positive. 
Desk Study, Annex 17, page 3 
See  Council  Resolution  of  1 June  1995.  It  states  that  these  programmes  are  a  major  feature  of EC 
development policy  and  may  contribute to  fostering  'the smooth and  gradual  integration of the developing 
countries  in  the  world  economy'  (one  of the  Maastricht  objectives  for  development  policy).  The  new 
approach  will  be  based  on  developing  capabilities  and  strengthening  institutions.  support  for  the  private 
sector. and the support of structural adjustment instruments to intra-regional economic liberalisation. Results of EC aid  21 
Assessments of instruments and sectors: (1) Programme aid
1 
Programme food  aid,  which  began  in  1967,  was the  first form  of  balance of payments support used by 
EC  aid.  It was initially focused  on  the  supply side  and  self-sufficiency,  but following the Joint Evaluation 
and a 1996 Council Regulation it was  better integrated with food  security strategies and food  entitlement. 
Stabex was  set up  in  1975  (Lome  I)  to mitigate the  harmful consequences of  instability by acting as an 
automatic  system  for  stabilising  export  receipts,  to  maintain  the  purchasing  power  of  populations 
affected.  Stabex conditionality was  introduced under Lome  IV,  together with  the  Structural Adjustment 
Facility  (1990).  The  structural  adjustment  support  programmes  (SASP)  were  set  up  to  support  the 
general BWI  structural adjustment programmes, taking into account the social dimensions of adjustment 
and  the  requirements  of  long  term  development,  adapting the  speed  of  reforms  to  the  constraints and 
capacities of specific countries, facilitating the internalisation of this process, and focusing on the  regional 
dimensions of adjustment. 
Structural adjustment 
1 
The  SASP  has  supported  policy  dialogue  between  the  BWI  and  ACP  governments.  At  headquarters 
level, the  strategy has  been  to support the  BWI  programmes while  using  international forums  (such  as 
the  Special  Programme  for  Africa)  to  support  the  ownership  and  social  dimensions  of  the  overall 
adjustment  programme.  The  Commission's  in-country  involvement 'in  the  overall  policy  dialogue  on 
structural  reforms  and  its  participation  in  public expenditure  reviews  have often  been limited by  staffing 
constraints,  by the  degree  of  ownership  of  the  reform  programme,  and  by  over-detailed  earmarking  of 
counterpart  funds.  A  more  general  constraint  has  been  the  mixed  results  of  the  BWI  reform 
programmes.  The close monitoring of macroeconomic conditions and reforms, and participation in public 
expenditure  reviews,  are  essential  for  supporting  sectoral  policy  dialogue  and  for  the  effective 
implementation  of  the  SASP.  Nevertheless,  the  Commission's  involvement  in  structural  adjustment 
operations is facilitating its transition to being a policy-based donor. 
The systematic earmarking of counterpart funds has  proved difficult.  While earmarking to sectors has in 
some cases facilitated sector dialogue, over-detailed earmarking  ~as been administratively burdensome, 
as  we  saw in  Zimbabwe and Jamaica (Jamaica Case  Study 18-21).  The SASP focus  on the  budgetary 
process in  the  social sectors  is  in  some cases contributing to  initial improvements in  public expenditure 
management,  for  instance  in  Cote  d'lvoire  and  Cameroun.  Significant  counterpart  funds  have  been 
targeted  at  the  social  sectors,  but  there  has  been  only  limited  effectiveness  in  protecting  budgeted 
expenditure in these sectors.  As with  other donors' structural adjustment programmes, sustainability has 
also  been  affected  by  conditionalities  being  too  numerous  and  unrealistic  and  by  the  difficulty  of 
strengthening  public administration (particularly in budgetary management in the social sectors). 
Stabex
1 
Prior  to  1990,  Stabex  did  not  include  conditionalities.  Stabex  funds  were  often  used  to  support 
inadequate projects and  monitonng was very limited.  However, this facilitated some effectiveness in the 
stabilisation of export earnings. 
The  introduction  of  conditionality  (through  the  Framework of  Mutual  Obligations)  and  the  monitoring  of 
activities have  improved effectiveness.  However, the  resulting  delays have  neutralised the  stabilisation 
effect of the Stabex funds,  which were already limited by the size of Stabex.  Compensation to producers 
has sometimes achieved positive results  (for instance in Tanzania), but there has been no clear effect on 
sector diversification.  However, the use of policy conditionality has  in  very recent cases facilitated sector· 
reform  and  restructuring,  which  could  be  sustainable.  The flexibility of Stabex has  also  in  some  cases 
allowed a rapid response where urgent action was needed. 
Programme food aid 
In  the  past,  the effectiveness of food  aid  was  weakened both  because of the  modest scale of  rc;so:...;cos 
and because tr.e  Commission did not address the causes of food insecurity.  Food aid provided balance 
of payments support. and  in  most cases it substituted for commercial imports, with no clear effect on food 
security.  It  created  counterpart  funds,  with  some  difficulties,  but  they  were  not  conditional  on  sector 
reform,  and  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  programme  has  supported  agricultural  development. 
Moreover,  programme food  aid  was  not  effectively targeted to  the  poor.  Food  aid's effectiveness  has 
been  greater  when  responding  to  a transitory  food  insecurity  situation.  But  this  is  often  affected  by 
management  inefficiencies  - a  1994  evaluation  noted  that  the  time  needed  for  the  food  to  reach 
beneficiaries  ranged  between  31  weeks  and  44  weeks.  The  effect of  the change  in  policy since  1996 
has not yet been evaluated, but food security strategies have been negotiated in a number of countries. 
Coordination through the Food Aid  Committee has  not been systematic and  appears to have been one-
way,  with  information running  only from  the Commission to  Member States.  In-country coordination  by 
the World  Food  Programme mostly consists of information sharing.  The EU  however took an  important 
step by carrying out a Joint Evaluation of Food Aid, which was completed in  1996. 
1.  Boxes  on  followmg  3  pages  largely  drawn  from  the  Desk Study.  Stabex drawn  from  CERDI  evaluation, 
March 1998.  Structural adjustment drawn from  Case Studies Synthesis. 22  Chapter 2 
Assessments of instruments and sectors: (2) 
Transport 
Investment programmes in  transport have been successful as far as physical output is concerned. 
The Commission has a strong engineering and technical presence, and there is agreement that the 
implementation of infrastructure projects has been one of the strongest areas of EC  aid.  However, 
as  with  other  donors.  an  emphasis  on  policies  and  institutions  has  only  appeared  recently. 
Evaluations  have  shown  that  the  weakness  of  ACP  institutions  and  management  was 
underestimated,  and  that  this  has  affected  road  maintenance  and  the  financial  sustainability  of 
transport projects. 
There has been insufficient assessment of the broad impact of transport projects on  the poor, and 
limited  local  participation  in  project  design.  However.  recent  interventions  and  new  policy 
guidelines have attempted to  address these problems.  For example, the financing agreement on a 
recent  road  maintenance  programme  in  Tanzania  (RUSIRM)  includes  policy  conditions  and 
monitoring  indicators  (Tanzania  Case  Study  p.  37).  Donor  coordination  also  appears  to  be 
gradually Improving. 
Agriculture and rural development 
Until  the  1990s,  the  focus  was  on  Integrated  Rural  Development  Programmes  and  large-scale 
irrigation  schemes.  IRDP  programmes  were  often  too  dispersed,  and  many  projects  were  not 
sustainable.  Increases  in  production  were  uneven,  given  the  many  policy  constraints  facing  the 
agricultural sector.  While public infrastructure was  built,  which did often have a short-term impact 
on the quality of life in  rural areas, it was often not part of a national plan and sometimes exceeded 
the  capacity  of  local  areas.  Results  were  often  disappointing  in  the  environmental  protection 
component  of  programmes  and  in  the  organisation  of  local  civil  society.  These  projects  were 
therefore often  rated  as  not sustainable.  Their impact on  rural  incomes has  not  been  monitored, 
but it is likely to  have been uneven. 
These  problems  have  led  to  sector  approaches  and  support  to  liberalisation.  While  these 
programmes have often been affected by limited government commitment, sector approaches, with 
their emphasis on gradual institutional strengthening and donor coordination, are beginning to show 
their  potential.  as  seen  in  the  Agricultural  and  Services  Management  Project  in  Zimbabwe 
(Zimbabwe Case Study pp. 20-23). 
Education 
The focus was initially on  scholarships. and later on  vocational training, infrastructure and teaching 
materials.  There have been few evaluations in this area, but programme objectives appear often to 
have been unclear, leading to weak results (particularly in  regional programmes).  Interventions did 
not involve significant policy dialogue.  Since Lome  IV  and the SASP, the  emphasis has gradually 
begun  to  change  to  basic  education  and  more  policy  dialogue.  However,  progress  in  policy 
dialogue has been difficult (see for example the difficulties in  the  Sector Development Programme 
in Tanzania, in the Tanzania Case Study pp. 28-31 ). 
Health 
The focus was initially on  curative services and  specialised activities.  There were few evaluations 
in  this early period.  More  recently,  there has been  a shift to  support for reforming health systems 
towards primary health care policy,  AIDS programmes and family planning.  The new approach has 
given a clear focus to  strengthening policies and  institutions in  the health sector.  With a small but 
motivated  health  unit  in  DGVIII,  staff  have  been  involved  in  developing innovative programmes in 
the sector,  using project and programme aid coherently and coordinating with other donors,  as we 
saw in  Cote  d'lvo1re  (see  Box on  p.  18).  While it  is too early to  assess the impact, the focus given 
to institutions is important for sustainability.  Previous evaluations have noted some concerns, such 
as the small size of the AIDS programme and the emphasis on infrastructure and equipment. 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises and industry 
The  effectiveness of  the  instruments for the support of  industry was  limited  in  the past  because, 
until  Lome  IV,  there  was  little  focus  on  creating  an  appropriate  environment  for  private  sector 
development. 
An  evaluation  of  support  for  small- and  medium-sized  enterprises  found  some  impact  on  job 
creation,  although  at  a  relatively  high  cost  per  job.  Sustainability  has  been  affected  by  the 
weaknesses of credit mechanisms and the neglect of physical components of investments. 
The  Commission  shares  responsibility  for the  support  of  industry  with  the  European  Investment 
Bank (EIB)  and the Centre for the  Development of  Industry (COl).  No  recent  evaluations on  EIB 
and CDI  are available. Results of EC aid  23 
Assessments of instruments and sectors: (3) 
Micro-projects 
The  Micro-projects  instrument  was  introduced  in  1975  and  its  principles  were  reaffirmed  under 
Lome  IV:  promoting  small-scale  operations  with  collective  benefits  which  are  initiated,  managed 
and  financially  supported  by  the  beneficiaries.  It  has  been  used  mostly  to  finance  physical 
infrastructure in  rural  areas,  which  has  in  most cases been  properly constructed.  The success of 
Micro-projects  depends  on  the  operational  capacity of  grassroots  organisations  and  its  effective 
support to  local  organisations.  The  programme concept  and  design  is  clear,  and  the  orientation 
towards  beneficiaries  is  often  clearer than  with  other instruments.  Evaluators  conclude  that this 
instrument  has  had  a  positive  impact  on  democracy,  decentralisation,  human  resources 
development.  and  poverty  reduction.  Successful  examples  were  found  in  our  field  studies  in 
Zimbabwe and  Liberia.  Sustainability has been enhanced by local participation but there has been 
extensive  use  of  TA.  Initially  there  were  some  problems  with  the  administration  of  funds,  but 
implementation units have addressed the credibility and efficiency of these programmes. 
Cooperation with NGOs 
Co-financing of NGOs, which is the main instrument of EC cooperation with NGOs, started in  1976. 
It  has  supported  interventions  in  many  sectors,  targeting  in  particular  the  poorest  segments  of 
society.  NGO  projects  have  also  been  financed  in  the  context  of  food  aid,  rehabilitation 
programmes, human rights and democracy. 
The  strength  of  cooperation  with  NGOs  derives  from  the  close  contact  between  NGOs  and 
beneficiaries.  This  often  produces  greater  'ownership'  of  interventions,  and  may  increase  the 
impact and sustainability (with, for example, communities making contributions to maintenance). 
However,  there  have been some weaknesses.  The large number of small projects involved raises 
problems  of  management  for  the  Commission,  and  of  coordination  and  coherence  of  these 
interventions with  other instruments and  with  national  policies.  They  have often  suffered from  a 
short-term  perspective,  with  insufficient  analytical  understanding  of  the  roots  of  problems.  In 
addition,  procedures for planning, financing and  monitoring are  often  weak.  Sustainability is often 
affected  by  the  weakness  of  Southern  NGOs.  While  many  of  these  weaknesses  are  being 
addressed through  new guidelines  (e.g.  on  food  aid),  it  is  too  early to  judge the  results of  recent 
interventions. 
Regional cooperation 
Regional cooperation has always been a priority in  EC aid  (14% of  EDF funds between 1986 and 
1995,  see  ODI  1997  p.  53),  however  initial  programmes  involved  a  spectrum  of  uncoordinated 
interventions (Lome  I and  Lome  II).  Later Conventions brought more  focus,  but some problems 
remained.  The bulk of  regional funds is allocated to programmes which are regional in conception 
and intent, but national in  their execution.  Programmes have focused particularly on transport and 
communications,  but  have  also  frequently  been  concerned  with  agricultural  research,  education, 
training,  and  trade  promotion.  The  regional  specificity  makes  these  programmes  lengthier  and 
more  complex  than  national  projects,  particularly  given  the  absence  of  regional  officers  in 
delegations and the weaknesses of  regional organisations (despite technical assistance provided). 
However, project execution appears not to be different from national programmes. 
The  experience  has  been  less  favourable  with  programmes  setting-up  and  running  regional 
institutions.  Institutions  have  proliferated,  but  ownership  by  governments  is  weak  and  the 
programmes are  not sustainable.  This has  also  been the  case  for institutions supporting regional 
integration.  Evaluations  conclude  that  interventions  have  made  some  contribution  towards  a 
gradual  intensification  of  cooperation,  but  there  has  been  no  noticeable  impact  on  regional 
integration.  Programmes for trade cooperation  have failed  to  reverse the  negative trend  in  trade 
between members of regional groups. 
The  EC  has  decided  now  to  give  priority  to  regional  integration,  focusing  on  staff  training, 
institution-building,  and  the  negotiation  of  short-term  compensation  for the transitional  cost from 
reforms,  as  well  as  persuasion  to  ensure  government ownership.  Many  of the  weaknesses  of 
previous interventions are addressed in the new approach, seen in interventions such as the Cross 
Border Initiative in  Eastern and Southern Africa, initiated in  1992, and the support to UEMOA (West 
Africa) for tariff reform and macroeconomic convergence.  These actions were co-sponsored by the 
Commission with  other donors,  they include the private sector,  and  they rely  on  existing  regional 
organisations.  The focus  is  on  capacity-building  and  technical  assistance for regional  institutions 
which  have  a  mandate  for  economic  integration.  While  traditional  regional  cooperation  still 
accounts for the bulk of project funding, early indications of the new approach are positive. 24  Chapter 2 
8: What explains these results? 
The evaluation found that the following three factors are central in  explaining EC aid results: 
the  commitment and  capacity of ACP institutions  (  2.4  ),  donor coordination  (2.5),  and the 
performance of the Commission itself (2.6 ). 
All  three  factors  affect  EC  aid  results  across  all  programmes  and  projects.  Below,  we 
consider each in  tun1.  For each, we assess the ways in  which it affects EC aid results.  The 
performance of the Commission is examined in more detail in chapter 3. 
We could  have  presented  these  issues  in  other ways.  In  our presentation,  some issues cut 
across  more  than  one  of the  three  factors.  However,  our presentation  allows  us  to  show 
clearly that observations  in  the  field  confirmed the  importance of the  principles for results-
oriented and effective aid, identified at the beginning of this report, namely: 
•  the importance of the  commitment and capacity of ACP institutions.  Reducing 
poverty  and  achieving  other  priority  objectives  depend  above  alJ  on  the 
institutional and policy environment in developing countries themselves.  That is 
why the  Commission should help to  strengthen institutions and policies in ACP 
countries  committed  to  reform.  However,  the  Commission,  and  other donors, 
have found difficulties in this institutional role. 
•  the  importance of donor coordination.  Since aid financing  is  typically fungible, 
donors  should  not  be  concerned  just  with  the  quality  of  their  individual 
interventions,  but  should  act  together.  That  is  why  it  is  important  for  the 
Commission to coordinate with other donors.  However, donor coordination in the 
field is often still weak. 
•  the  importance  for  the  Commission  of having  clear  objective~,  of measuring 
results against these objectives, and of being a results-oriented organisation. 
2.4  The commitment and capacity of ACP institutions 
Aid can only reduce poverty and have an impact on the other priority objectives in the •right' 
institutional  and  policy  context.  The  capacity  and  commitment  of  ACP  institutions 
(government and civil society) are key determinants of the results of EC aid.  They affect both 
the success of the overall reform programme
6
u and the success of individual projects.
61  This 
was confirmed in our case studies. 
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Sec Dollar D.  and  Svenson J..  What Explains  the  Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programs? 
June 1998, WPS  1938, and World Bank, Washington DC.  See also Bottchwey et al., IMF, 1998, op. cit. 
A recent analysis of more than 900 completed projects confirms that 'borrower performance is most critical to 
determining project outcome.  Good borrower performance raises the probability of a satisfactory outcome by 
35  to  40  percentage  points.'  OED.  The  Annual Review of Development Effectiveness  (ARDE),  November 
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Ways  In  which A  CP institutions  have  affected  the  performance of EC 
aid 
Commitment determines the implementation of policy reforms 
Because of the  ·entitlement' approach embodied in  the EC-ACP partnership, EC aid was in 
the  past provided to countries which were not committed to  'good governance'
62  or policies 
for promoting investment and growth.
03  This limited the effectiveness of EC aid.  The EC's 
shift  towards  the  ·conditionality'  approach  was  intended to  address this  problem.  The EC 
structural  adjustment  programme supported the conditionalities of the  BWI, and introduced 
also a number of specific conditionalities.  However, the  ·conditionality' approach has had a 
number  of  weaknesses.  All  the  evaluation  country  visits  looked  at  policy  dialogue  in 
structural adjustment. and confirmed the difficulties of the ·conditionality' approach. 
In  many cases,  the  weakness of ACP civil  services and the  ACP need of donor funds,  has 
resulted in  ACP governments accepting  reform  policies which  were  prepared  by  the  BWI 
(including Policy Framework Papers, Letters of Intent and Public Expenditure Reviews).  The 
weakness of ACP civil services made it  difficult to elaborate quickly alternative policies to 
discuss with donors from a position of strength.  In this context, the BWI often relied on too 
many  conditions,  many  of them  unrealistic,  resulting  in  an  attempt  to  micro-manage  the 
reform  process.  For example,  see  the  discussion  on  policy  dialogue  in  the  SASP in  the 
Tanzania Case Study.n-:  In Tanzania we found that the government was often confused by the 
large number of conditionalities from different donors. 
All  this  has  contributed  to  insufficient  government  'ownership'  of the  reform  programme, 
which contributes to  a  lack of commitment (and capacity) to  implement reform policies. In 
practice, many ACP governments have had to agree to policy and institutional conditionalities 
which  they  knew  they  could  not  (or  were  not  willing  ) to  fulfil.  The insufficient focus  on 
building civil society's support and consensus for reform has also undermined conditionality 
and contributed to the reversal of policy reforms.
6
:;  See also the Zimbabwe Case Study. 
The  conditionality  approach  has  been  further  weakened by  donors'  incentives  to  disburse 
funds  even  when  a  government's  track  record  on  implementing  reforms  is  poor.
66 
Conditionality has not  in  practice been  very  'selective'  in  BWI programmes.  Some of the 
countries we visited have  been undergoing  'stop-go'  structural adjustment for more than 10 
years (e.g. Tanzania and Jamaica).
67 
The  problems  associated  with  the  insufficient  'ownership'  and  insufficient  'selectivity'  of 
reform  programmes  have  recently  been  recognised  by  the  IMF  itself.
68  The  EC  SASP 
programmes have shared many of the difficulties of the conditionality approach.  However, 
the  Commission  has  been  among  the  first  donors  to  be  concerned  about  'ownership'  and 
institutional  capacity.  It  is  currently  testing  (with  other  donors)  a  new  approach  to 
conditionality  in  Burkina  Faso,  to  reinforce  government  ownership  of  reforms  through 
intensified preparation of the reform programme.
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Including democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 
IDS.  1996. op. cit. 
Tanzania Case Study pp. 20-22 
Bottchwey K., eta!., IMF.  1998. op.  cit. 
See discussions on the selectivity of the Higher Impact Adjustment Lending of the World Bank. 
'Sitting with the IMF and the World Bank over the last ten years in structural adjustment loans is  something 
like being in  the dentist chair for ten years.'  Address by Prof. J.  Sachs at the  1998 World Economic Forum, 
Windhoek. !\lamibia. 
Distilling the Lessonsfrom the ESAF Reviews, July 1998, IMF. 
The pilot also aims to link structural adjustment disbursements to  agreed performance targets and to enhance 
donor coordination by carrying out joint donors assessments. 26  Chapter 2 
Participation affects the realism of donor projects 
In  our country visih,  we  observed that many  EC  aid projects, which should have been identified 
and prepared by ACP governments, have in  fact been prepared by foreign  technical assistance or 
by  the  Commission,  often  with  inadequate  supervision  from  ACP civil  services.  Where  ACP 
governments  have  weak  capacity,  their  participation  in  sectoral  policy  frameworks  and  the 
identification  and  preparation of donor projects  is  often  limited.  This  also contributed to  limit 
consultations with other stakeholders.  (See,  for example, the Box on the preparation of a project 
in  Zimbabwe in  chapter 3).  Where donors and foreign consultants play the lead role, the result 
can be  projects and policies that do not reflect realities on the ground. 
By  contrast,  the  close  involvement of civil  society  in  project  preparation can  in some cases  be 
very  effective.  This  is  seen  in  Micro-projects  programmes.  And,  in  Jamaica,  the  success  of 
policy dialogue on the Banana Support Programme was in  large part due to the involvement of the 
.  'II 
pnvate sector. 
Government capacity affects both policy dialogue and aid implementation 
While many donors suggest policies and projects which point in the right direction, they often 
underestimate  their  institutional  requirements.  In  particular,  ACP  governments  have 
difficulties in implementing institutional reforms. 
The co-management of EC aid makes it particularly dependant on the capacity of ACP civil 
services.  The  capacity  of ACP governments  has  heavily  influenced  the  way  in  which  EC 
interventions  have  been designed and implemented, and  this  in  tum  has  affected the EC' s 
contribution to the process of institutional-strengthening  . 
Where  capacity  has  been  high,  the 
Commission has been able to rely more on 
ACP  governments.  In  such  cases,  the 
office of the National  Authorising Officer 
has  been  integrated  in  a  particular 
ministry (usually the  Ministry of Finance) 
and  has  been  staffed  with  civil  servants, 
the  EC'  s  procedures  have  been  more  in 
line  with the  government's, projects have 
been managed by the normal ci vii  service, 
and donor coordination has  been more  in 
government's  hands.  By  contrast,  where 
implementation capacity has been low, the 
Commission  and  ACP  governments  have 
found  themselves in  a  vicious circle.  To 
circumvent  government's  low  capacity, 
the  Commission  has  sometimes  adopted 
parallel structures, and the NAO office has 
been  staffed  mainly  with  consultants, 
which  may  further  weaken  capacity  (see 
Box). 
.-------------------------------------~ 
Institutional  arrangements  for  EC 
aid management in Cameroun 
•  There  are  three  support  units  to  the  NAO 
responsible  for  managing  the  three  most important 
instruments of EC aid to Cameroun: a Stabex unit, a 
SASP Unit and a Co-ordination Unit. 
•  These  units  are  staffed  with  consultants.  No civil 
servants  work  with  them.  Counterparts  were  not 
designated. 
•  There  is  no  structure officially in charge of donor 
co-ordination. 
•  There  is  a  general  use  of  TA-staffed  Project 
Management  Units  loosely  attached  to  line 
ministries  and  monitored  by  a  Co-ordination  Unit 
(also staffed by TAs). 
•  A separate Tender Board has been created for EDF-
funded projects, using EDF procurement procedures 
instead of local procedures.  While this has speeded 
up  procurement,  it  is  regarded  as  an  unsustainable 
solution. 
Government capacity is not evenly distributed - it varies not only between countries, but also 
between sectors within a country.  In the countries we visited, capacity was found to be higher 
in Zimbabwe, Cote d'lvoire and Jamaica than in Tanzania and Cameroun.  Within Cameroun, 
capacity  was  found  to  be  higher in  the  transport  sector than  in  the  cocoa  sector.  In the 
70  Jamaica Case Study p.  23 Results of EC aid  27 
transport  sector in  Cameroun,  high  capacity, together with a  good sectoral framework,  has 
resulted in  active policy dialogue.
71 
We found many cases where weak government capacity made policy dialogue more difficult 
- transport and education  in  Tanzania, cocoa in  Cameroun,  water in  Jamaica, and  trade  in 
Zimbabwe. 
72  In Tanzania, the Commission and  other donors identified road maintenance as 
the key policy issue, and identified ways to address the issue.  However, they underestimated 
the institutional difficulties in implementing the road maintenance policy. 
73 
Public expenditure management is  a key government capacity which contributes to enhance 
aid effectiveness. It should link sector priorities with planning, provide a  sectoral framework 
for  coordinated government  and  donor interventions,  use  reliable  accounting  and  auditing 
controls, and strong monitoring and evaluation functions. 
Government capacity is key for effective donor coordination 
When  governments  have  had  insufficient capacity  to  take  the  lead  in  donor coordination, 
donors  have  found  it  very  difficult  to  coordinate  themselves  in  the  field  (see  section  2.5 
below).  Failure to coordinate has often led to situations in  which each donor pursues its own 
aims, often  with competing programmes and projects which may undermine each other and 
which distract the management capacity of ACP governments. 
ACP governments themselves  should take  the  lead  in  donor coordination.  This  requires a 
clear policy  framework,  a  strong  public expenditure management system,  and an  effective 
donor coordination unit.  These allow a government to inform each donor where and how it 
can  fit  in  with  the  government's  own  plans,  ensuring  that  both  domestically  and 
internationally financed  programmes are  integrated into the country's development strategy 
and budget system.  In our field visits we found very few countries that had this capacity. 
The difficulty of strengthening institutions in A CP countries 
Institutional development is  a complex process that only  works with  local commitment and 
participation  in  the  process. 
7
.+  The  task of strengthening  institutions in  ACP countries is  a 
very difficult one. Ten  years of structural adjustment have  been accompanied by  a  trend of 
falling real  wages and wage compression in  civil services.  There are poor work incentives, 
while (donor-financed) seminar and travel allowances distort work decisions.  Civil services 
in Africa are often still over-staffed, even after retrenchments. 
Civil service reform programmes in  Africa have improved the effectiveness of civil services 
to  only a  limited  degree.
7 ~  Until  recently,  their emphasis has  been  on  reducing the size of 
civil services, rather than on  improving efficiency or delivering better services.  While most 
donors have  now recognised that reform programmes have often been constrained by weak 
government  civil  services,  few  have  a  successful  record  in  technical  assistance  for 
institutional strengthening in ACP countries.
76 
Tr.e  use  of  T A  to  strengthen  government  institutions  by  training  local  government 
counterparts  has  proved  difficult  given  the  poor  incentives  in  many  ACP  civil  services. 
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See, for example, Making Democracy Work:  Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, by R.  Putnam et al. 
See Decade of  Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa, IMF Working Paper 179, 1997, I. Lienert 
'Outcomes have varied widely, but overall the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of TA has been disappointing, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa' OEDIWB, Lessons & Practices, May 1996. 28  Chapter 2 
Effective use of technical assistance requires government capacity for selection, management 
and supervision.  \Vhere there is  such capacity, TA can represent their client's interests when 
dealing with  the donors who fund  their assignments.  Support to  institutional reform in  the 
Ministry of Agriculture in  Zimbabwe shows some examples of successful technical assistance 
compatible  with  policy  ownership.
77  However,  more  frequently  we  found  that  TA  are 
perceived as  working on  behalf of the donors which fund  them.  Therefore,  management of 
T A  is  a key capacity for ACP governments to  develop.  In  the case of the Commission, we 
found in  our country visits that T A often has dual responsibility to ACP governments and the 
Commission (see discussion of TA in chapter 3 ). 
Donor competition has also further contributed to  weaken the capacity of ACP civil services 
(see Box in  the next section). 
2.5  Donor coordination 
Since  aid  is  typically  fungible,  each  donor  effectively  finances  a  share  of  the  entire 
government budget, and the impact that each donor has depends on the impact that all donors 
collectively  have.  Donors  should  therefore  be  concerned  with  the  quality  of all  public 
expenditure  management  and  the  quality  of all  aid  interventions,  not just with  their own 
specific  interventions.  It  is  essential  for  donors  to  act  in  a  coordinated  way, even if each 
focuses  on  particular  sectors.  Weak  coordination  between  donors  means  that  any donor, 
however  great  its  efforts.  could  have  its  performance  undermined  by  the  work  of other 
donors.  Donor coordination needs to be led by ACP governments, and this requires strong 
government capacity  and  a  clear policy  framework.  Where government capacity is  weak, 
donor coordination is  more difficult but equally important, and should be aimed primarily at 
strengthening  ACP  institutions,  particularly  in  public  expenditure  management  and  the 
delivery of social services. 
Ways in which coordination has affected EC aid results 
Has not facilitated donor complementarity 
Where there has been weak coordination, individual donors, including the Commission, have 
often  tried  to  be  present  in  most  sectors, and  particularly  in  the most popular sectors (e.g. 
recently  in  education  and  health).  Donors  have  done  this  without  adequately  taking  into 
account the  overall  needs of the  country. the  activities of other donors, or where their own 
strengths  lie.  In  this  way,  when  considered together, donors  have  duplicated each other's 
interventions in  some areas, while not paying sufficient attention to other areas.  Insufficient 
donor  specialisation  has  weakened  the  quality  of aid  - it  also  makes  coordination  more 
difficult, as it  increases the number of donors who have to be coordinated in any given sector. 
Effective coordination should make it possible for individual donors to  play complementary 
roles  in  meeting the  aid  requirements of a  recipient country.  What matters is  that the aid 
requirements of a country are met by all donors collectively, not by any one donor, and that 
each donor focuses  on  the  areas  where it  has relative  strength.  Where this  happens, each 
donor maximises its contribution to the performance of aid. 
EC aid  also  has  not  found  a  strategic  role  to  play, taking  into account the roles  of other 
donors.  In  the  countries  we  visited  we  found  that the Commission's resources are  spread 
77  Zimbabwe Case Study pp. 20-23.  See also Box in Chapter 3. Results of EC aid  29 
thinly over too  many areas, and it  does  not focus on those areas where its  strengths lie (see 
discussion on  indicative programming in  the  next chapter).  Delegation staff in most of the 
countries  we  visited  noted  the  difficulties  they  face  in  working  in  too  many  sectors  and 
projects. 
Donor competition 
Coordination is  also important for ensuring that when donors perform similar roles they act 
together rather than compete.  Where there have been coordinated actions, important results 
have been achieved (see Box on Effective Coordination in the Country Cases below). 
Weak coordination. by contrast, has often resulted in donor competition, which is particularly 
burdensome  to  ACP  civil  services.  In  all  these  cases,  aid  has  weakened,  rather  than 
strengthened, the  institutional  capacity of ACP governments (see  Box). Donor competition 
results from donors focusing on the implementation of their own projects, rather than in the 
work of all  donors in  a  particular sector.  Donors  lobby for government approval for  their 
policies,  and  their  projects  compete  with  each  other  for  the  attention  of  civil  service 
managers.  Interacting  separately  with  a  large  number of donors,  each  with  their own aid 
conditionalities  and  procedures.  uses  up  the  limited  time  and  energy of senior ACP civil 
servants.  We have observed instances of donor competition in  most countries that we visited, 
but particularly  in  those  with  weak government institutional  capacity.  Donor competition 
affects both projects and also some of the new 'sector approaches'. 
Donor competition has affected all  levels of programme and project implementation.  Donors 
have  carried  out  their  aid  programming  exercises  separately,  and  they  have  also  required 
governments to respect their own - the donors' - implementation procedures.  In neither case 
have  donors'  actiVIties  been  integrated  with  governments'  normal  budgetary  or 
implementation procedures.  Donors have made ACP governments adapt to  the requirements 
of their own  aid  instruments.  rather than  modifying  their aid  instruments to  improve  their 
support for public expenditure management systems. 
Donor competition weakening ACP governments' civil services. 
Far  from  strengthening  institutions,  donors'  actions,  including  those  of  the  Commission,  have  often 
contributed  to  further weaken  the capacity of  ACP  civil  services.  Donors  are  often  under pressure to 
commit  resources  and  implement their  own  programmes  quickly,  so  they find  it  difficult to  adjust the 
planning  of  their  programmes  to  governments'  implementation  capacity  or commitment to institutional 
reform. 
The  use  of  parallel  government structures  has  probably been  the  most popular response  by  donors to 
get their own  aid  progiammes  implemented  quickly  in  a context of  weak  government capacity.  Too 
often donors seem to believe that every problem should be addressed by creating a new unit (e.g.  in the 
1  990s  the  World  Bank  has  recommended  the  creation  of  15  different  units  to  work  on  the  Integrated 
Roads Project in Tanzania). 
Parallel structures are not sustainable and fragment the civil service.  Donors overlook the fact that they 
still  need  to  interact  with  normal  government  structures.  These  structures,  outside  the  normal  civil 
service,  are  staffed  with  consultants.  As  they  pay attractive salaries, they tend  to  recruit the  best civil 
servants, which  may weaken government capacity in priority areas. 
Furthermore, to help them  implement their programmes, donors sometimes recruit senior civil servants 
as  short-term  consultants,  or supplement civil  servants' salaries 
1  (contradicting the  DAC  Principles for 
effective aid\  Some  donors  believe  this  to  be  justified  because they believe their programmes and 
projects to be the  most valuable for the country.  The  country visits found evidence of this both  in  the 
traditional  'project'  approach  and  also,  more  recently,  with  the  new  'sector  approaches'.  These 
problems were observed in most of the countries that we visited. 
1.  '  .. in  Tanzama  the  offictal  policy  is  not  to  supplement  local  civil  servant  salaries.  However,  given  the  unsustainably  low 
remuneratton  level  tn  public  service,  donors  provided  and  employees  obtained  supplements  through  indirect means.  In  fact 
donors competed for capable civil  servants to  improve the chances for proper implementation of their projects' OEO,  1997, op. 
cit.,  p.62. 
2.  'Rather than topping-up salaries, donors should encourage reciptent governments to articulate a strategy to address civil service 
reform.  Donor assistance can only be effective when governments themselves are seriously committed.' OECD/DAC, 1992, op. 
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Sharing of expertise 
Insufficient  sharing  of expertise  and  experience  has  weakened  the  quality  of all  donors' 
interventions  in  institution-building  and  the  reduction  of poverty.  Donor coordination  has 
mostly been limited to  information-sharing and even this has not been very effective.  In the 
countries we  visited,  though there  were regular meetings between delegations and Member 
States,  these  often  lacked  a  clear  focus.  Similar  problems  are  found  in  wider  donor 
coordination meetings. 
Similarly.  donors.  including  the  EC,  have  not  often  carried  out joint  monitoring  or JOint 
evaluation of each other's projects. and they  only  rarely co-finance each other's operations. 
This has affected the transparency of aid processes. and limited their ability to learn from best 
practice and to obtain a more independent and transparent assessment of their operations.  In 
the few cases where coordination has moved further (e.g. the agriculture sector in Zimbabwe), 
the  process has  been slow and time-consuming,  but has been  much more coherent and has 
been supported by ACP governments. 
Factors explaining weak donor coordination 
A government policy framework 
As discussed at the beginning of this section, we found that the existence of a well developed 
policy  framework  and  institutional  capacities  within  ACP  governments  are  the  most 
important factors  facilitating  donor coordination.  These promote coherent and transparent 
policy  dialogue.  encourage  donors  to  adopt  common  positions  in  their  dealings  with 
governments,  and  guard  against  different donors  introducing  divergent approaches into  the 
programmes  and  projects  which  they  support.  The  relative  success  of  the  operational 
coordination initiative in Cote d' Ivoire was in large part due to these factors.  In Cameroun, a 
strong transport sector policy framework ('Programme Sectoriel de Transport·) has provided 
the basis for coordination of donor inputs, and has led to some complementarity among EU 
donors.  with  the  EC  supporting  maintenance  of  unpaved  roads,  Germany  supporting  the 
maintenance of paved roads. and France concentrating on financing national bridges and air 
transport. 
Willingness of donors 
Coordination is  more difficult where government capacity is  low and where there is  no clear 
government  policy  framework,  but  it  is  still  necessary,  even  if donors  have  to  take  the 
initiative.  Donors may be  unwilling to engage in  extensive coordination because it  is  often 
time-consuming,  and  becau~e  they  have  internal  incentives  to  disburse  and  implement 
projects rapidly.  What is  more. few donors have a clear view of their strategic role vis-a-vis 
other donors, and there  is  often disagreement between donors on what policies and projects 
should receive priority (see the case study on the education sector in  Tanzanian).  We found 
that donor coordination is  often  more effective among groups of 'like-minded'  donors who 
share similar objectives. 
The success of EU coordination depends as much on the political will of Member States as on 
that of the Commission.  We found that, in  many cases, there is a perception that the sharing 
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of aid  information runs  only in  one direction,  from  the Commission to  the  Member States, 
and that this affected the quality of donor coordination efforts. 
Where there has been strong political will, coordination has improved.  Positive developments 
on the  Commission's side  include discussions with  Member States on  Strategy Papers and 
National Indicative Programmes.  Liberia provides a good example of effective coordination 
where  there  is  particularly  strong common purpose between  the  Commission and  Member 
States (see our Case Study on Liberia). 
Although we  observed few  concrete actions in  the  countries that we  visited, in  many cases 
Member  States'  delegations  stated  their  willingness  to  increase  joint  operations  and 
evaluations with the Commission in order that each might learn from the other's strengths. 
Donors'  in-country  capacity  and 
organisational set-up 
Coordination  takes time  and  energy, both 
as  a  result  of the  capacity  of some  ACP 
governments and as a result in  many cases 
of the  large  number  of donors  active  in 
each  country.  Coordination  is  often 
limited  by  the  capacity  and  expertise 
available  in  their  delegations.  Some 
donors  (such  as  the  World  Bank)  rely 
more  on  missions  from  headquarters,  but 
this  can  introduce  discontinuity  into 
coordination and policy dialogue.  On our 
visit  to  Tanzania,  several  Member States 
noted  that  coordination  in  the  transport 
sector  wa~  difficult  because  the  World 
Bank  had  limited  in-country  capacity  in 
that  sector.
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generalist staff, and this can limit their contribution to  strategic sectoral co-ordination.  There 
has as yet been little progress towards the pooling of expertise within the European Union as 
a whole- Member States and Commission -to strengthen the capacity of European aid. 
In the  case  of the  Commission,  the  demands  of coordination in  some  cases  appear to 
strain further the capacity of delegations which are already over-stretched.  In Tanzania, 
the Commission  was  chosen  to  act  as  coordinator for  Member States  in  the  education 
sector, even though it had very limited in-country capacity in that sector.  In the countries 
we  visited,  capacity  was  found  to  be  strongest in the agriculture and transport sectors, 
although in  a  few delegations, such as  Zimbabwe, we also found strong macroeconomic 
monitoring capacity. 
Weak donor coordination is  also explained by  differences in donors'  organisational set-ups, 
both in  their presence in  the field and in  the delegation of decision-making to  field offices. 
For some donors decision-making is  centralised,  with ex ante controls in aid  management, 
while others are more decentralised and have less administration-intensive organisations (see 
Figure).  Where donors differ in their organisational models, coordination is  complicated, as 
in-country representations have very different responsibilities, powers and procedures.  The 
Commission has a relatively strong presence in the field but centralised decision-making. 
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Coordination and coherence in country case studies 
Some  progress  has  been  made  towards  improving  donor coordination.  Positive  developments  on  the 
Commission's side  include the  discussion of  Strategy Papers and  National  Indicative Programmes with 
Member  States.  The  practical  benefits  of  effective  donor coordination  were  seen  in  Liberia  (where 
coordination took place in the absence of a functional government), Cote d'lvoire (pilot country chosen by 
the Council), Zimbabwe (agricultural sector), and the Eastern Caribbean (international trade in bananas). 
However, these are still exceptions rather than the rule. 
In the country cases we found two examples where policy incoherence appears to have been addressed: 
in  the  policy dialogue  on  international trade  in  bananas  in  the  Eastern  Caribbean  and  in  the transition 
from emergency to development assistance in Liberia (see Case Studies Synthesis, pp. 49-51 ). 
Policy dialogue on bananas 
1 
The  banana trade  in  the  Eastern Caribbean,  which  has enormous social and  economic significance for 
many  countries  in  the  region,  has  had  to  face  falling  prices  and  production  levels,  and  the  threat  of 
further loss of  market share following  a ruling  by  the  World Trade Organisation against the EU  banana 
regime. 
In  1994, the  Secretariat of the  Organisation of Eastern  Caribbean  States (OECS)  requested assistance 
from a number of different donors. 
In  response, the  EC  took the  lead in  coordinating a donor group,  which  included the  BWI, to  engage in 
policy dialogue with  the  producer countries of the  OECS.  The donor group recognised that the  industry 
needed to be restructured, and adopted a common stance. 
Intensive negotiations between the donors and governments of the OECS resulted in an  action plan, and 
two  subsequent Agreements:  Castries  I (November 1996) and  Castries  II  (January  1998).  On  the EC 
side,  these  provided  for  the  innovative  use  of  Stabex  financing,  to  support  implementation  of  the 
restructuring  plan,  and  to  make  available  budgetary  support  to  meet  the  additional  fiscal  demands 
caused by restructuring. 
1. See Eastern Caribbear Case Studv oo.  12-16 
2.6  The Commission 
While many aspects of the results of EC aid are attributable to the weakness of the whole aid 
system,  the  Commission's  difficulties  in  strengthening  ACP  institutions  and  donor 
coordination and its  weaknesses in  aid management have also directly contributed to EC aid 
results.  The Commission has been focused not on achieving results - poverty reduction and 
other  priority  objectives  - but  on  administrative  procedures  and  levels  of disbursement. 
While this in  part reflects constraints imposed on the Commission, it  also reflects limitations 
within the  Commi~sinn.  External constraints include the fact that it has not been given clear 
objectives or sufficient operational flexibility. while EC aid results have not been adequately 
monitored by  policy-makers.  Internal  limitations reflect a  history as  an  organisation which 
initially focused on projects and administration and which  has  grown rapidly,  spreading its 
resources too thinly. 
In  chapter  3,  we  assess  the  Commission's  performance  in  managing  EC  aid  activity  by 
activity,  and examine in  more detail  the  factors  which explain the Commission's strengths 
and  weaknesses.  First,  in  this  section,  we  summarise  key  factors  in  the  Commission's 
performance which contribute to an explanation of EC aid results. Results of EC aid  33 
Clear objectives and complementarity of EC aid 
EC aid policy has not yet provided clear objectives or facilitated 'complementarity' with other 
donors.  Moreover. EC aid results are not adequately monitored by EU Member States (or the 
Commission).  At  the  same time,  policy-makers. who do not have  sufficient feedback from 
experiences  in  the  field,  have  added  to  the  constraints  on  the  Commissions'  operational 
flexibility  introduced  by  Lome.  This has  led  to  a  mismatch  between an  expanding policy 
agenda and the  Commission·  s  capacity to  implement this  agenda.  In  this  context,  policy-
makers have not yet been· able to  identify the role that EC aid should play in  ACP countries 
taking  into  account  the  overall  needs  of these  countries,  the  activities  of other donors,  or 
where its own strengths lie. 
The Commission is  required to  pursue too many objectives and to manage too many different 
instruments and budget lines.  While our case studies confirm that the latest Country Strategy 
Papers
80  have improved significantly, the Commission continues to be involved in too many 
sectors.  It  has not  specialised sufficiently.  This matters not only because it  means that the 
Commission is  spreading its resources too thinly, but also because it may not be acting where 
its  strengths  lie.  In  the  view of the  evaluators, the  Guidelines for the  Negotiation of New 
Cooperation Agreementsx 
1  point in  the  right direction but they  may  still  include too  many 
potential focal sectors to ensure complementarity. 
Commission's results-orientation 
The limitations within the Commission reflect both constraints imposed on it and its  history 
as  an  organisation  which  initially  focused  on  projects  and  administration  and  which  has 
grown rapidly, spreading its resources too thinly.  Internal fragmentation, inadequate systems 
and procedures. excessive centralisation  in  decision  making have all  contributed to a  'visa 
culture',  with  overly  complex  and  inefficient  administrative  and  financial  controls, 
82  with 
weak team work and little demand for quality support or peer review.  Limited accountability 
for results  is  also reinforced by  a  weak system for monitoring the performance of on-going 
projects. and EC aid co-management with many ACP governments with weak capacity.  All 
this has contributed to weaknesses in aid management. 
Excessive administrative demands have resulted in  over-stretched capacity in key areas. This 
has particularly affected delegations' capacity for policy dialogue, institutional strengthening 
and  donor coordination.  For example, in  our country visits we  found  that delegation staff 
have  limited  time  to  work  closely  with  ACP  governments  in  institutional  strengthening. 
Furthermore, EDF technical assistance ends up supporting the capacity of delegations rather 
than that of ACP governments (see next chapter).  Support to ACP governments' capacity to 
focus on poverty and other priority objectives is  severely constrained by the  sl-Jort1ge  of in-
house staff with specialist skills in these areas. 
80 
81 
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These documents replaced the Pre-Programming documents of Lome IV. 
Guidelines for  the  Negotiation  of Ne~v Cooperation  Agreements  with  the  African,  Caribbean  and Pacific 
(ACP!  Countries,  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament, 
COM(97) 537 final, 29.10.1997. 
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3. The Commission's performance in managing EC 
aid 
In  chapter 2,  we  identified three key  factors  which explain EC aid results:  the  capacity and 
commitment  of  ACP  institutions,  donor  coordination,  and  the  performance  of  the 
Commission  itself.  In  this  chapter,  we  focus  more  closely  on  the  performance  of the 
Commission. 
In  (3.1 ),  we  assess  the  contribution  made  by  the  Commission  in:  policy  preparation  in 
headquarters,  policy  dialogue  with  ACP  governments,  management  of programmes  and 
projects, and evaluations, transparency and accountability. 
In (3.2), we then discuss the factors which explain the performance of the Commission, both 
the  constraints  imposed  on  the  Commission  and  its  own  internal  limitations.  The 
Commission has  been focused  not on achieving results - e.g.  on reducing poverty - but on 
administrative procedures and commitment of resources.  Finally, we briefly discuss recent 
changes in  the Commission in  the light of the need to move towards a  more results-oriented 
organisation (  3.3 ). 
Background: EC aid and the Commission
1 
EC aid to developing countries, at US$ 5.3 billion in  1997,
2 makes the EC the second largest multilateral 
donor of concessional aid, and the fifth largest donor among the 22 DAC Members. 
The European Union's external relations with  developing countries are managed by five different parts of 
the  European  Commission  (four  Directorates  General  for  External  Relations  - RELEX  - and  one 
Service),  for  which  since  1995  five  different  Commissioners  have  been  responsible.  DGVIII  is 
responsible for ACP countries, non emergency food aid and NGO co-financing. 
Before the recent reorganisation, DGVIII employed a staff of about 620 at headquarters.  In addition, 280 
Commission staff were employed in delegations and offices in  71  ACP countries.  In general, delegations 
in the RELEX DGs have relatively low budgets (less than 3% of EC external aid). 
EC-ACP development cooperation 
EC  aid  to  ACP  countries  has  two  main  sources  of  funding:  the  EC  budget  and  the  European 
Development Fund (EDF), the latter being financed through direct contributions by Member States.  Most 
of the growth in  EC  atd  over the  last five  years is explained by the increase  in  budget lines, created by 
the European Parliament, as EDF disbursements have declined in real terms during this period. 
Development policy formulation 
Development cooperation policies,  which  set the  objectives and responsibilities of the Commission, are 
formulated  both  at the  level  of the  Lome convention  (including its joint institutions) and  through the  EC 
'internal' policy formulation process.  In the EC policy formulation process, the decision-taking body is the 
Council of Ministers,  which consists of the Ministers for Development Cooperation (or their equivalents) 
of the 15 Member States.  Several working groups, attended by representatives of the relevant Ministries 
of  the  Member  States,  usually  assist  the  Council  in  reviewing  policy  proposals  presented  by  the 
Commission (who has the monopoly of policy initiation). 
1.  See Annex for more background information. 
2.  Net ODA disbursement (Source: DAC). 
3.  In  addition, the  Common Service (SeNice Commun Relex)  has recently been  created for implementation (after 
the completion of financing agreements) in the RELEX services. 36  Chapter 3 
3.1  The Commission's performance 
The Commission is  involved in  both the formulation of development cooperation policies and 
in  their implementation.  Policy formulation begins with policy initiation by the policy units 
of  DGVIII  and  leads  to  the  preparation  of  Communications  to  the  Council  and  draft 
Resolutions.  The Commission's  work  in  the  implementation of policies  occurs at several 
levels.  In  indicative  programming, the  Commission prepares a  financial  envelope for each 
country and  works with ACP countries and regions in  outlining development strategies, and 
in  identifying  specific policies and accompanying projects. It  also engages in overall policy 
dialogue  with  ACP  governments  in  structural  adjustment  and  sector  operations.  In  the 
preparation  and  implementation  of projects,  although  the  Lome Convention provides for a 
division of responsibilities between the  Commission and ACP governments, in  practice the 
Commission  carries  out  many  stages  of  the  project  cycle,  from  preparation  through  to 
implementation.  The  Commission  also  evaluates  its  interventions  and  disseminates 
information  on  EC-ACP  cooperation  in  order  to  provide  more  accountability  and 
transparency. 
Policy preparation at headquarters 
The  role  of the  Commission  in  policy  initiation  has  been  affected  by  the  fragmentation 
between  policy and  geographical units and the  limited  staffing  in  the  policy units that deal 
with the priority objectives (poverty reduction, governance, gender and the environment).  In 
this context, policies sometimes do not have enough focus and they do not sufficiently reflect 
the  Commission's experience on  the  ground.  In  its  policy function,  the Commission faces 
difficulties in the incorporation of the priority objectives into EC aid, and in monitoring them. 
However, in  some recent cases the Commission has increased its consultation with experts in 
Member  States  and  other  stakeholders  before  producing  policy  proposals.  This  is 
contributing  to  a  more  transparent and  participatory process and one which  also results in 
more  operational  policies.  Examples of good  practice  include  the  Relief and Long-Term 
Development Communication  and  the  current  preparation of a  Communication on  private 
sector development.  Similarly, in the Green Paper exercise the Commission initiated a wider 
debate on the future of ACP development policies, presenting and discussing its own internal 
reflections (see Box). 
Notwithstanding  its  efforts,  the  Commission has  been  unable to  persuade policy-makers of 
the  need to  adopt a strategic role  for EC  aid  and to  recognise the Commission's constraints. 
There  appears  to  he  scope  for  improved  coordination  between  the  Commission  and  the 
Council in the policy formulation process. The Commission's perfonnance in managing EC aid  37 
The  Green  Paper  on  future  EC-ACP  relations  - opening  up  the  policy 
debate 
In  November 1995, at the  signing ceremony of  Lome  IV bis,  the Commissioner announced that a Green 
Paper on  the future  of  EC-ACP relations  would  be  prepared  by the end of  1996,  and  would serve as a 
basis for debate on the reform of development cooperation. 
In  the following  12  months,  the Commission  'Reflection Group' engaged in  a consultation process.  The 
group was  composed  of  high  officials from  DG  VIII  headquarters, two heads of  delegations from  Africa, 
and a member of the  F01wards  Studies  Unit (attached to the  President of the Commission).  The  group 
organised a conference (January 1996 in  Brussels) and two seminars (February 1996 in  Maastricht, and 
April1996 in Abidjan), and  it commissioned a number of expert papers. 
After  publication  of  the  paper,  a year-long  consultation  with  a wide  variety  of  interested  parties  took 
place, both  1n  the fifteen  MS,  and  in the three ACP regions.  A conference in  September 1997 concluded 
the consultations,  following  which  the  Commission presented  a communication  to the  Council outlining 
more specific guidelines for the upcoming EC-ACP negotiations. 
The Green  Paper exercise  was  the  first time that the  Commission  had  attempted  such  a wide-ranging 
consultation on  development cooperation policy.  Many welcomed the initiative, the impetus that it gave 
to the debate on  the future of Lome,  and the responses that it drew.  Both the European Parliament and 
the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  presented  reports  on  the  Green  Paper.  Many  MS  provided 
comments  on  the  documents,  and  a  number  of  external  groups,  including  academics  and  NGOs, 
contributed  to  the  discussion.  Private  sector  and  civil  society  groups  in  the  ACP  countries  were 
particularly  positive  about  the  extension  of  the  policy  debate  beyond  the  confines  of  government. 
However,  discussions  also  revealed  the  different  level  of  capacity  between  the  preparations  in  the 
Commission and in the ACP countries for the negotiation of the post-Lome Convention. 
Policy dialogue with ACP governments 
Indicative programming 
Progress has been gradually achieved in transforming indicative programming from an ad hoc 
collection of projects (EDF 1 and  EDF 2)  into a more effective instrument for planning and 
dialogue.  In  particular,  the  most  recent  Indicative  Programming  exercise  (EDF  8)  has 
benefited from the new Strateg_v Papers prepared by the Commission, which are significantly 
more analytical than the previous Pre-Programming documents (EDF 7).  The Strategy Papers 
often note programme constraints and interventions by other donors, and in some cases even 
include lessons learnt from previous evaluations.  However, the Strategy Papers in some cases 
still continue to  underestimate programme risks.  The Strategy Papers have  been subiect to 
consultation  with  Member  States.  Although  the  degree  of  consultation  is  considered 
adequate.  it  varies  between  countries  and  between  sectors.  Strategy  Papers  are  internal 
Community documents and are not normally shared with ACP countries. 
Similarly, some of the  weaknesses of previous National Indicative  Programmes have  been 
addressed  in  the  most  recent ones  (EDF 8 ).  The  latest NIP also  benefited from  increased 
consultation  with  ACP  governments  and  Member States  (both  in-country  and  through  the 
EDF  Committee).  In  some  cases,  there  has  been  extensive  consultation  with  ACP 
governments, including,  for example, discussion on  specific conditionalities on institutional 
reform,  e.g.  in  the  transport  sector  in  the  Cameroun  NIP.  In  general,  the  quality  of 
consultation (with ACP governments and Member States) has been lower in the countries and 
sectors where ACP government capacity is low. 
While the Commission still has the strongest role in  the choice of focal sectors, in some cases 
ACP governments' pressure to  maintain and even increase the areas for EC intervention has 
contributed to insufficient concentration of EC interventions and insufficient selectivity in the 38  Chapter 3 
choice of focal  sectors (for example, note the inclusion of the education sector in Zimbabwe 
and Tanzania).  In  addition,  the  fact  that donor programming exercises are  carried out for 
each donor independently.  and  are  not  linked to  governments'  budgetary  processes,  means 
that they overload rather than strengthen governrnent capacity.s_
1  Insufficient integration into 
ACP governments' medium-tenn expenditure frameworks (which in  any case do not always 
exist) means that sectoral choices are probably not optimal. 
Overall economic dialogue 
Through  the  Structural  Adjustment  Facility  the  Commission  has  supported  the  policy 
dialogue  between the  Bretton Woods  Institutions  and ACP governments.  At  Headquarters 
leveL  the  strategy  ha:-:.  been  to  support  the  BWI  country  programmes,  while  using 
international  forums  effectively  (such  as  the  Special  Prograrnme for  Africa)  to  support the 
social  dimensions  of adjustment,  local  ownership  of reforms,  and  improvements  in  ACP 
budgetary  institutions.  However,  staffing constraints have  limited  headquarters'  support to 
delegations  in  the  preparation  and  implementation  of  Structural  Adjustment  Support 
Programmes (SASPs). 
The  Commission's  in-country  involvement  in  the  overall  policy  dialogue  on  structural 
reforms and its participation in public expenditure reviews have often been limited by staffing 
constraints in  delegations, by the degree of government ownership of the reform programme, 
and by  over-detailed earmarking of counterpart funds. The success of the SASP in  supporting 
improvements  in  the  budgetary  process  in  education  and  health  has  been  limited  so  far, 
usually because of poor fiscal  performance and  insufficient co-ordination with other donors 
and with the civil service reform programme.  However, it appears that some initial progress 
has been achieved in strengthening institutions in both Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroun. 
While the Commission has recognised from the beginning the need for ownership and a more 
selective conditionality approach, it  has had some difficulties in  implementing this approach 
in  the  field.x
1  The Commission was often recognised by  ACP governments, on our country 
visits,  as  more  willing  to  'listen'  than  other donors.  However,  even  in  the  case  of the 
Commission, the conditionality approach has  often led  to  too  many conditionalities and too 
much  micro-management (although less  than  the  BWI).  A  more general  constraint on the 
Commission· s  overall  policy  dialogue  has  been  the  mixed  results  of  the  BWI  reform 
programmes in the countries that we visited. 
Nevertheless,  the  Commission's  involvement  in  overall  policy  dialogue  through  structural 
adjustment  operations  is  facilitating  its  transition  to  being  a  policy-based  donor.  More 
effective work in this important area requires strengthening of the macroeconomic capacity in 
DGVIII.x::;  The  clo'-'.~  '"'10nitoring  of macroeconomic  cnnditions  and  of general  structural 
reforms.  and  participation  in  public  expenditure  reviews.  are  essential  to  support  sectoral 
policy dialogue and the effective implementation of SASPs. 
The Commission has been active in  sectoral policy dialogue in  many countries, in spite of the 
many  constraints on  its  work.  The Commission  was often found to  be  effective, although 
results  varied  widely.  It  has also been active in  international forums in  identifying ways to 
improve the  implementation of sector-wide approaches.  The shift from a project to a  sector 
approach  requires  special  caution.  Weak  civil  services,  and  the  difficulties  of  donor 
coordination,  constrain  both  project and  sector approaches (e.g.  in  the  education  sector in 
Tanzania). 
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This does not imply any duplication of the specialised work of the BWI in this area. The Commission's perfonnance in managing EC aid  39 
However,  in  some  cases  sectoral  policy  dialogue  is  facilitating  more  effective  ways  of 
managing aid, of strengthening government institutions and policies, and of improving donor 
coordination.  Effective  sectoral  policy  dialogue  was  found  to  depend  on factors  such  as 
delegations'  staffing  and  sectoral  expertise  and  the  capacity of ACP governments.  In  the 
health sector in  Cote d'lvoire. for example, the EC successfully assisted the Government in 
developing  a  financially  viable  system of public  medicine supply and distribution.  Strong 
capacity, a clear and selective strategy and strong co-ordination were among the key factors 
for  its  success.  A  case  study  of  successful  policy  dialogue  in  the  agriculture  sector  in 
Zimbabwe is given in the Box. 
Preparation of the ASM P in Zimbabwe: a case study of policy dialogue 
The  Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, signed in  1991, contained  elements for the  reform  of 
the  agriculture  sector.  Recognising  the  need  to  articulate  an  appropriate  sector policy  linked  to  the 
macroeconomic  reform  process,  in  1994 the  Government  set  about  preparing  an  agricultural  policy 
framework, which was approved by the Cabinet in  1996. 
The Agricultural SeNices and Management Project (ASMP) was then proposed, 'to put in place improved 
institutional  arrangements  and  operational  capacity  for  policy  formulation  and  for the  sustainable  and 
efficient management, financing, and delivery of agricultural seNices in Zimbabwe'. 
Although  there  was  agreement  between  the  Government  and  donors  on  the  main  objectives  of  the 
ASMP,  during  the  joint  pre-appraisal  mission  of  May  1997  (World  Bank,  EC  and  DFID)  differences 
emerged on how best to pursue the project objectives. 
In particular, the Ministry of Agriculture was concerned about insufficient donor recognition of the 'change 
process'  within  the  Ministry.  This  process  began  in  1991  with  the  introduction  of  a  Management 
Institutional Performance Programme, funded by Germany and co-ordinated by a resident adviser.  The 
Ministry's  comments  on  the  mission  Aide-Memoire  were  that  it  'appears  to  reflect  the  World  Bank 
standard  project procedures and  ignores those of other donors ... .'.  Further,  it 'seems to  be  advocating 
for  the  traditional  project  approach  rather  than  the  process  approach'  and  it  'lacks  the  concept  of 
ownership and  negatively reflects the  issue that the Government should become the owners, but rather 
depicts a donor driven thrust.' 
This  reaction  could  be  attributed to  problems  on  both  sides.  Donors had  included  some  inteNentions 
that were new to some of the Ministry's departments, while some officials in the Ministry believed that the 
project focus should be  on  'strengthening' (i.e.  reversing the recent decline in  Ministry resources) rather 
than  'reforming and rationalising'. 
Further friction was  caused by capacity constraints within the Ministry, which delayed the  preparation of 
various documents.  The Ministry wanted the ownership of the project and this meant that it was going to 
produce documents at its own speed (which didn't necessarily fit donors' timetables). 
Closer co-ordi11ation  was achieved during the  appraisal stage, particularly on the management structure 
for the  project.  Instead  of  adopting  a parallel  management  unit,  the  Ministry  suggested  allowing  the 
existing  management  structure  of  the  Ministry  to  manage  the  project.  The  Ministry,  which  is  quite 
sceptical  about  Technical  Assistance,  will  also  screen  TA  carefully  through  special  'Change  Project 
Teams'. 
Some  frictions  resurfaced  during  the  appraisal  mission  workshop  (November  1997).  There  were 
disagreements over the  content of the  project log-frame.  At some  point, Government participants were 
close to abandoning the workshop altogether.  lnteNiews with participants at the workshop suggest that 
the  Government  believed  that  both  the  World  Bank  and  DFID  were  perceived  as  too  interested  in 
achieving their own  goals.  According to our interviews, the  EC  was  perceived by the Government and 
some other donors as being a more neutral player.  In this context, the EC was able to play a facilitating 
role  between  donors  and  the  Government.  Only  after the  workshop  co-ordinator  had  mediated  the 
discussions  did  donors  make  some  concessions  to  the  Government's  position.  The  Government's 
negotiation position  was  very firm.  The ASMP would only happen  if the Government was  in the driver's 
seat. 
Source: Zimbabwe Case Study pp. 21-22 40  Chapter 3 
Management of programmes and projects 
The introduction of Project Cycle Management in  1993  has contributed to improvements in 
the  process  of  project  implementation.  However,  some  issues  affecting  project  cycle 
management. which also affect many other donors. are still of concern. 
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Project preparation 
Some  improvements  in  quality  have  resulted  from  the  introduction  of  Project  Cycle 
Management in  1993,  which  now guides the  preparation of financing  proposals.  Its  impact 
on  aid  implementation  was  noticeable  in  our  country  studies.  Recently,  lessons  from 
experience  have  also  been  better  incorporated  into  the  design  of  several  new  projects. 
However, a number of issues are still of concern: 
• 
• 
8o 
In  many  cases,  there  has  been  insufficient  rigour  and  consultation  in  project 
identification. Identification. in  the view of the evaluators, is one of the weakest points in 
the preparation of EC aid.  Continuity with the past seems to have been a decisive factor 
in  many  instances  reviewed in  the  country  visits.  Projects were  often identified by the 
Commission,  consultants  or  other  donors.  Consultation  with  ACP  governments  and 
beneficiaries and sector dialogue are often limited by  staffing constraints in  delegations 
and  by excessive reliance on consultants who are not sufficiently supervised.  However, 
there has been greater participation of beneficiaries in EC Micro-projects and NGO co-
financing. 
There  has  often  been  insufficient clarity and realism  in  design.  Project design  should 
correspond to  the managerial and technical capacity of recipients and proposed projects 
should  be  ·affordable'.  In  our  case  studies,  we  found  that  unrealistic  assumptions, 
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especially  in  tenns  of  sustainability  and  government  commitment,  were  common, 
particularly  in  structural  adjustment  and  transport.~
7  We  found  this  problem  to  be 
common for other donors (see Case Studies Synthesis). 
•  Priorit_v  ohjecril·es  remain  difficult  to  incorporate  into  project  design.  Some  of the 
reasons  for  this  are:  shortages  of  specialist  staff,  difficulties  of  'mainstreaming' 
approaches, disbursement pressures, and heavy workloads on the staff who would need to 
adopt  the  new  approaches.  However,  in  the  health  sector,  good  results  have  been 
achieved  through  efficient  networking  between  policy  staff  in  DGVIII,  geographical 
desks, delegations, and field-based technical assistance. 
•  Some of these  problems are  in  part attributable to  insufficient quality support and peer 
rev1ew.  Until  recently,  the  EDF  Committee  was  the  only  forum  for  quality  support. 
While  it  has  had  some  impact in  a  screening  role,  its  role  in  quality  control has  been 
limited  by  its  limited  technical  capacity,  by  its  fragmentation,  and  by  the  fact  that  it 
intervenes  only  at  the  end  of  the  project  preparation  stage.  Member  States' 
representatives have  little  influence on project design.  It  has therefore  in  the  past been 
possible  for  interventions  to  be  processed  without adequate  scrutiny  either within  the 
Commission  (e.g.  by  policy  units)  or  outside  it.  Being  the  target  audience  for  the 
advocacy  that  is  found  in  financing  proposals,  the  EDF Committee  may  even  have  a 
negative  impact  on  the  quality  of project preparation  'as risks  may  be  minimised and 
benefits exaggerated to facilitate the passage of the project through the committee' .
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The  system of quality  support has  recently  been  reinforced through the  creation of an 
internal  Qualif.Y  Support Group,  whose mandate  was  adopted  in  February  1997.  Early 
indications on  the work of the  QSG are promising, but it  is  as  yet too early to judge its 
full  impact.  It  will  probably  require  both  more  support  from  policy  advisers  in 
headquarters and delegations and more resources, to allow it to focus on the initial stages 
of project design, identifying the key issues to be addressed. 
89 
Project implementation 
OveralL EC aid implementation has been characterised by:  delays, extensive and inefficient 
financial  and  administrative  controls,  weak  monitoring  of on-going  projects,  and  frequent 
problems with technical assistance. 
Delays in  processing  projects  and  in  procuring goods  and  TA are  one of the most visible 
examples of inefficiency in  EC aid,  particularly in  programme aid and rural development.
90 
However, evaluations have found  that large works have been implemented efficiently (even 
when  compared  with  some  other donors).  The  same  applies  for  locally  managed  micro-
projects.  In  a  sample of projects in  our sectors of analysis in Zimbabwe and Tar.za;Jia,  we 
found delays in  project preparation, although project implementation delays were within the 
reference limits set in the  1992 Post-Fiji study.
91  This may indicate that delays have not been 
growing longer. 
The extensive nature of  ex ante administrative and financial controls has contributed to these 
delays.  The controls are a result both of Community arrangements and of requirements from 
Member States, together with the  'visa' culture within the Commission.  These financial and 
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Case Studies Synthesis p.  71 
Project Monitoring and the Use oflndicators. ITAD,  1996, p.  21 
Initial steps in  this  direction are currently  being taken.  The QSG examines project identification sheets for 
10-15 minutes each. 
Desk Study. p.  50. 
Price Waterhouse, Study of the causes of  delay in  the implementation of  financial and technical cooperation, 
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administrative controls are  extremely timl:-consuming and inefficient.  They are carried out 
without selectivity and  impose  high costs,  particularly on delegations.  In  a  sample of four 
countries which we  visited, 609'c  of procurement decisions under EDF 6-7 accounted for only 
59c:  of cxpenditures,
92  the  effect  being that  delegations spend considerable time  processing 
payment orders.
91  Furthermore, in Delegations these controls are carried out by advisers who 
often  do  not  have  the  necessary  financial  expertise.  In  some  sectors  over-stretched  staff 
verify  every  expenditure,  while  in  other sectors (such  as  structural  adjustment) there is  no 
systematic  usc  of  ex  post  financial  audits  in  some  countries.  This  approach  diffuses 
accountability  and  diminishes  ACP governments'  responsibility for  financial  management. 
Substantial time would be  saved by a move towards more selective ex ante controls and more 
systematic use of ex posr financial audits.  We found some good examples of more selective 
financial controb in  the Road Maintenance Programmes in Tanzania and Liberia. 
Weak monitoring.  Monitoring of on-going projects has generally been weak, as illustrated in 
the  Box  by  the  case  of  SASP  counterpart  funds  in  Tanzania. 
9
-+  While  the  results  of 
evaluations of completed projects are  starting to be fed  into the design of new ones, only a 
few  on-going  projects  have  been  tlexible  enough  to  adapt  their  design  to  changing 
circumstances (e.g.  Stabex  projects  in  Tanzania and Micro-projects  in  Zimbabwe
95
).  This 
weakness  is  in  part  due  to:  (a)  the  sharing  of monitoring  responsibilities  between  ACP 
governments and delegations; (b) the focus  on financial management of projects rather than 
on overall performance: and (c) the lack of a standardised monitoring system. 
Monitoring SASP counterpart funds in Tanzania 
Since  July  1992.  the  EC  has  provided  Tanzania  with  three  SASPs,  totalling  120  million  ECU.  The 
SASPs are intended to support the overall reform  programme as  well as the accessibility and  quality of 
health  and  education  services.  This  was  to  be  achieved  through  counterpart  fund  support  to  the 
Government budget  and  through  the  support given  to  sectoral  budgetary improvements.  The  SASPs 
were to  provide counterpart funds to the non-wage recurrent budget of the health and education sector, 
and  SASP  conditionality  was  linked  to  both  the  ESAF  and  the  social  sectors.  However,  during 
implementation this budgetary approach proved difficult to follow. 
SASPs represent almost 40%  of the  EC's total  commitments to Tanzania under EDF 6 and  EDF 7.  It  is 
the largest EDF financed operation.  However, insufficient manpower in the Delegation and support from 
Headquarters  limited  economic monitoring and  policy dialogue  with  the  Government on  reforms  in  the 
social sectors (including budgeting). 
A Programme  Support  Unit~ supporting  the  NAO  and  the  administration  of  EDF-funded  interventions, 
was  in charge of the monitoring of counterpart funds.  However, it has faced difficulties in carrying out its 
functions  adequately.  As  a  unit  staffed  with  consultants  working  exclusively  in  EC  programmes,  its 
communication  with  Government  departments  has  sometimes  been  insufficient.  Its  weakness  in 
accounting  and  financial  controls  may have  affected the  monitoring  of  some  EDF  projects,  particularly 
the  management  of  counterpart  funds.  In  the  case  of  the  SASP,  implementation  and  monitoring 
arrangements were  weaK.  Neither the Government nor the  Commission  had the manpower to monitor 
such an ambitious programme effectively. 
Problems  ~vitlz technical assistance.  The high administrative demands of EC aid have often 
resulted in excessive reliance on technical assistance (T  A).  The most common problem in the 
implementation  of TA  programmes  is  the  dual  role  of many  TA  (supporting  both  ACP 
governments  and  delegations)  and  the  weak  monitoring  and  management  of  these 
92 
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Out of 1.800  procurement decisions  under  EDF 6  and  7  in  four  ACP countries  analysed during  the  field 
phase. less than 40% (those above ecu I 00,000) accounted for 95% of the total amount of ecu involved. 
We estimated up to~ person-years (estimate based on two of the country case studies in the field phase). 
'Basic monitoring of the physical progress of projects within DGVIII remains rudimentary.' ITAD,  1996, op. 
cit  ..  p.  35 
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programmes.  The effective  use  of T A  requires  both careful design (to ensure government 
ownership)  and  management  capacities  in  ACP  government  and  delegations.  On  the 
government's side, the constraints on its management capacity, as  well as  the fact that TA is 
in many cases perceived as an additional conditionality of an aid package, contribute to weak 
supervision (e.g. the T A programme in the Tanzanian SASP
96
). 
While T A (financed by  the EDF) is  nominally provided to  support the government, in many 
cases,  because  of  delegation  staffing  constraints,  the  T A  supports  central  Commission 
functions.  Dual  responsibility  can  often  compromise  the  contribution  of  the  T A  to 
strengthening  the  institutions  of ACP governments.  It  has  sometimes created problems of 
accountability,  with  the  T A  representing both  governments and donors.  It can also have a 
large  impact  on  both  project preparation  and  implementation (see  Box).  The Green Paper 
noted  that  'the  EC  has  tended  to  rely  excessively  on  T A  consultants  to  determine  the 
procedures for the implementation of its aid operations.' 
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The role  of consultants  in  the  preparation of a project 
in Zimbabwe 
The  project  was  identified  in  1991  by  the  consulting  company  that  was 
implementing  its  predecessor.  The  process started  with  the  preparation  of  a 
draft financing  proposal by the consultant,  with  limited input from Government 
or the delegation. 
The proposal,  both  in  its draft as  well  as  in  its final form,  did  not include cost-
benefit analysis nor detailed implementation arrangements. 
The  consulting  company  designed  and  negotiated  the  project  with  the  EC 
delegation.  The  project  (10.2  Mecu)  included  a TA  project  of  over 7 Mecu. 
The project was  supply-driven  at a time  when  best practice  in  the  sector was 
already pointing to the advantages of demand-driven approaches.  The project 
files contain very limited evidence of consultations with the Government. 
The consulting team advised the delegation on the type of contract to use and 
prepared the project budget.  It then took part in the tender for the contract and 
eventually won  it. 
Evaluation, transparency and accountability 
In  all  the  countries  we  visited,  we  found  evidence  of the  Commission's  thorough  work 
carrying  out  ex post  evaluations  of its  projects  in  ACP countries.  While  the  quality  of 
evaluations  is  mixed according to  the first  user survey in  the Commission,
98  the  design of 
some new projects is  be2"inning to benefit from the lessons learned.  However, the limited in-
house staff of the evaluation function
99  may  have  limited the  organisational learning of the 
Commission and the strength of this function.  Given the resources available to the evaluation 
function, there is  a  need  to concentrate resources on key evaluations and to ensure that the 
main lessons are implemented.  Joint evaluations with other donors are still infrequent. 
Finally,  it  is  important to  note  that the  recent placing of the  merged Relex evaluation unit 
within  the  new  implementation  service  (Common  Service)  raises  concerns  over  its 
independence and impartiality.
100 
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DAC  Review  of the  Development  Co-operation  Policies  and Programme  of the  European  Community, 
OECD/DAC. 1998, draft, p.  32.  We commend the participation of DG VIII in the independent DAC survey 
of users. 
Most evaluations are carried out by external consultants. 
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Disseminating information 
Information on EC programmes towards ACP countries is  still very difficult to obtain.  This 
is  in  part because of the  fragmentation of the  EC aid programme and the complexity of the 
operations with ACP countries (EDF and budget lines).  The Courier is  the main publication 
from  DGVIII  and  is  distributed  to  80,000  people.  The  inventory  of EC  aid  policies and 
programmes (mandated by  the Council of Ministers) may contribute to the understanding of 
EC  aid.
101  However, while  DGVIII has  the  most developed public information service for 
development  cooperation  within  the  Commission,  most  of  the  information  that  the 
Publication and Information Service (PIS) provides to the public is descriptive. 
Delegation  annual  reports  could  be  made  more  systematic  and could  be  made available to 
wider audiences.  DGVIII' s  website. should  also  be  used  more  effectively  to  include  more 
information on the aid programme to ACP countries (see for example information on the web 
sites  of the  BWI).  The  recent  dissemination  of evaluation  summaries  through  DGVIII's 
website is  an  important step towards greater transparency.  However, key evaluation reports 
should also be disseminated more widely. 
3.2  What explains the Commission's performance? 
The Commission has  been  focused not on  achieving results - on reducing poverty - but on 
administrative procedures and levels of disbursement.  While this in  part reflects constraints 
imposed on the Commission, it  also reflects limitations within the Commission.  The positive 
results of many EC aid  interventions are explained by the hard work of its staff, particularly 
in  delegations,  and  often  by  the  quality  of the  partnership  with  ACP  policy-makers  and 
technical staff. 
The  Commission  has  not  been  given  clear  objectives  or  sufficient  operational  flexibility, 
while EC aid results have not been adequately monitored by policy-makers. The development 
policy formulation system (which includes both Lome and the policy formulation within the 
EC) strongly constrains the Commission's actions.  The Lome Convention provides too many 
objectives and instruments, and specifies complex procedures, including co-management with 
many governments with weak capacity. The EC policy formulation system has expanded the 
policy  agenda  and  the  number  of  instruments,  while  introducing  extensive  and  time-
consuming  administrative  and  financial  controls,  and  providing  for  limited  budgetary  and 
staffing flexibility.  All  of this has constrained the operational flexibility of the Commission. 
The policy formulation process does not include an effective system for monitoring EC aid 
result~  .. 
The  limitations  within  the  Commission  reflect  these  constraints  and  its  history  as  an 
organisation  which  initially  focused  on  projects  and  administration  and  which  has  grown 
rapidly,  spreading its  resources too thinly.  The Commission's transition  to  being a  policy-
based donor is difficult.  It requires an organisation that is results-oriented, knowledge-based, 
and  self-critical.  The  limitations  within  the  Commission  are  a  fragmented  structure  with 
weak accountability, inadequate systems and procedures, over-stretched capacity, and weak 
learning from performance. 
101  Understanding European Community Aid, ODIIEC,  1997. The Commission's performance in managing EC aid  45 
Constraints imposed on the Commission 
Too many objectives and instruments 
As  discussed  in  chapter  1,  the  Lome Convention and the  'internal'  EC policy  formulation 
process have given rise  to  an  expanding policy agenda for EC  aid and, going  hand in  hand 
with that,  an  expanding number of aid  instruments.  In spite of the momentum given by the 
Maastricht  Treaty,  there  is  no  overall  statement  of development  policy,  and  the  policy 
formulation process has not been guided by a sufficiently clear sense of direction. 
This is explained by the complexity and fragmentation of the development policy formulation 
process within  the  EC.  Much of the complexity is  unavoidable and even desirable, arising 
from the large number of actors and institutions involved.  However, there are some specific 
complications.  There is  weak coordination between the main actors in this process.  There 
are weak links between the EDF Committee, the Council of Ministers, the ACP-Fin and other 
Council  working  groups,  and  the  development and  budgetary committees of the  European 
Parliament.  The role of the EDF Committee in enhancing coordination has not been realised. 
In  addition, each  Member State has  its  own particular policy emphasis,  and even  within a 
Member  State  there  may  be  weak  coordination,  for  instance  between  finance  and 
development ministries.  Member States are involved at all  stages of the policy formulation 
process, but their level of representation and their degree of involvement are variable.  What 
is  more, the environment is  one in  which, at the moment, development policies towards ACP 
countries do not constitute one of the key priorities for the Community. 
The  expanding  policy  agenda  has  not  been  sufficiently  realistic,  either with  regard  to  the 
Commission's constraints or with regard to  implementation realities in the field.  There is a 
mismatch between an  expanding policy agenda and the Commission's capacity to implement 
this  agenda.  The  Commission  is  limited  in  terms  of  human  resources,  finances,  and 
organisational limitations.  The policy agenda has expanded in  both scope and detail, but the 
Commission's capacities and resources have not kept pace. 
The complexity  of EC  aid  instruments has  also  had  a  negative  impact on  all  stages of the 
project cycle.  Even when a country team makes a special effort to coordinate the use of these 
instruments (e.g.  SASP and NIP in  the  health sector in Cote d'lvoire), the fragmentation of 
instruments introduces different procedures and  inefficiencies.  The creation of a multiplicity 
of special budget lines,  by the European Parliament, also introduces further complexities in 
the  EC aid  system,  as  each  of them  is  small  and difficult to  manage.  This  was a  concern 
expressed by many of the delegation staff during the country visits.
102 
The  Commission's  work  would  benefit  from  a  strategic  reduction  in  the  number  of aid 
instruments  and  areas  of  concentration.  allowing  it  to  focus  more  pragmatically  on  its 
strengths and relative advantages. 
Insufficient operational flexibility 
The Commission's operational flexibility has been constrained.  Administrative burdens have 
limited its ability to focus  its efforts where they have been most needed.  Constraints on the 
use of financial  and human resources have limited its ability to respond flexibly to changing 
needs or to adopt a more results-oriented approach.  Consultation with the EDF Committee on 
projects takes considerable time without achieving close technical scrutiny, and contributes to 
the centralisation of decision-making. 
102  On the difficulties of managing budget lines. see also ERM, 1997, op.  cit.  On the incentive to commit budget 
line funds too quickly, see  1998 DAC Review of EC Aid, draft, p. 44 46  Chapter 3 
Because of EC financial arrangements and requirements from Member States (particularly the 
provisions  of  the  Financial  Regulation  applicable  to  the  Convention),  e:r  ante  financial 
controls are applied without selectivity, placing a lzea\'Y administrati\·e burden on delegations 
The Commission·-. work. both at headquarters and in the field, is  affected by limitations on its 
financial resources.  In  many cases we found in  our case studies that delegations· operational 
budgets  were  affecting  the  efficiency  of aid  implementation.  One  possible  solution  is  to 
increase  the Commission's resources.  Another is  to  increase the tlexibility with  which the 
Commission  can  use  its  financial  resources.  The Commission  has  up  to  now  had  limited 
operational tlexibility.  If it  is  to  be  results-oriented, the  Commission needs to  be  given the 
flexibility  to reallocate financial  resources both  between projects and between units.  Matrix 
organisational  structures, like  the one recently introduced within DG VIII, are based on this 
premise. 
Staffing constraints have  also been a  major limitation within DGVIII.  While DGVII1  grew 
considerably up to  199-+, there have been constraints since then as a consequence of pressures 
from  the  European  Parliament  and  other  Directorate  Generals  and  the  priority  given  to 
Eastern  Europe.  The number of advisers  in  Delegations  has  been  reduced.  This  is  in  a 
context where demands on staff resources may be higher than for other aid organisations as a 
result of the EC policy formulation cycle, the co-management of aid, and the role of DGVIII 
in coordinating with  the bilateral  agencies of Member States.  However, it  is  hard to assess 
what  the  optimal  level  of professional  staff should  be,  since  perceptions  of shortages  are 
affected by both external constraints and organisational limitations. 
The  Commission· s  ability  to  respond  to  staffing  shortages  has  also  been  constrained  by 
limited flexibility  in  recruitment policy.  DGVIII cannot  independently  recruit  professional 
staff - recruitment  is  carried  out on a  Commission-wide basis.  In  fact.  there  has  been no 
competitive recruitment at all for the last five years.
11n  The Commission has therefore had to 
~  use  consultants 
10
J  and  seconded  experts  to  fill  gaps,  making  its  skill  acquisition  only 
temporary.  Flexibility is also constrained by compensation being based on seniority. 
Co-management with weak ACP capacity 
While  the  co-management established  in  the  Lome Convention  in  principle  hands  over to 
ACP governments most of the tasks involved in  aid management. in  practice, as a  result of 
the weak capacity of some ACP governments, the Commission has had to carry out many of 
these.  Co-management is  highly dependent on the capacity of both partners, and in  practice 
often  implies  the  duplication  of  functions  and  the  dilution  of  responsibilities  and 
accountability.  As shown in  the Table below,
105  in the sample of countries visited during the 
field  phase of  thi~ evaluation the  Commission  has  been  involved in  many of the  functions 
assigned  by  the  Lome  Convention  to  its  ACP  partners.  It  is  therefore  very  difficult  to 
determine accountability for actions taken at most of the stages described in the Table. 
With the  benefit of hindsight,  it  i~  now recognised by both the  Commission and most ACP 
countries  that  co-management  of  EC  aid  has  diminished  the  effectiveness  of  its 
implementation.
1
nn  The Green Paper also notes that 'Joint management as practised hitherto 
with  Lome  has  revealed  its  limitations.  It  has  hampered  the  effective  management  of 
liD 
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A competitive recruitment for the entire Commission is presently under way. 
Moreover. the EDF place restrictions on the use of consultants by the Commission. 
Whenever we found a situation substantially in  line with the provisions of the Convention, we wrote  'Real = 
Lome'. while any  discrepancy has been shaded. with what we observed on  the  ground marked as  'real' and 
what the Convention envisages marked as  'Lome'. 
See for example ECDPM. Beyond Lome IV:  Exploring  Options for Future ACP-EU Cooperation,  1996 and 
Price Waterhouse.  1992, op.  cit. The Commission's performance in managing EC aid  47 
disbursements and has discouraged the intemalisation of reforms or development programmes 
by their beneficiaries· .
107 
In  practice,  the  institutional 
arrangements  for  EC  aid  vary  from 
country  to  country.  The  capacity  of 
ACP  governments  has  determined  the 
ways in  which EC projects have been 
designed  and  implemented,  and  this 
m  tum  has  affected  the  EC'  s 
contribution  to  the  process  of 
institution-building.  Institutional 
arrangements  vary  at  three  levels:  in 
the  co-ordination  of EC  aid  with  aid 
from  other  donors;  in  the  overall 
management  of  EC  aid:  and  in  the 
management  structures  for  EC 
projects/programmes.  In  the 
countries  we  visited  during  the  field 
phase of the evaluation, we found two 
institutional  models  for  EC  aid,  as 
h  .  h  p·  ]()~  s  own m t  e  tgure. 
The  first  model  comprises 
whose  governments  have 
greater  capacity  (Cote 
Zimbabwe  and  Jamaica). 
countries 
relatively 
d'lvoire, 
In  such 
cases, the  Commission has  been able 
Aid management structures and capacity in six 
countries and one region 
lllGH 
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IDGH 
ROLE r'li L\1PLEMENfATION AND 
COORDINATION 
to  rely  more on  the  ACP government.  The office of the  National  Authorising Officer has 
been  well  integrated in  a  particular ministry (usually the Ministry of Finance) and has  been 
staffed  with  civil  servants,  the  EC' s  procurement and disbursement procedures have  been 
consistent with the Government's, projects have been managed by line Ministries or by units 
mostly  staffed  with  civil  servants,  and  donor coordination  has  been  in  the  Government's 
hands. 
The  second  model  (Tanzania  and  Cameroun),  where  government  capacity  is  weaker,  is 
characterised by a detached NAO office staffed mainly with consultants, donor coordination 
more  centred  around  the  donors  themselves,  and  a  proliferation  of parallel  management 
structures. 
Co-management can be  problematic in  both models.  In ACP countries with well-functioning 
governments and sufficient capacity,  it  can be  resented as  'paternalism'.  In countries with 
poor governance or administrative capacities, it  leads to most tasks being carried out by the 
Commission.  This may  both strain the capacity of the Commission, and weaken further the 
capacity of ACP governments (see chapter 2). 
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Green Paper. op.  cit., p.  XIIl 
The East Caribbean is in  between the two models, as  projects and programmes are identified and prepared by 
a regwnal  structure (CARIFORUM) but implemented by  national ones.  Its  Regional Authorising Office is 
separate. not because governments lack capacity to manage EC aid but because of its regional nature. Liberia 
is  another exception because it refers to an  emergency situation where a consultant-staffed unit, the Aid Co-
ordination Office (ACO), linked directly with Headquarters. 48  Chapter 3 
~lain roles and responsibilities under Lome IV his 
ACP Leads 
Joint 
ACPOnly 
i 
\  EC Only  EC Leads  EC-ACP  Stage 
A.  PROGRAMMING  I 
I.  Indication  of  the  total  tnd1cativc [ Real =Lome i 
programmmg allocation (Art. 2R 1.1  )  i  i 
Prepare draft NIP (Art  . .2S 1.2)  J  J 
I  l 
Real 
I 
Lome 
3.  Exchange v1ew-; on draft NIP (Art. 282.1)  Real=Lome 
4.  Adopllon of ~IP  (Art. 21'\4.2)  I  I  Real =Lome 
5.  Report  nn  Implementation  of  NIP  (Art. 
1 
28-+.3) 
I Real =Lome 
B. PROJECT PREPAR:\TION  I  i 
I. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Identiftcatwn &  preparation of proJech and  J 
programme.., (Art. 285 l  I 
Appra1~al  of  proJeCh  and  programme~  I, 
(287 1  I 
Preparallon of financing proposals (  288. I )  i 
Adoption  or  reJection  of  financmg 
proposals (28R.4) 
Drafting of financing agreements (  29 I ) 
Real  /  Lome 
I 
Real  Lome 
Real =Lome 
Real =Lome 
Real  Lome 
6.  Signing of financing ilgrccmcnt" (29 I l  Real =Lome 
C. PROJECT IMPLEMEN!ATION 
1.  Prepare invitation-. to tender (  31J.l.c  l  Real  Lome 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Approve mvitation to tender (  317.d and e l  Real =Lome 
Issue invltatlons to tender ( 313.l.b)  Real =Lome 
Open tenders  Real =Lome 
Evaluate tender" and -.elect  contractor  Real =Lome 
Sign contracts and ndcr~  Real =Lome 
Approve delegated appropriauon 
I 
Real  I  Lome 
I 
I 
Real  Lome  Paymenb (  319.-+ l 
Lome  Real 
I 
i 
Monitonng and evaluation (  320 & 321) 
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Limitations within the Commission 
Fragmented structure and weak accountability 
The  managerial  structure  within  which  DGVIII  operated  until  recently  was  highly 
compartmentalised, with 7 directorates and 49 units.  The fragmented structure has resulted in 
responsibility for particular policy areas being divided between different units, and in  policy 
and operational units being unduly separated.  This fragmentation has resulted in a  'culture' 
of weak team-work.  Coordination between directorates and between the technical units in the 
Geographical Directorates has varied considerably, often depending on personal initiative.  In 
some  areas,  such  as  health,  coordination  has  been close  and  effective,  while for  thematic 
policies  (governance, gender, poverty and environment) it  has been more difficult.  Team-
work and professional networks have not been common in the Commission. 
One  important consequence  of the  fragmentation  of responsibilities  (combined with  some 
duplication of functions with ACP governments) has been limited accountability for results. The Commission's performance in managing EC aid  49 
Where responsibilities are  divided,  it  is  hard to  link  results to units or individuals, and it  is 
therefore difficult to reward good performers. 
On-going initiatives 
The weaknesses of the  present structure  have  been  recognised  within  DGVIII.  The recent 
reorganisation  is  intended  to  address  these  weaknesses.  The  reorganisation  of  DGVIII 
merges together the  Development Policy and Sectoral Implementation directorates, and the 
technical  units  in  the  Geographical  Directorates.  The  new  DG  VIII  is  organised  in  12 
geographical units and 9 thematic units, each with a clear mission statement and permanent 
tasks to undertake.  The reorganisation will also be accompanied by the introduction of a task-
oriented  approach,  team  work  and  the  creation of flexible.  thematic  teams  providing  both 
policy and  programming  support to  the  geographical  units.  Using  the  NIP and  the  newly 
introduced annual country reviews, lOY  the geographical units and the delegations will establish 
the  priorities  for  each  country  and  identify  specific  tasks  to  be  carried  out.
110  Each 
geographical  unit.  to  which  resources  in  terms of person-months and administrative credits 
will be allocated. will then assemble a team for each task/ group of tasks and agree with it on 
a  work  programme  and  budget.  Each  team  will  then  have  the  authority  to  make  most 
decisions on matters included in the work programme. 
This reorganisation is accompanied by the creation of the Common Service (Service Commun 
Relex), responsible for implementation after completion of financing agreements.  While the 
merging of implementation units in  the RELEX services is  clearly a positive step, there is  a 
risk that the Common Service will reinforce the fragmentation between policy and operations 
in development cooperation  with  ACP countries.  This is  particularly significant at  a  time 
when  Community  aid  is  increasingly  concerned  with  supporting  policy  reforms  in  ACP 
countries.  The problem will  be reduced if the  RELEX directorates are  merged as  soon as 
possible with the Common Service.  In the  meantime, strong and close team work between 
DGVIII, the Common Service and delegations is particularly important. 
The  introduction  of results-oriented  aid  management  would  require  a  stronger  incentive 
system, in  which clearly-defined staff responsibilities are linked to  measurable performance 
objectives, and  in  which  performance is  linked to  pay and  career development (see end of 
Chapter). 
Inadequate procedures, and over-stretched capacity 
Systems and procedures 
Internal systems and procedures within  DGVIII are  inadequate. 
111  \Vhile  the organisation 
has  become  increasingly  complex.  it  has  continued  to  rely  on  limited  and  unsy,tematic 
information  flows.
112  Staff  responsibilities  are  not  clearly  defined,  and  individual  staff 
operate with insufficient job descriptions and terms of reference.  Mission statements for units 
and  departments have  not  been completed.  There are  a  number of manuals available,  but 
their contents have not  always been  adequately transformed into working procedures.  The 
last full  revision of the Manual of Instructions occurred in  1988.  The lack of an up-to-date 
operations manual may  have  made  it  more difficult for staff to  work within a  single,  clear 
framework.  Some other manuals have been introduced with limited training. 
[09 
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Annual Country Reviews will introduce more flexibility in programming, as they will allow lessons learnt in a 
given year to be incorporated in revised plans. 
E.g.  preparation  of  country  strategies,  processing  of  financing  proposals,  preparation  of  draft 
Communications, negotiation of trade agreements, management of crises. 
However. changes are being introduced as part of the reorganisation of DGVIII. 
See IT AD, 1996, op. cit. 50  Chapter 3 
These factors  combine to  lead  to  wide  vanatiOns  in  the  role  of staff,  unclear definition of 
responsibilities. ad hoc decision making, and unsystematic information flows. 
A significant success was achieved through the introduction of the Project Cycle Management 
Manual. which was accompanied by  an effective training programme and which now guides 
the preparation of financing  proposals.  Its  impact on  aid implementation was noticeable in 
our country studies. 
The  Commission  is  characterised  by  a  'visa'  culture,  with  overly complex and inefficient 
administrative  and financial  controls.  This  has  contributed  to  a  focus  on  processes  and 
inputs,  rather  than  results  and  the  monitoring  of performance.  While  financial  probity  is 
crucial. the  Commission has  not  been  able,  as  yet,  to  simplify administrative and financial 
controls by using ex ante controb selectively while relying systematically on ex post financial 
audits of all  projects.  We found that a move in  the direction of more selectivity in  the use of 
financial controls is  essential for the  better management of EC aid.  However, such a move 
would require the support of the Member States (see discussion above). 
There  is  little  demand for quality support or peer review s.vstems  because of the  focus  on 
procedures.  DGVIII staff need a quality support system that is not based on a series of 'visas' 
but that rather guides them using mentoring and peer reviews.  The recent introduction of the 
Quality Support Group is a step in the right direction.  It should be given both more resources, 
particularly  for  quality  support  at  the  identification  stage,  and  more  access  to  information 
from the field.  More peer reviews should also be encouraged. 
Budget resources and deconcentration 
Budget resources often appear inadequate.  and have  not  been allocated in  an  optimal way. 
There have  been insufficient resources for a  number of activities: quality support, specialist 
skills.  measuring of performance, and particularly the  work of delegations.  There has also 
been  insufficient  flexibility  in  the  budgeting of financial  resources across  departments and 
units.
1 
Ll  To do this, the way budgets are prepared would need to be reformed and would need 
to start from country strategies rather than from the work plans of the various units. 
Delegations.  in  particular,  have  been  affected  by  insufficiently defined responsibilities and 
decision-making authority. and by  limited budget resources.  The decision-making authority 
of delegations  has  been  very  limited.  The  concentration  of authority  at  headquarters has 
meant that in  many cases the staff who have the most direct information on developments in 
the  field  - usually  in  delegations  - have  had  very  little  input  into  the  decision-making 
process.  The capacity of delegations varies significantly from country to country.  In recent 
years. the number of delegation advisers in  ACP countries has been reduced.  In our country 
visits, we  found some delegations to  be relatively understaffed, particularly in key specialist 
areas.  Some delegJtic.J" also suffer from protracted vacmcies, frequent turnover of staff and 
a  mismatch  between  the  skills  of  staff  and  their  project  portfolio.  Understaffing  is 
particularly  noticeable  in  the  areas  of poverty  reduction  and  other priority  objectives.  In 
addition,  the  Commission  frequently  allocates  insufficient  manpower resources  for  project 
preparation  where  other donors  would  normally  require  a  larger project  preparation  team. 
Delegations  receive  limited  technical  back-up  from  headquarters  and  have  weak networks 
connecting them with other delegations. 
Due  to  insufficient  resources,  the  Commission frequently  recruits  consultants  to  work  on 
project preparation, paid using EDF resources.  This weakens  the  Commission's ability to 
learn from experience and often leads to the importance of local conditions being understated. 
113  This is in  part because of external constraints described above. The Commission's performance in managing EC aid  51 
Specialist skills and training 
There  is  a  clear shortage  of in-house  specialist skills.  The  deployment of specialist  staff 
within  DGVIII retlects  the  traditional  emphasis on  project implementation in  infrastructure 
and agriculture.  There are relatively few specialist staff in  institutional development or in the 
areas of poverty, gender or the environment, despite the  increasing emphasis given to  these 
areas in  the EC aid programme.  The shortage of such staff in delegations in part explains the 
difficulties  of following  through  policy  initiatives  at the  field  level.  In  theory  such  skills 
could be either recruited externally or developed internally. 
Skills are sometimes already available within the Commission but not allocated strategically. 
For example, the  staff in  delegations who are  required to  monitor the financial  management 
of  projects  do  not  usually  have  finance  or  accounting  skills,  while  the  delegations' 
Administrative  Attaches,  who do have  such  skills,  monitor only the  delegations'  operating 
budgets.
114  Economists  are  used  to  monitor  payment  orders  instead  of  focusing  on 
monitoring policy implementation or engaging in policy dialogue. 
At  the  same  time,  there  has  been  inadequate  investment  in  professional development and 
training  due  to  budget  limitations.  There  is  no  requirement  for  training  as  part  of career 
development.  There is also very limited training for staff going to delegations. 
Learning from performance 
Monitoring performance 
The introduction of Project Cycle Management has  improved monitoring,  but the  lack of a 
standardised system 
11
-"  to  summarise the  indicators from various logical frameworks using a 
common  format  has  made  comparing  performance  among  projects  practically  impossible. 
There  has  been  little  demand  within  the  Commission  for  monitoring  of  results.  The 
Commission continues to focus on processes and inputs rather than outputs and results, on ex 
ante financial controls but not on the monitoring of performance. 
Performance of staff has not been adequately measured.  Time sheets have not been used in 
DGVIII, but they  will  be  introduced as  part of the  on-going reorganisation.  Monitoring of 
performance would also  be  supported by  a clearer definition of staff responsibilities and by 
the completion of mission statements by departments and units.  It is currently very difficult 
to  trace  changes  in  project  performance  to  individuals  or  teams.  Annual  performance 
reviews, common in other organisations, are not carried out in DGVIII as yet. 
A  standardised monitoring system that starts with projects would allow an assessment of the 
overall performance of DGVIII, and allow it to  be  traced back to  the performance of teams 
and  individuals.  supporting  project  adaptation.  Performance  should  be  assessed 
independently and on a regular basis. 
Learning fronl performance 
The capacity to ensure that knowledge and  best practice are disseminated and incorporated 
systematically  within  the  Commission  is  weak,  although  the  current  restructuring  into  a 
matrix  organisation  may  help  address  some  of the  problems.  The  Commission currently 
learns  from  experience  mainly  at  the  individual  level  (and  sometimes  the  knowledge  is 
obtained  by  external  consultants),  while  team-learning  and  organisation-wide  learning  are 
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In  the  past.  financial  attaches  were  responsible  for  the  monitoring  of  financial  matters  in  projects  and 
programmes. 
Different  monitoring  tools  have  been  used  by  the  Commission  over  time.  The  'traffic  light'  report  was 
introduced in  1988/89 but not used  for long.  The Impact Fiche was introduced in  1994 but was later put on 
hold.  Both systems were deemed by some staff to be too subjective (IT  AD. 1996. op.  cit.,  p.34 ). 52  Chapter 3 
limited.  There has been little demand for learning lessons from evaluations, either internal or 
carried out by other donors.  The fact that most of our findings had already been identified by 
other  scattered  evaluations  but  had  not  been  acted  upon  illustrates  the  difficulties  of 
implementing evaluation lessons. 
To  ensure  that performance  is  objectively analysed and that  the  resulting  lessons are  acted 
upon, there is  a need for a strong, independent unit in charge of both.  The evaluation function 
has carried out very important activities.  However, it  does not have, as yet, a strong enough 
profile. 
The EDF Committee should play a greater role in  the EC aid learning cycle as it is an ideal 
place to  discuss broader policy. system and implementation issues, and to ensure that lessons 
learnt  are  duly  incorporated  both  in  projects  and  in  policies.  The  fact  that the  Committee 
comprise~ representatives  from  :\1embcr  States  should  give  it  both  the  authority  and  the 
independence to exercise such a function. 
3.3  Looking forward 
The reorganisation of DGVIII and 
the  creation  of  the  Common 
Service  (discussed  above)  are 
important  steps in  making EC  aid 
more results-oriented.  The current 
initiatives  on  Country  Reviews 
and greater coordination (see Box) 
are  important  tools  for  the 
reorganised Commission. 
A  results-oriented  organisation 
needs to  have clear objectives and 
needs  to  be  able  to  measure  its 
performance  based  on  those 
objectives.  Once  there  is  an 
understanding  of  the  factors 
explaining  performance,  this 
knowledge  should  be  effectively 
communicated  and  translated  into 
new  approaches  and  procedures. 
For  perfonnance  to  be  improved, 
teams may need to  be strengthened 
Some recent initiatives 
Country Reviews 
In  June  1998,  the  Director  General  of  DGVIII  issued 
guidance for the setting up of Country Reviews, to be carried 
out at least once a year.  These are formal  meetings that will 
bring  together  relevant  staff  (both  EDF  and  budget  lines) 
from  the different units of DGVIII, the delegations, and where 
appropriate  from  other  services  (SCR,  Echo,  etc.)  These 
reviews are to provide a complete and up·to-date overview of 
the  Commission's actions,  and  to  examine the adequacy of 
the  Commission's  strategy,  in  particular  with  a  view  to 
facilitating  complementarity  with  Member  States  and  other 
donors.  The Country Reviews will  be  followed by  in-country 
meetings with ACP  representatives. 
Coordination 
The  June  and  September  1998  meetings  of  the  Director 
Generals  of  Development of  the  EU  outlined principles and 
practical  proposals for coordination  at sectoral,  operational, 
and  international  levels.  These  proposals,  if  implemented, 
will  be  an  important step  to  operationalise  the  objectives of 
coordination  and  complementarity  set  out  in  the  Maastricht 
Treaty. 
with  additional  skills.  or resources  reallocated  to  where  they are  most needed (operational 
flexibility).  The success of change towards a results-oriented organisation depends on how 
external constraints limit room for manoeuvre, on the  'culture' of the organisation, and on its 
incentive system. 
The Commission· s move towards a more results-oriented system is limited by some external 
constraints.  These include: the lack of clear overall policy objectives and a strategic role for 
EC  aid,  and  limited  operational  flexibility  in  financial  and  human  resources.  In  the 
Commission,  operational  budgets  are  rigid  and competitive  recruitment is  infrequent (and 
does  not  focus  on  specialists).  while  compensation  is  based  on  seniority.  Experience 
elsewhere suggests that these constraints must be addressed in a move towards more results-
oriented mana~ement of EC aid. The Commission's performance in managing EC aid  53 
Member States should consider taking  steps  to  adopt an  overall  statement of development 
policy, to  provide EC  aid  with  a  more  strategic  role,  and  to  make  the  policy  formulation 
process  more  realistic.  Member  States  should  also  consider  allowing  the  Commission 
greater operational flexibility,  in  the  use of the Commission's budget and in  the recruitment 
of staff, while at the same time making the Commission more accountable for its actions. 
Changes in  external constraints should facilitate  a  more strategic focus by the Commission. 
However,  these  changes  may also  require  a  change in  organisational  'culture', which will 
require time, strong leadership, and possibly some external recruitment of middle managers. 
More flexible  use  of human and  financial  resources is  also  important.  Financial budgeting 
needs  to  be  consistent  with  real  priorities,  and  choices  need  to  be  constantly  revised  and 
reallocated according to perfonnance and reality on the ground.  Flexibility in the use of staff 
is also necessary, because the system should be demand-driven. Recommendations  55 
4. Recommendations 
If the  European Community is  to help meet the OECD development targets - especially that 
of reducing by half the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by the year 2015- and 
if it  is  to build a new partnership with ACP countries, EC aid programmes must be results-
oriented.  EC aid  should be assessed  by  the  results of aid  interventions in  reducing poverty 
and achieving  other priority objectives and  in  strengthening the  institutions of government 
and civil society in  ACP countries.  If EC aid is  to continue to be supported by EU citizens, it 
will need to  deliver results, and  progress towards the OECD targets must be  monitored and 
made known. 
Our recommendations on ( 1)  ways to  build  a  new  partnership with  the  ACP countries and 
with  EU citizens, (  2)  ways for donors to work together in supporting ACP institutions, and 
(3) ways for Member States and the Commission to improve the effectiveness of EC aid; are 
al]  targeted  towards one  objective:  strengthening  institutions to  provide a  context in  which 
poverty can be eliminated. 
•  We make recommendations on ways to  build a  new partnership with ACP countries 
and EU citizens. 
We make recommendations on ways to  build a new partnership between the EC and 
ACP countries which supports the development of ACP institutions, including those 
in civil society.  Such a partnership should involve reciprocal responsibilities for ACP 
governments and the EC.  Only in this way will one-sided conditionality be replaced 
by  a cooperative approach  in  which the  EC works together with ACP governments 
committed to  reform.  We also emphasise the need to build a partnership between the 
EU  and  its  citizens,  based  on  a  results-oriented  aid  programme,  transparency  and 
accountability,  to  reinvigorate  support  for  development  cooperation. 
(Recommendations 1-6 ). 
•  We make recommendations on  ways in  which donors should coordinate their actions 
to  strengthen institutions in ACP countries. 
This evaluation  has described the  difficulties  in  strengthening ACP institutions and 
the problems that arise where donors compete with one another in efforts to get their 
own projects implemented.  Donor coordination should involve some specialisation, 
with  each  donor acting  where  it  has  strengths  and  in-country  capacity,  to  achieve 
complementarity.  But it  will also require joint action.  Donor coordination will help 
to  identify a strategic role for EC aid.  It  will allow donors to Jearn from each other's 
experiences.  And  it  will  make  it  easier  to  work  together  with  ACP  partners. 
(Recommendations 7 -9). 
Strengthening  ACP institutions  will  be  a  demanding and  long-term task.  There is 
limited understanding of the process of institutional development, and there are few 
success stories in  ACP countries from  which to learn.  But there is  no other way to 
reduce  poverty.  The  reduction  of  poverty  requires  working  together  with  ACP 
governments  and civil  society.  In  particular,  donors  must ensure that  they jointly 
support the strengthening of ACP governments' capacity.  All donors must ensure that 
the  structures  they use  for  implementing aid  strengthen,  rather than  weaken,  ACP 
civil services.  (Recommendations 10-12). 56  Chapter4 
+  We  make  recommendations  on  ways  for  EC  aid  to  become  more  results-oriented, 
through actions by both Member States and the Commission. 
The Member States  need  to  take  actions  to  address  some of the  constraints on the 
Commission· s  activities.  such as  the  multiplicity of objectives and instruments, co-
management  with  weak  ACP  governments,  and  limited  operational  flexibility. 
Member States and the Commission must together also ensure that the EC acts where 
its strengths lie. and that both its objectives and its instruments take into consideration 
the  Commission'~ constraints in  the field.  (Recommendations 13-18). 
To enable  the  EC to  fulfil  its  responsibilities  within  the  new partnership with ACP 
countrie~  and  the  EU  citizen.  these  actions  by  Member  States  (moving  towards 
strategic  monitoring  of  results)  need  to  be  complemented  by  changes  in  the 
Commission.  The Commission should become a  more results-oriented organisation. 
It should be  an organisation which assesses its performance less in terms of processes 
and inputs. and more in  terms of the results it achieves, and which learns from its own 
successes and failures. and acts on the lessons it learns. (Recommendations 19-29). 
New partnership 
With ACP countries 
1.  Reciprocal  responsibilities.  ACP governments and EC aid  should both  be  subject to 
transparent  and  simple  performance criteria,  which  should be produced and monitored 
jointly.  We endorse the Commission· s Negotiation Guidelines 
116 on the need for a strong 
political dimension to  the  partnership and  the  linking of funding to  'merits'.  However, 
EC aid,  for  it~ part,  should also be  subject to  performance criteria, on coordination (see 
below). the efficiency of the Commission's aid management, and transparency. 
2.  Joint  institutions.  We  recommend  restructuring  and  simplifying  the  joint  Lome 
institutions,  which  is  necessary  if they are  to  become central actors  in  the  political and 
management  aspects  of aid.  as  envisaged  in  Article  30 of Lome  IV  bis.  This  could 
include,  for  example.  more -systematic  participation  in  the  discussion  of EC  Council 
Resolutions  and  Commission  initiatives  relating  to  cooperation  with  ACP  countries. 
They could also play a role in the monitoring of reciprocal responsibilities. 
3.  joint aid  management.  We  endorse  a  differentiated  approach,  as  suggested  in  the 
Guidelines.  Where  possible,  the  management of aid  resources  by  ACP governments 
should be  monitored ex post, with sanctions imposed where there is  lack of probity (see 
·merit'  criteria  above).  Where  few  responsibilities  lie  with  ACP  governments,  aid 
management  i~  not  conducive  to  institutional  strengthening  and  over-stretches  the 
capacity of Delegations.  ln such cases, if the government shows commitment, the priority 
should  be  to  strengthen  the  government's  aid  management  capacity  rapidly.  Where 
government commitment is  low, partnerships with civil society should be the priority. 
4.  Opening up the partnership to civil society.  We endorse the  suggestion made in the 
Green  Paper on  opening up  the partnership to  civil society in ACP countries (including 
the private sector and local government), to engage its representatives in dialogue and aid 
implementation.  This will  require marked changes in  the way aid instruments operate. 
We  also  suggest  examining  ways  to  establish  independent  mechanisms through which 
stakeholders can provide direct feedback on EC aid programmes. 
116  Guidelines for the Negotiation of  New Cooperation Agreements with ACP Countries, EC,  1997. Recommendations  57 
With EU citizens 
5.  Transparency.  More  information  on  the  programmes  and  performance  of EC  aid 
(including key evaluation reports, and progress towards meeting the OECD development 
targets for 2015) should be disseminated widely, particularly through electronic media, in 
order to strengthen the partnership with EU citizens. 
6.  Co-financing.  In order to enhance collaboration with EU non-government institutions in 
development  cooperation,  we  recommend  more  emphasis  on  the  co-financing  of non-
government (and  local  government)  institutions,  though  with  greater attention  to  cost-
effectiveness. 
Jointly strengthening ACP institutions 
Ensuring coordinated donor action 
7.  EU coordination.  Member States and the Commission should appoint lead coordinators 
in  sectors  of  intervention  in  each  recipient  country  to  lead  dialogue  with  ACP 
governments and to facilitate a common approach.  This arrangement should also support 
coordination with non-EU donors. 
8.  Increased contacts at all levels.  Contacts between Member States and the Commission 
should be intensified at all levels: director generals, desk officers and experts, particularly 
in  the  field.  These contacts should facilitate  the internalisation of EC policy objectives 
and  greater  agreement  on  country  strategies  and  sectoral  policies.  In-country 
coordination should be a two-way process between the Commission and Member States, 
and should be improved by setting up data banks on European aid interventions.
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9.  Joint activities.  The Commission should exercise leadership in expanding the number of 
joint activities,  particularly annual  reviews, appraisals and evaluations,  but also the co-
financing of operations.  The Commission should also pilot joint programming exercises 
with Member States, which should be integrated with ACP governments' normal budget 
processes. 
Strengthening institutions 
10. Joint donor support to institutions.  We recommend that the support to  the capacity of 
ACP  governments,  a  pre-condition  for  successful  interventions,  should  be  given  by 
donors  jointly.  Institutional  support  should  initially  focus  on  public  expenditure 
management, essential  education  and  health services, and the  management of technical 
assistance. 
11.  Civil service reform.  Support to parallel government structures and salary supplements 
for  ci vi I  servants 
11 x should  be  discontinued  by  all  donors,  including  the  Commission. 
Donors should instead jointly support civil service reform programmes. 
12.  Technical assistance.  Technical assistance programmes should, whenever possible, be 
jointly  monitored  by  donors.  These  programmes  should be  small and  simple,  should 
focus  on  training  ACP  counterparts,  and  should  be  ·owned'  and  managed  by  ACP 
governments.  Whenever possible,  T A  programmes should also be jointly financed  by 
donors. 
117 
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See also related suggestions on page X (in  'Main Topics') of the Green Paper, op. cit. 
Principles for Effective' Aid, Development Assistance Manual, OECDIDAC, 1992, pp. 5! -64 58  Chapter 4 
Making EC aid programmes more results-oriented 
A more strategic role for EC aid 
13.  Overall statement of development policy.  The Council of Ministers should develop an 
integrated and strategic statement of policy to guide work throughout the Commission, to 
help  identify  a  strategic  role  for  EC  aid.  and  to  facilitate  coordination  with  Member 
States.  This requires a  move towards Council agendas that are planned on  the basis of 
common priorities (e.g. through multi-year work plans).  Council outputs should then be 
widely disseminated by all the Member States and in  the field. 
14.  A more realistic policy agenda.  We recommend a review of ways to integrate the policy 
formulation process. enhancing coordination between the EDF Committee, the Council of 
Ministers. the ACP-Fin Group and other Council Working Groups, and relevant European 
Parliament committees.  This is to help produce policies that are more coherent and better 
informed of operational constraints, and to  facilitate monitoring of the implementation of 
policies.  We suggest that the EDF Committee move its  focus from individual projects, 
which  reduces  the  Commission's  flexibility,  to  more  strategic  tasks:  policy  direction, 
monitoring  implementation.  learning  from  evaluations,  and  coordination  with  Member 
States.  This may require changes in the seniority of representation on the Committee. 
15.  Pragmatic specialisation, for complementarity.  Based on coordination with  Member 
States  and  realistic  policy  formulation,  we  recommend  a  gradual  and  pragmatic 
specialisation of EC aid,  which does not imply a scaling down but a refocusing based on 
relative strengths.
119  Possible areas for specialisation include the transport sector, because 
of the  Commission· s  expertise.  structural  adjustment,  because of its  high  coordination 
requirements, and areas which require in-depth  political dialogue (e.g. democratisation). 
Regional  cooperation.  though  central  to  the  EC.  requires  caution,  considering  the 
difficulties in achieving results in this area in the past. 
16.  Fewer  and  simpler  instruments.  We  endorse  the  Guidelines'  recommendation  to 
simplify and reduce the number of Lome aid instruments.  This should be complemented 
by a simplification and reduction in the number of special EC budget lines. 
17.  Structural  adjustment  programmes.  We  endorse  the  important  initiatives  of  the 
Commission to reform the conditionality approach at international level.  Given that these 
programmes rely upon intensive coordination, and given the scale of EC operations, there 
is a prima facie case for the Commission to remain in this area.  However, we recommend 
that  the  Commission· s  macroeconomic  capacity  be  strengthened, 
120  to  enhance  the 
monitoring  of the  reform  programme,  and  to  enhance  sector  policy  dialogue,  SASP 
implementation and  donor support for  public expenditure management.  This should be 
accompanied hy a reform of the detailed earmarking and conditionalities of the SASP. 
18.  Sector approach and programmes. While we endorse the efforts of the Commission in 
international  forums  to  improve  the  implementation  of sector-wide  programmes,  the 
Commission· s  shift  from  a  project  to  a  sector approach  nevertheless  requires  caution. 
Weak civil services, and the difficulties of donor coordination, constrain both project and 
sector  approaches.  We  recommend  that  projects  continue  to  be  used,  whenever the 
Commission has the necessary knowledge, to pilot innovative approaches to institutional 
strengthening and the participation of beneficiaries. 
12.0 
In  our view. although the priorities in the Guidelines point in the right direction, further specialisation may be 
needed in order to ensure complementarity.  By  specialisation, we do not mean an a priori rigid specialisation 
but  a  pragmatic concentration.  based  on  the  relative  strengths of the  organisation,  which may evolve over 
time. 
This does not imply duplication of the specialised work of the BWI. Recommendations  59 
Making the Commission more results-oriented 
To  make  the  Commission  itself  more  results-oriented,  both  the  Member  States  and  the 
Commission must take actions.  The Member States should help to identify a strategic role for 
EC  aid  and  provide  greater  operational  flexibility.  The  Commission  should  reform 
organisational  structures and incentives, equip its  staff better, and improve its  learning from 
performance. 
Actions for the iWember States: 
19. Providing operational flexibility.  In  order that the  strategic choices (above) contribute 
to  a  more  results-oriented  management  in  the  new  DGVIII and  Common Service,  we 
recommend that the following measures be considered by the Member States: 
a)  Facilitate flexibility  in  the use of ex ante administrative and financial controls in EC 
aid management, with systematic ex post financial audits.  This may require revisions 
to the Financial Regulation adopted by the Council on 29th July 1991. 
b)  Allow greater flexibility in  the use of the Commission's budget, for consistency with 
a matrix organisation (DGVIII's new structure). 
c)  Provide  greater  flexibility  for  the  recruitment  of  junior  staff  with  specialised 
backgrounds  (special  competitions),  and  allow  for  some  external  competitive 
recruitment. at senior (department) and middle manager (unit) levels.  The manpower 
requirements  of  EC  aid  demand  these  and  other  approaches  to  staffing  to  be 
considered. 
Actions for the Commission: 
Managerial structures and incentives 
20. Preventing further organisational fragmentation in the Commission.  We agree with 
the  DAC  Review  that,  on  balance,  the  creation  of the  Common Service  is  a  positive 
transitional step.  However, in  order to prevent further fragmentation in the management 
of aid to ACP countries, it  is  essential that, as planned, the Common Service is integrated 
with the RELEX DGs as  soon  as  possible.  In  the  meantime, we recommend that team 
work  between  DGVIIL  the  new  Common  Service  and  delegations  should  be  closely 
monitored. 
21. Responsibilities and incentives.  We recommend that mission statements be completed 
by all departmenb anJ units, with measurable performance objectives, and clearly defined 
staff responsibilities.  Performance objectives should be  related to J:lOlicy  priorities rather 
than the commitment of resources.  Career paths and salaries should be more related to 
performance.
121  We suggest considering the introduction of annual performance reviews 
and a system for recording time usage. 
Equipping staff 
22.  Clear operational  procedures.  We  recommend  that  the  Commission  simplify  and 
integrate its procedures, and update its manual of instructions accordingly, to ensure that 
all  staff operate  within  a  single,  clear framework.  In particular,  we  recommend  that 
responsibilities between headquarters and the field be well defined. 
121  We endorse the current moves to reform staff regulations to address this issue. 60  Chapter4 
23.  Simplifying administrative and financial controls.  We  recommend a  more  selective 
use  of ex ante administrative  and  financial  controls.  according  to  the  country  and  the 
amount involved, with ex post financial audits of all projects and programmes.
122 
24.  Budget  resources.  We  recommend  flexibility  in  the  budgeting  of resources  across 
departments and units to  ensure that country strategies are effectively implemented.  We 
suggest  that  more  resources  be  given  for  quality  controL  specialised  skills, delegations 
and the measuring of performance. 
25.  Better quality support.  We  recommend a  move from  a  'visa'  system towards a  peer 
review system (formal and informal).  We endorse the work of the Quality Support Group 
and  recommend that  it  be given  more  resources for  its  work at  the  identification stage. 
We also suggest that project preparation be given more resources.  The quality of project 
preparation  should  also  be  enhanced  through  early  consultation  with  other donors  and 
with  beneficiaries and  through  systematic  use  of evaluations.  The quality of appraisal 
should be enhanced through the use of cost-benefit and institutional assessment. 
26.  Specialised skills.  We  recommend  that  the  Commission should identify where  it  has 
gaps in  specialised skills (e.g. the integration of priority objectives into programmes), and 
acquire those skills through flexible recruitment (see above) or quality specialist training. 
Quality  training  should  be  given  higher  priority,  should  be  an  element  in  career 
assessment, and should be complemented with more exchange programmes. 
27.  Resources for delegations.  Subject to  adequate capacity and controls.  we suggest that 
more  responsibilities  and  decision-making  authority  be  transferred  to  delegations 
(deconcentration).  We recommend that delegations be reinforced through the use of more 
local  staff at  professional  level  on  fixed  term contracts.  We also  recommend that the 
Commission  be  given  resources  to  use  Technical  Assistance  specifically to  support its 
own capacity to monitor and implement programmes, so that it no longer depends on T A 
nominally  provided  to  ACP  governments.  However,  core  functions  should  be  the 
responsibility of Commission staff, to ensure 'donor ownership' of aid programmes. 
The performance learning cycle 
28.  Monitoring performance.  We recommend that the  Commission significantly improve 
its  system for monitoring project and programme performance, both at headquarters and 
in  delegations.  This  will  require  strong  management  support.  It  will  also  require 
identifying a clear set of performance indicators at the outset which should be  monitored 
independently and regularly, and incorporated into the Commission's monitoring system. 
This standardised information should be made widely available. 
29.  Independent evaluation.  Vvr e recommend a review of ways to achieve greater separation 
of the Commission's evaluation function from the new implementation Common Service. 
One possibility is  for it  to  report to  the  Comite de Direction 
123  with the collaboration of 
the  Member  States  (possibly  through  a  restructured  EDF  Committee).  In  addition, 
evaluations  should  be  carried  out.  whenever  possible,  in  collaboration  with  Member 
States and ACP countries. 
122 
I.D 
This needs to be  consistent with Commission-wide procedures and the fmancial  regulation of the EDF (see 
above). 
Suggested in the 1998 DAC Review of EC Aid. Annex  61 
Annex 
For more background on European Community aid, see Understanding European Community 
Aid, which  was  the  inventory  for the  global evaluation of EC aid.
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--l  This annex  is  drawn 
from this report and from the Desk Study of the ACP evaluation. 
EC aid in context 
·European Community aid' here refers to the portion of European Union aid that is  managed 
by the European Commission and the  European Investment Bank rather than Member State 
bilateral aid.  Of the total official aid disbursed by EU donors in  1990-95, 18  % was EC aid. 
When comparing EC  aid  with  aid  from  other donors.  it  is  important to  bear in  mind that a 
very large proportion (  91  9c) of EC aid is in the form of grants, rather than loans. 
In  1990-95. of all  official aid from OECD donors, 9  %  was EC aid.  Adding this to  the aid 
managed  by  the  Member States  of the  EU,  in  1990-95.  51  9f:,  of all  aid  came  from  the 
European  Union.  In  1995,  5510  million  ecu  of  EC  aid  was  disbursed.  Of  these 
disbursements.  using  EC' s  own regional  categories,  42o/c  went  to  ACP countries,  17%  to 
Central  and  Eastern European  Countries  (CEECs),  12%  to  New Independent States of the 
Forn1er  Soviet  Union  ( NIS ),  12%  to  Asia  and  Latin  America  (ALA),  and  1  Oo/o  to 
Mediterranean and Middle East (MED). 
The main sources of EC aid during the 1986-1995 period were the EC Budget (56% ) and the 
European Development Fund (37%) of EC aid commitments.  Over time the proportion of 
EC aid constituted hy the EDF (exclusively ACP countries) has decreased. 
The organisation of the Contmission 
EC  aid  to  ACP  countries  is  managed  by  the  European  Commission  and  the  European 
Investment  Bank.  The section of the  Commission responsible for aid to  ACP countries is 
DGVIII- the Directorate General for Development.  Until 1985, DGVIII was responsible for 
all aid managed by  the  Commission.  In the following years, there were several changes in 
management structures.  From  1995, the EC' s external relations  with developing countries 
were managed by five  different parts of the European Commission, for which five different 
Commissioners  were  responsible.  Responsibilities  have  primarily  been  divided  on  a 
geographical  basis.  although  they have  to  an  extent  been divided on a  functional  basis.  In 
1998,  a  further  managerial  reorganisation  took  place,  with  the  creation  of the  Common 
Service,  responsible  for  the  implementation  of EC  aid  (after  the  completion  of financing 
agreements) to all  countrie~. 
124  Understanding  European  Community  Aid:  Aid  Policies,  Management  and  Distribution  Explained, 
ODI/European Commission. 1997. 62  Annex 
Relex DGs and  Areas of responsibility 
services  I 
DG VIII 
I  ACP countries  .  .  ~on-emergency food aid (lor all countries) 
I  i  •  NGO co-financing (lor all counrries) 
I  DGIA  I· 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  the  Republics  of  the  Former 
I 
Soviet Union. Mongolia. Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and other non-
EC European countries 
I  Phare and Tacis programmes  l  • 
I  DGIB  I  •  Southern Mediterranean, Middle East, Latin America and most 
I  Asian developing countries 
DG  I  !  •  China, Korea. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
I  : .  International negotiations (j'or all countries) 
L_  ECHO  I •  Humanitarian aid (jor all countries) 
EC aid to ACP countries 
This  report  evaluates  aid  to  ACP  (African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific)  countries.  The  ACP 
countries are defined as those which are signatories to the Lome Convention.  Today there are 
71  ACP countries. 
Over the period 1986-95, the ACP countries received 51 o/o  of  EC aid disbursed.  However, 
the  proportion of aid  they have received has  been declining in  recent years (ACP countries 
received 63  o/c  of disbursements  in  1986,  but only 42%  in  1995).  This change principally 
reflects the increase since 1990 in the volume of EC aid going to Central and Eastern Europe 
and to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union. 
The European Development Fund (EDF) was created in  1957 by the  Member States of the 
newly formed European Economic Cornmunity, to provide aid to dependent territories.  Many 
of these  territories  gained  independence  in  the  following  years,  and  in  1963  the  Yaounde 
Convention was signed by the  Member States of the  EEC and  18  sub-Saharan francophone 
countries. The first  Yaounde Convention was in force for 5 years, and was then succeeded by 
a second, which was in  force until 1975. 
Lome 
A new Convention was signed in  1975 -Lome 1- following the UK's accession to the EEC. 
Many Commonwealth countries became ACP states, and signatories now included not only 
countries in  sub-Saharan Africa, but also islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean.  The 
first Lome Convention ( 1975-80) was succeeded by Lome II  ( 1980-85), Lome III ( 1985-90), 
and Lome IV ( 1990-99, revised in  a mid-term review in  1995, the revised Convention being 
termed Lome IV bis ).  A new Convention is currently being negotiated. 
The Conventions have set out the objectives of the EDF, the instruments through which it is 
channelled,  and  the  institutional  framework  which governs  its  implementation.  With each 
revision  of  the  Convention,  the  EDF  has  been  renewed  - most  recently  Lome  IV  bis 
established the  8th EDF (see Table below).  The EDF is not part of the regular budget of the 
EC, although, like the budget, the EDF is managed by the Commission. 
ACP countries are also financed through the EC budget, and there has been an increase in the 
proportion of ACP aid funded through the budget.  During the period 1986-1995, 79 % of EC Annex  63 
aid  to  ACP countries was channelled through  the  EDF,  14  o/r  through the  budget, and 7  % 
through the EIB .
12s 
EIB.  In  addition  to  its  operations  within  the  EU,  the  European Investment Bank provides 
loans to developing countries.  A  small proportion of these  loans carry a  subsidy of at least 
25%, and therefore count officially as aid.  Most of these loans are financed from the EIB' s 
own resources.  In  addition, the EIB  manages some risk capital finance  for ACP countries, 
with funds drawn from the EDF. 
EC cooperation with ACP countries 
Agreement  Period  ~o. of  Population  EDF  ! 
countries  (Mio)  allocations 
I 
(Mecu) 
Yaounde I  1964  18  69  666 
(EDF 2) 
Yaounde II  1971  19  80  843 
(EDF 3) 
Lome I  1976  ~6  250  3124 
(EDF4J 
Lome II  1981  57  348  4754 
(EDF 5J 
Lome III  1986  66  413  7754 
(EDF6) 
Lome IV  1991  68  460  10800 
(EDF 7) 
Lome IV  bis  1996  70  571  12967 
(EDF8) 
Source: Desk Study, ADE. p.  5 and p.  27 
EDF disbursements- 1990 prices 
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125  The figure for the EIB only includes concessionalloans. 
EIB 
(Mecu) 
64 
90 
390 
685 
1100 
1200 
1658 
EC aid 
NIPs 
Stabex 
NGO prqgy-ammes 
Sysmin 
Rural development 
Human rights 
Environment 
SIPs and GIPs 
Democracy 
SAFs 
Selectivity 
FMOs for CFs 
Private sector 
CBI/UEMOA 
Two tranches 
.EDF7 
OEDF6 
OEDF5 
.EDF4 
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A  substantial  proportion  of EDF  funds  has  been  channelled  through  National  Indicative 
Programmes (NIP) and Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP) ('Programmable aid').  NIPs 
(or RIPs) are documents in  which the governments of ACP countries (or regions 
126
)  set out 
their priorities for the  use  of project aid  for 5  year periods.  The EC provides the funds  to 
finance these programmes.  In  addition, EDF funds also finance aid instruments like structural 
adjustment. Stabex and Sysmin. 
With budget lines, the Commission maintains control over the selection and implementation 
of the activities.  They mainly finance humanitarian and food aid.  They also finance projects 
in areas such as:  the environment and forestry, and democratisation and human rights. 
Programme aid 
Structural adjustment 
Stabex 
Sysmin 
Food aid 
Humanitarian aid 
Humanitarian 
rehabilitation 
Nat Res Prod sectors 
Agriculture 
Forestry 
Fishenes 
Other productive sectors 
Industry. mining 
Trade 
Tourism 
Eco Infrastructures 
Tramport & 
communications 
Energy 
Banking. Fmance 
Social  Infrastructures  & 
services 
Education 
Health & population 
Water supply 
Others 
Governance and civil 
societ)· 
Aid to ~GOs 
Multi sector/crosscutting 
Environment 
Rural  Development 
Others 
Unallocable 
Total 
Sectoral allocation of EC aid to A CP countries 
(commitments, Mecu) 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
159  523  972  481  338  715  892 
37  '1'"1'1  351  188  104  183  403 
122  301  554  278  219  515  397 
0  ()  66  16  15  18  92 
6  0  14  248  224  410  279 
18  36  61  83  72  79  117 
18  .~3  55  76  57  62  104 
0  3  5  7  14  17  13 
29  328  374  107  85  61  112 
27  302  352  86  54  43  70 
0  23  0  8  27  6  31 
2  4  21  12  3  12  11 
149  242  299  233  76  250  252 
L~9  231  272  208  43  239  196 
7  10  13  16  12  ]()  4~ 
J  I  14  9  21  I  12 
126  578  313  354  229  411  388 
49  442  197  278  128  299  288 
77  135  114  75  98  104  99 
l  1  2  1  2  9  0 
38  142  174  111  106  57  268 
7  48  48  38  41  4  67 
0  27  43  14  9  12  108 
30  ~0  78  ~9  51  37  77 
0  26  4  10  6  5  16 
()  3  7  8  28  19  41 
13  22  23  27  29  34  29 
15  557  56  ...  279  114  86  295 
·"' 
4  6  20  s  13  20 
-+  524  516  239  77  52  145 
8  24  ~~  20  29  21  128 
587  201  69  63  63  1  94 
1141  2632  2869  1993  1362  2123  2765 
Source: ODI.  1997. op  cu  .. p  ~9 
1993  1994  1995 
487  988  492 
419  316  '277 
4  615  131 
64  57  84 
331  365  337 
144  348  417 
127  316  187 
17  33  229 
265  191  102 
220  146  87 
18  18  14 
'27  27  2 
295  166  258 
216  139  210 
52  21  25 
27  5  21 
462  653  533 
259  358  287 
187  262  206 
16  33  40 
393  235  226 
96  86  24 
143  40  78 
108  62  88 
46  48  36 
22  10  31 
36  36  41 
265  322  63 
66  14  19 
47  18  7 
152  289  37 
74  199  99 
2774  3514  2599 
126  ACP 'regions' consist of groups of neighbouring ACP countries.  The regions are: Sahehan and Coastal West 
Africa, the Horn of Africa and East Africa, Southern Africa. the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. ' 